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 Abstract: The goal of this dissertation is to offer a systematic phenomenology of 
the conversion experience based primarily on the transcendental method of Husserl. 
Conversion is an empirical phenomenon that, when phenomenologically analyzed, is 
revealed to have several eidetic or essential features that shape any conversion in general. 
After reviewing the secondary literature on conversion, I construct a synthetic account of 
the empirical experience. I then sketch the transcendental phenomenological method and 
proceed to evaluate conversion as a firsthand experience in the “natural attitude” which is 
necessary in order to ensure that I can exclude or bracket all of the assumptions that I 
make regarding conversion in this attitude once I enter the phenomenological attitude. 
Before attempting a reduction of conversion, in the phenomenological attitude I explore 
the nature of self and consciousness, and I examine the nature of conversion as an 
 v 
embodied phenomenon. I also revisit the famous conversion story of Saint Paul, which I 
treat as a phenomenological case study. Finally, I present an eidetic account of the 
conversion experience, where my most important claim is that on the phenomenological 
level all conversions require judgment, the world, the Other, and time-consciousness. 
Ultimately, I conclude that conversion is a fundamental human experience for which we 
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Conversion defines our lives. It is the process through which we ourselves change over the 
course of time. It is almost as hard to imagine a life without personal change as it is to imagine a 
life that exists outside of time. To the extent that we live in time our existence essentially entails 
the phenomenon.  
 Thus, it comes as no surprise that much of our art and culture focuses on conversion as a 
central theme. First, conversion is often construed as an essential experience in the major 
Western religions. While ordinarily it is supposed that every religious believer is not necessarily 
a convert in a formal sense, a broader definition of conversion would include all of them, since 
every religious person was once, at some point in time, not religious (e.g., childhood). This 
universality is reflected in the preponderance of scriptural examples of the phenomenon. 
Consider, from the Abrahamic religions alone, the stories of King David, Ruth, Zacchaeus, 
Saul/Paul, and Cornelius. All of Christ’s Twelve Apostles are converts, with some, like St. Peter, 
being converts twice over.1 Outside of scripture there are the beatified cases of Saint Augustine, 
Edith Stein/Saint Teresa Benedicta of the Cross, and Saint Josephine Bakhita, as well as 
instrumental proponents of the experience, like John Cotton and Jonathan Edwards. 
 Second, outside of the purview of religious experience, conversion occupies a status as a 
common theme in art and literature. For example, conversion is a particularly popular them in 
the Baroque and Renaissance periods of art history. The conversion phenomenon is the focus of 
paintings by Michelangelo, Caravaggio, Bruegel the Elder, Rubens, Murillo, Reni, and Par 
Myriad.  
 
1 I refer to the Peter who emerges after the threefold denial of Christ. Luke 22:54-61 NABRE 
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Numerous works of literature incorporate the thematics of conversion, which makes for a 
compelling and humanized characterization, since to live is to experience personal change. 
Examples include Beowulf, Goethe’s Faust (1808/1831), Shakespeare’s The Tempest (1611), 
Proust’s À la recherche du temps perdu (1871-1922), and more; in fact, it can be argued that any 
work of fiction which incorporates a dynamic character involves in some sense a conversion.2 By 
such a definition we could include Guy Montag from Fahrenheit 451 (1953), the boys in Lord of 
the Flies (1954), Raskolnikov in Crime and Punishment (1866), and even Gregor Samsa in The 
Metamorphosis of Kafka (1915). More recently there are cultural giants who have converted, 
like Sojourner Truth, Salvador Dalí, C.S. Lewis, Oscar Wilde, and T.S. Eliot. Some demented 
individuals have also gone through conversion experiences, including Mark David Chapman, 
who murdered John Lennon. It should come as no surprise that conversion has been such a 
prominent theme in the history of human culture; it is universal.  
 But I suggest that conversion, precisely because it is so universal, can take on many 
different variations. In this respect it is rather like consciousness itself. It would be an 
understatement to characterize consciousness in general, in all of its variegated manifestations 
across the breadth of human experience, as vast and diverse. The truth is that even these strong 
words are not enough to accurately capture just how free-flowing heterogenous the phenomenon 
of consciousness truly is. Consider the fact that even in our ordinary and natural modes of 
 
2 The conversion that occurs in Goethe’s version of Faust resembles more closely a traditional 
conversion in the sense that the conversion is associated with moral improvement. Many early 
scholars of conversion presupposed that conversion always incorporates such improvement. In 
this text I will argue that this is misguided. For example, consider how we can compare the 
repentant Faust in Goethe to the version presented by Christopher Marlowe. In Marlowe’s 
Doctor Faustus, the namesake character essentially “converts” to wickedness. See Susan 
Snyder’s “Marlowe’s Doctor Faustus as an Inverted Saint’s Life,” 566. Snyder suggests that 
Faustus “is ‘converted’ to the devil.” 
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consciousness, whereby we complete activities as manifold as answering emails, running 
errands, solving puzzles, reading books, exercising, and preparing meals, we are actually living 
out sundry experiences.  This is a bit ironic since we often approach our consciousness as if it is 
a homogenous “thing.” For example, we typically assume that consciousness is stable and 
consistent on the level of personal identity, missing the fact that it is constituted out of 
remarkably variegated constituent parts which are, so long as we have consciousness, maintained 
in a state of perpetual flux.3 Consciousness, in short, is at once both monolithic and ever-
changing. Conversion is analogous to consciousness in general since it marks the shift or change 
from one state of existence to another. 
Experiences are easy to enumerate, but they sometimes prove to be difficult to describe as 
they are experienced by consciousness. Descriptions are mediated by language, after all, and 
even the most rigorous description of human experience will be limited by the radical ontological 
difference between explicans and explicandum, since language is attempting to describe 
something that is practically ineffable. Ordinary language must reach too far as it endeavors to 
grasp an object that is radically different in kind from itself.  
 The phenomenological approach can partly overcome the difficulties of ordinary 
language. Without a doubt there persists an enigmatic remainder that eludes the analysis of even 
the most practiced phenomenologist (and phenomenologists contend differently regarding the 
nature of this remainder), but when considered overall, not so much as a clearly defined 
discipline (which it is not), but instead, as an approximate set of methods and concepts, 
 
3 Heraclitus and Friedrich Nietzsche are two of the most famous advocates of this sort of 
description of the state of reality. See Heraclitus DK22B12. Nietzsche refers often to Heraclitus. 
See, for example, Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks §§5-7, The Birth of Tragedy §24, 
and “On the Utility and Liability of History for Life,” §1. 
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phenomenological philosophy is more capable than any other approach at describing lived 
experience as it appears before consciousness. Thus phenomenology is uniquely equipped to 
objectively grasp the nature of conscious reality, despite the fact that consciousness and language 
are radically different in kind; phenomenology is the best compromise that we are afforded.  
 To this day one of the most mysterious aspects of conscious reality—and therefore one of 
the most deserving of scholarly attention— is the domain of religious, spiritual, and/or mystic 
experience. William James (1842-1910) is among the first to have recognized that religious 
phenomena, as objects of consciousness, were worthy of serious and careful analysis.4 Indeed his 
Varieties of Religious Experience reads much like a phenomenological study, specifically 
because James focuses on “subjective phenomena” and passes over questions of theological and 
metaphysical significance. Thus, he was able to study religious and spiritual experiences without 
worrying about the question of religious or absolute truth. In so doing he can carry out a bold and 
adventurous foray into “alternative” modes of consciousness that transcend that which is 
“ordinary and natural” in an empirically scientific sense. In a section of Varieties where he is 
exploring mystic experience, James writes that: 
Our normal waking consciousness, rational consciousness as we call it, is but one special type of 
consciousness, whilst all about it, parted from it by the filmiest of screens, there lie potential forms 
of consciousness entirely different. We may go through life without suspecting their existence; but 
apply the requisite stimulus, and at a touch they are there in all their completeness, definite types 
of mentality which probably somewhere have their field of application and adaptation. No account 
of the universe in its totality can be final which leaves these other forms of consciousness quite 
disregarded. How to regard them is the question—for they are so discontinuous with ordinary 
 
4 It might be true that philosophers as early as Aristotle studied topics of eventual interest to 
philosophers of religion, but metaphysics is not equivalent with the study of the consciousness of 
religious phenomena. 
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consciousness. Yet they may determine attitudes though they cannot furnish formulas, and open a 
region though they fail to give a map. At any rate, they forbid a premature closing of our accounts 
with reality.5 
What James here states cannot be stressed enough—any scientific explanation of nature would 
be incomplete if it did not strive to explain, or at least acknowledge, the existence of modes of 
consciousness that differ from the “normal waking” version. It is William Blake (1757-1827) 
who famously indicates that “[i]f the doors of perception were cleansed every thing would 
appear to man as it is, infinite.”6 This quote has inspired countless musicians and recreational 
drug users, but it should inspire scientists and philosophers as well, especially when the full 
quote is presented: “[f]or man has closed himself up, till he sees all things thru' narrow chinks of 
his cavern." Indeed this is the issue with any partial or arbitrary limitation that is imposed upon 
the supposedly “proper” objects of intellectual study. The best science is the most complete 
science, one which employs careful methods to the study of all aspects of nature. 
 And yet, not everyone is convinced that the examination of religious or spiritual 
experiences should take up the time of serious scientists, philosophers, and surprisingly even 
theologians. Karl Barth (1886-1968), for example, rejects the very idea of religious empiricism.7 
Going further back in the western tradition, David Hume (1711-1776) concludes that religious 
experience cannot serve as evidence of the divine.8 John Locke (1632-1704) does not come 
down quite so hard on religious experience, and seems willing to grant that sense experience can 
qualify as evidence for a belief.9 It should be clear that Hume and Locke are not quite on the 
 
5 James, The Varieties of Religious Experience, 296. 
6 Blake, The Marriage of Heaven and Hell, 36.  




same page, though. While Locke will grant that the experience can count as evidence for the 
belief in God, Hume is saying that the experience cannot count as evidence for the existence of 
God (ignoring the question of belief). 
 These days, with the insights of modern psychology, modern medicine, and 
phenomenology, it practically goes without saying that the experiences are worthy of scientific 
study regardless of their supposed objective reference.10 This is particularly obvious in clinical 
cases, where, for example, a medical subject might be experiencing frightening night terrors in 
which he is certain that shadowy figures congregate around his bed, despite the fact that no one 
else can see them—a psychologist can benefit from the study of this experience, just as a 
physician or neuroscientist can benefit from studying the events that occur in the brain as the 
patient has these frightful hallucinations. Clearly the scientist or philosopher who studies the 
hallucinating subject need not concern himself over the question of the objective reference of a 
perception. To do otherwise would be to muddle one’s own investigation with peripheral 
considerations. 
 As Jonna Bornemark and Hans Ruin note, phenomenological philosophy has proven to be 
especially useful for problems and questions that are “religious” in nature.11 This is because 
phenomenology, at least as it is commonly understood, takes as its subject matter the immediate 
experience of consciousness. It is particularly useful for studying the experience of religious 
phenomena because of the way in which it concerns itself only with those very phenomena. 
 For the phenomenological student of religion, metaphysical questions concerning the 
empirical existence of God are to be “bracketed” to the side while the analytic focus is placed 
 
10 By ‘modern psychology’ I mean post-Wundt scientific psychology, in contrast to the older 
versions of psychological philosophy explored by Aristotle, Hume, etc. 
11 Bornemark and Ruin, Phenomenology and Religion, 7. 
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upon the mystic’s experience of God. Similarly, investigations of the so-called “real” world that 
exists independent of mind, the world that is purely and only objective, cannot be taken up by a 
phenomenologist. This “real” world separate from consciousness is that which Immanuel Kant 
(1724-1804) would call the “noumenal” precisely to the extent that it is non-phenomenal—it 
does not appear to consciousness or “mind.” We cannot be sure if such a thing exists or not since 
we are limited to our own consciousness.  
 In any case with phenomenology new realms of philosophical inquiry are uncovered. 
Even an atheistic philosopher who is positively convinced that a God does not exist now finds 
herself in front of a door that was previously locked. The experience of religion and the 
experience of spirituality are phenomenologically analyzable whether a God really exists or not. 
The very question of whether such a God exists is one upon which the phenomenologist must 
remain agnostic, at least for as long as the phenomenologist retains his method and theory. 
 While it is true that, at least since Plato, philosophers have concerned themselves with 
questions that are of interest to theologians and spiritualists, it is also true that what is called the 
“philosophy of religion” is a relatively nascent field in western philosophy, at least when we 
compare it to other areas of inquiry, many of which are thousands of years old. It is already 
obvious why this must be the case. The phenomenological “realization” is something of which 
Plato, Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274), and René Descartes (1596-1650) all remain 
ignorant. Indeed, we might source the historical emergence of the phenomenological realization 
to Kant's first Critique, and the institution of phenomenology in a methodological sense to 
G.W.F. Hegel (1770-1831), who is also one of the first authors to explore phenomenological 
philosophy, but not in any manner that closely resembles the phenomenological movement that 
starts with Edmund Husserl (1859-1938).  
20 
 Suffice to say that today much work is being done in religious studies on the 
phenomenology of religion. It was nearly twenty-five years ago that Dominique Janicaud noted a 
“theological turn” in phenomenological studies, evinced in the work of authors the likes of which 
are as variegated as Jean-Luc Marion (b. 1946), Emmanuel Levinas (1906-1995), and Jacques 
Derrida (1930-2004).12 
 To be sure, phenomenology seems uniquely equipped to address religious experience. As 
Husserl explains in a 1919 letter to Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911), we can understand religion if 
we more fully understand “inner life.” Insofar as both the experience of the transcendental and 
the doxic position of faithfulness can only be mediated phenomenologically—a basic insight 
derivable from Kant's “Copernican” revolution in The Critique of Pure Reason—it is only natural 
that phenomenological philosophy is a fecund environment within which one can return to 
classical questions in a new light. 
 Thus it will here be assumed that the academic study of alternative modes of 
consciousness is a worthwhile scientific and philosophical pursuit. In order to continue with the 
analysis of phenomenology, it is necessary to make preliminary distinctions between different 
types of experience. 
 
The Different Types of Experience in General 
 
At first glance it appears that any given experience is either physical, emotional, mental, or some 
combination thereof. 
 
12 Janicaud, Le tournant théologique, 17. 
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 If an experience is physical, it could be said to be physical in several different ways. First, 
an experience could be physical in that it directly involves the organs of the body and 
corresponding physiological “feeling.” According to the phenomenological view, I am my body 
and I perceive with it, such as when I taste a sumptuous dessert, delight at the harmonious 
melodies of live music, or run my hand across the head of a dog. There are other organs, like the 
stomach or reproductive organs, the primary function of which is not the transmission of a 
feeling, yet nevertheless are capable of transmitting that type of information, as when one feels 
hunger, or sexual arousal.  What is more, there are ambiguous types of experience where one 
does use organs of sense, but not in a primary fashion, such as when one plays a video game that 
simulates a visual field which in fact is not suspended in empirical, three-dimensional space-time 
(in other words the sight corresponds to a simulated reference but lacks an objective, non-
phenomenological reference). 
 Emotional experiences comprise a rich domain of the human experience. These 
experiences are sometimes called “feelings” but not in the physical sense of the word. Emotional 
experiences include relatively precise, culturally transmitted feelings like sadness, happiness, 
anger, love, or boredom, but an emotional experience can also be less defined, especially when 
one is experiencing a combination of different emotions. 
 Sometimes but not always an emotional experience has a correlate on the level of 
physical experience, as when a stomachache accompanies nervous feelings before an important 
event. Another example is the case of the experience of love, which probably has a tactic 
correlate. Like religious experiences, emotional experiences have only more recently entered the 
fold of serious academic study.13 
 
13 Jaggar, “Love and Knowledge.” 
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 The third type of experience is mental experience, which includes the use of reason, the 
holding of beliefs, all imaginative activity, and all other forms of what is ordinarily referred to as 
“thought.” Often, we experience emotions corresponding to our mental life, and often we reflect 
in our mentality on the experience of our emotions. Thus, these two types of experience often 
comprise a sort of continuous feedback loop. 
 There is still scientific debate over the extent to which mental life can be causally 
explained solely in physical scientific terms (like the statement “the mind is what the brain 
does”). While it is presently unclear whether or not all mental experiences are ultimately caused 
by physical processes, we can still determine that at least some of our mental experiences rely on 
our sense organs in this way, as is the case when one calculates a sum “in one’s head,” which one 
must admit would still require a brain.14 In still other cases we can have mental experience in the 
style of physical sensation, but without their actual involvement, especially with respect to 
situations involving vision, like when one uses their imagination to picture a magical creature, or 
recalls something from the past, or even has a dream. 
 Mental experience would also include the consciousness of memory. To the extent that 
one has a memory, one also experiences most if not all of the time something like a story of 
oneself, a personal narrative. This narrative is tied to one’s sense of identity and selfhood. In part 
this story is composed of big events and significant moments, but it also would not be much of a 
story at all without all of the more banal and routine details that comprise the majority of a 
typical life. It could be fairly stated that so long as one is living, even idly and monotonously, 
this story is always being written in the “background” of one’s experience. 
 
14 There are debates regarding the extent to which mathematics is mind-dependent but here I will 
assume that at the very least performing a mathematical calculation is something that can only be 
enacted by consciousness. 
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 The idea of a “background” of experience is intriguing but rather peculiar. Consider how, 
on top of human experience as heretofore characterized, there waits at one’s recourse the human 
faculty of reflection by way of which one can, in any moment, “retreat” back into the confines of 
the mind to “think” and otherwise perform analysis. For this reflective retreat to be possible, the 
“content” of experience has to “be” a certain way. Indeed, constituent to the human experience of 
subjectivity is a linguistic and mathematical film that naturally colors, shades, and provides 
depth to “bald” experience as such.15 To be sure this dynamic and generative layer of concepts 
and number is not always at the fore of one’s consciousness, nor is every aspect of this layer 
discursive, but, as Kant understood, the layer itself in part establishes the very possibility of 
human experience.16 According to Kant, forms of intuition integral to the understanding actively 
construct the foundations for experience. 
  Of all the variegated experiences that are possible for consciousness, from the richly 
textured experience of flavor or music to the subtle numbness of a “sleeping” limb, perhaps the 
experience of religious or spiritual conversion is most fascinating—and mysterious—of all. 
These experiences are remarkable in that they disorient the human subject in such a way that the 
end result is a reoriented being. The experience of conversion can fairly be reduced to the 
experience of self-change.17 
 The experience—subjective phenomenon—of conversion is mysterious and therefore 
especially worthy of academic interest primarily due to the way in which the experience is at 
 
15 It would be reasonable to doubt the extent to which such a “bald” version of human experience 
is even possible. 
16 For example, Kant denies that space is simply a “discursive concept” and states rather that it is 
a “pure intuition.” CPR A24/B39. 
17 I will show that self-change includes changes not only in the experience of identity but also of 
role. 
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once both ordinary (in the sense of being common) but also remarkably powerful. Marie Baird 
writes that it is in the “foundational capacity” for conversion that a subject confronts “an 
ultimate, transcendent field of signification” and thereby self-transcends, thus “escap[ing] the 
biogenetic determinism that consigns pre-human life forms to those roles dictated by the 
environment in which they live.”18 If this propensity to convert is as universal as Baird suggests, 
then it is practically an essential feature of our very Being. Furthermore, if Baird is right, then 
not only is this experience what distinguishes our humanity from other organisms, but having the 
experience is actually the (only?) means of avoiding the strictures of an existence that is 
otherwise ultimately determined by outward forces rather than one’s own will. 
 
Conversion: Psychological Mechanics 
 
The etymology of ‘conversion’ can be traced to the Latin convertere of the 1300s, which means 
only “turn altogether.”19 Later via Middle English the word picks up a specifically religious (and 
Christian) connotation, when it comes to mean “turn as a sinner to God.” Here I do not 
presuppose that conversion is only something that occurs in religious or spiritual contexts, and 
my reasoning for this will be made clear much later. But for now, I would like to add a third sort 
of conversion, the “philosophical” conversion, which need not entail a formal philosophy per se, 
but can instead amount to a change in certain relevant beliefs held by the subject.  
 When consciousness experiences a religious, spiritual, or philosophical conversion, it is a 
“turn altogether” to the extent that consciousness has identified itself on new terms. Is the subject 
 
18 Baird, “Role and Dynamics of Conversion,” xxvi. 
19 Early Modern Conversions, “OED Research Usage for Conversion.” 
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always aware of this re-identification? For starters, how can consciousness “turn altogether” if 
not of its own volition? Yet, in the case of a non-denominational and non-religious spiritual 
conversion, it is far from obvious that a “genuine” conversion experience would necessarily 
require analytic knowledge (and awareness) thereof. Consider, for example, how a person can go 
through an experience (it need not be harrowing) that has an enormous impact upon one’s 
character, albeit one that is more gradual and therefore harder to notice, both for the person 
herself as well as those who encompass her milieu. Without a doubt this sort of conversion 
would depart significantly from the sort described by Baird, wherein one encounters a 
“transcendent field of signification,” unless we are to suppose that one can encounter said field in 
such a casual and nonchalant fashion over the course of time that one did not even have an 
inkling that the encounter occurred at all. Devoid of reflective intentionality, can this experience 
properly be called a “conversion”? Can consciousness execute a re-identification that is so 
gradual that it does not rise to the “tip of the iceberg” of conscious awareness? And does the 
answer to the question change if the subject herself does not believe that she has experienced a 
conversion, but those who know her think otherwise? Perhaps consciousness can “turn 
altogether” in the sense of a subtle series of small changes resulting in an eventual overall 
evolution rather than a quick and deliberate “turn” toward something more immediate, as if to 
proceed through a transformative gateway. Indeed, this is the basic schematization employed by 
William James, who groups all conversion experiences into either the “gradual” or the “sudden.” 
James, however, understood that the gradual conversion was deliberate and volitional. 
 Even if we are satisfied for the time being with the analysis of this question, there remain 
other astounding facets to the mechanics of conversion experience, which I will here outline 
preliminarily. A spiritual conversion is something that seems to occur in just a given instant or 
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moment, while, in order to have any real meaning, it must also transcend, in the present, the 
connection between the past and the new self of the future. Unlike other experiences had by 
humans, spiritual conversions, when authentic, are understood to be tied to one’s essential 
identity, to the real “substance” of what makes one oneself.20 Although the conversion produces 
an essential change in the person, the inner workings of this process are obscure, especially if 
one strives to refrain from making metaphysical assumptions. 
 Consider briefly how remarkable it is that in order for a conversion to be complete, it 
must institute the transition and difference between two different versions of oneself (that is, of 
consciousness). The result of this transition is a “fresh” conception of consciousness that self-
identifies within a new conceptual field. This new state of consciousness thus freshly defines the 
essence of the identity of the person. 
 This experience at once both disrupts and stabilizes the consciousness of the subject. 
Blaise Pascal (1623-1662) captures this idea when he writes that “true religion consists in 
annihilating self before that universal Being ….”21 The experience of self-annihilation is utterly 
intense; it should come as no surprise that often conversion experiences are ecstatic, euphoric, 
and hallucinatory. In leaving behind the old way for the new mode of consciousness, there is a 
hypothetical instant of transition where one passes from the prior identity to the new. It is in this 
instant that self-transcendence occurs, and understandably this phenomenon sounds like it could 
make for a frightening ordeal. 
 Consider the words of Alphonse Ratisbonne, whose vision of the Virgin Mary (and 
consequent conversion) is recounted by William James in his Varieties: “I did not know where I 
 
20 Here I do not use ‘substance’ in a technical sense, ontological or metaphysical.  
21 Pascal, Pensées, §470. 
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was; I did not know whether I was Alphonse or another. I only felt myself changed and believed 
myself another me; I looked for myself in myself and did not find myself.”22 Interestingly this 
temporary loss of self is disorienting but not, in fact, negatively perceived; to the contrary, 
Ratisbonne writes that at the bottom of his soul he “felt an explosion of the most ardent joy.” 
While he describes an experience that one would think would be terrifying for its displacement 
of one’s very sense of identity, to the contrary his perception of loss of self is colored with 
buoyant feelings. While it must be disconcerting to experience this displacement of one’s 
ordinary identity, in the moment of the experience this is not a focus at all. What is more, in the 
case of conversion experiences, the subject’s disorienting intuitions are typically interpreted 
optimistically.23 
 In fact, many “supernatural” or “paranormal” experiences have been noted to have this 
effect. In a 1973 study carried out by Andrew Greely, a remarkable number of survey participants 
showed a significant positive association between the experience of a “bereavement visit” and 
“positive emotional health.”24 As David Hufford writes, this relationship is later observed in a 
2001 study by Pim van Lommel, wherein positive psychological outcomes were the result for the 
majority of near-death experiences.25 Hufford himself has observed the same pattern in his study 
of sleep paralysis and other forms of “out-of-body” experience (OBE).26 In all of these types of 
 
22 James, Varieties, 177. 
23 Contrast these disorienting perceptions with those experienced during sleep paralysis and the 
perceptions are not interpreted as positively, although, perhaps surprisingly, some do regard their 
experience favorably, especially when the experience is a recurrent event. See Hufford, 
“Visionary Spiritual Experiences and Cognitive Aspects of Spiritual Transformation.” 
24 Greeley, Sociology of the Paranormal. 
25 van Lommel et al. “Near-death Experience,” 2039-45. 
26 Hufford, “Visionary Spiritual Experiences.” 
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experience one comes into contact with deviations from normal waking consciousness, and yet 
the result is not earth-shattering. 
 This might be surprising, but there is a probable reason behind it. William Jame’s full 
definition for ‘conversion’ is: “the process, gradual or sudden, by which a self, hitherto divided, 
and consciously wrong, inferior and unhappy, becomes united and consciously right, superior 
and happy, in consequence of its firmer hold upon religious realities.”27 What is significant here, 
and useful for our purposes, is James’ concept of the “divided self.” In a nutshell, bereavement 
visits, NDE’s, and OBE’s can afford a subject with what is required in order for one to feel whole 
or complete again. For example, after the death of a loved one, a self is divided in its 
consciousness of loss and absence. With an NDE one’s self has been divided through the 
harrowing and traumatic ordeal of having nearly died. 
 It is clear that disorienting experiences of self-transcendence, including the experience of 
conversion, are experienced (and interpreted optimistically) via the medium of a relative 
comparison. If someone feels lost, broken, or otherwise poor prior to a disorienting experience of 
self-displacement, then it reasons out that one is likely to interpret what an outsider may call a 
disorienting experience as something that is in fact an orienting experience when taken firsthand. 
In the case of the potent experience of “self-annihilation” described by Pascal, James’ divided 
self is effectively reborn through a subtractive process the result of which is only a “good” 
remainder of one’s self. While the consciousness of self-dissolution looks to be debilitating when 
surveyed from the sterile vantage point of psychology or rationalist philosophy, because this self-
dissolution can occur only for someone who is, as James puts it, “consciously wrong, inferior, 
and unhappy,” the ultimate outcome of a frightening ordeal turns out to be positive. 
 
27 James, Varieties, 171. 
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 But while James’ definition allows for either a sudden or gradual conversion event, his 
take on the corresponding states of self-consciousness seems to be misguided. Working off 
James’ definition of conversion, it is unclear how he understands one’s self-consciousness to map 
onto temporality. He seems to suggest that in the case of every conversion, he who eventually is 
to convert is, prior to his conversion, aware of the fact that he is “wrong, inferior, and unhappy.” 
Surely after the conversion one may experience this realization, but it seems implausible to 
suppose that one’s misguided ways are the object of consciousness before every conversion, even 
if sometimes this is the case, as with St. Augustine. 
 Perhaps James’ definition is rather too strict in its conditions. We can loosen and simplify 
his take on spiritual conversion as follows: essential change in oneself or, perhaps, essential 
change of self. In order to reasonably define a religious conversion, we could add more criteria: 
“intentional and essential change of self in accordance with an established metaphysical belief 
system.”28 In these definitions the word “essential” is used to capture the sense in which the 
experience is transcendent. Baird chooses to call this essential change “an experience of 
disruption in human subjects’ spontaneous self-understanding.”29 This wording helps clarify the 
way in which reflection maps onto time-consciousness; this self-reflection is always in a state of 
flux. Prior to a conversion event one might be unknowingly errant, or fully cognizant of the 
wrongfulness of one’s ways—either can make for an authentic conversion experience. 
 It might be the case that the inadequacy of James’ own definition comes down to his 
obscure use of the phrasing “consciously wrong” and “consciously right.” One would think that 
James means by this “aware that one is wrong (or right)” but that interpretation leads to the 
 
28 This definition leaves it unclear how to treat the significance of a so-called “personal religion.” 
29 Baird, “Role and Dynamics of Conversion,” xxvi. 
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ostensible dismissal of the case of every convert who did not know that his old ways were 
imprudent, which is an analytic judgment that, as we have seen, seems to be in error. But what if 
by “consciously wrong” James meant something more like “deliberately choosing to be wrong” 
instead of “awareness that one is wrong”? Thus, the only case of conversion that need be 
dismissed is the one wherein the convert’s old ways were perhaps wrong, but not as the result of 
any volition or act of will on the part of the convert himself. This seems to be a much more 
satisfactory account, at least for the time being.   
 Furthermore, this understanding of James’ thinking can help make more sense of even the 
famous cases from history. Take, for example, one of the most famous conversion stories of all 
time, and perhaps the single most famous example of a specifically Christian conversion.30 Saul 
of Tarsus was a first-century rabbi who persecuted early Christians until he had a blinding vision 
of Jesus Christ, the effects of which lasted three days before Saul could again see. One could 
hardly imagine that, prior to his conversion, Saul thought that his persecution of Christian’s was 
“wrong.” On the other hand, it goes without saying that Saul conscientiously chose to persecute 
Christians and did not do so by any accident or coincidence. The rest of the story holds that Saul 
fasted deep in prayer for three days after his magnificent vision; he was no longer the same 
person: he admitted the divinity of Christ, took his new name, Paul, and spent the remainder of 
his days as a missionary traveling around Europe and Asia. 
 To return to the conception of conversion as self-annihilation, the story of Paul is 
especially interesting because of how, on a theological level, the calculus of sin and salvation 
dictates that Paul’s past life as the Christian-tormenting Saul is supplanted fully by the new 
individual. While it would be hamartiologically (and eschatologically) problematic to suppose, 
 
30 Acts 9 NABRE 
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granting Paul’s remarkable conversion, that Saul and, more importantly, his actions, never 
existed and never occurred, the whole point of the story is that effectively this erasure is indeed 
the case. Indeed, it is something of a Christian platitude that any act, no matter how heinous, can 
be forgiven. If one commits some atrocious offense but then later authentically comes to a 
spiritual conversion, then it is understood that the “real” and genuine self is the reformed self, 
that the person who in the past committed a horrible deed is no longer. If the old subject is still 
there, after all, it is not a case of self-transcendence as Baird describes. 
 At the end of the day, in an ordinary and sensible way of looking at things though, the 
story of Saul/Paul is unremarkable. People go through changes all the time, after all, and when 
people decide to change their ways in a lasting and meaningful way, one might think that this 
process should not be hard to explain. This more or less sensible view is in fact misguided—the 
question of why or even how people choose to convert is not at issue; rather, what is unclear is 
how it can be that deep spiritual conversion, wherein consciousness itself changes, is a possible 
experience at all for consciousness, especially given the relatively stable, consistent, and 
unchanging nature of consciousness as ordinarily experienced. 
 
Overview of Chapters  
 
In the first chapter I review much of the conversion scholarship that already exists. It should be 
noted that all this scholarship belongs to the human sciences, but I have not so far found any 
sustained treatment of the phenomenology of conversion. After reviewing the scholarship on 
conversion, most of which comes from psychology, sociology, anthropology, and theology, I 
derive a general definition of conversion according to these disciplines. In the second chapter I 
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outline the specifics of my general explanatory framework and method, that of transcendental 
phenomenology. I mostly follow Husserl, and this continues throughout the rest of the text. In the 
third chapter I sketch the conversion phenomenon in the natural attitude. While I reviewed 
scholarly research in the first chapter of the text, here I take up a first-person account of the 
experience of conversion as I experience it in the natural (and theoretical) attitude. In the fourth 
chapter I take up the self and consciousness in the phenomenological attitude. I present an 
account of the phenomenological features of both in preparation for the eventual transcendental 
reduction of the conversion phenomenon in general. In the fifth chapter I examine conversion as 
a specifically embodied phenomenon; in this chapter I employ a significant number of ideas from 
Merleau-Ponty here. In the sixth chapter I present a case study of Saint Paul from a 
phenomenological perspective. Since this is just one particular conversion narrative, I do not 
attempt an eidetic reduction of the conversion on the basis of this case. In the seventh chapter, 
my conclusion, I proffer an eidetic reduction of the conversion phenomenon. I identify seven 
essential features of the experience, and I ultimately conclude that there is something 
fundamentally symmetrical between conversion and consciousness in general. 
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Ch. 1. Types of Conversion Experiences According to the Human Sciences 
 
Sudden “Pauline” Conversion vs. Gradual Conversion: A History of the Field 
 
A wide range of human sciences purport to explain conversion. it may turn out that deriving my 
own definition of conversion from these other accounts will prove to be challenging. In defining 
conversion, it can be hard to break with the historical trends that have driven conversion 
scholarship. Indeed, some scholars, like Lewis Rambo, suggest that defining conversion in fact 
turns out to be a “vexing problem” due to the sheer number of ways in which it can be 
interpreted.1 
 These historical trends are often times so implicit that even a conscious effort to avoid 
bias can prove to be difficult. Historically this played out in the contest between the “gradual” 
and “sudden” models of conversion. Rambo, for example, notes that for a long time, academic 
studies of conversion were largely confined to a western and specifically Christian context (in 
fact a “hegemony” according to Rambo) which interpreted conversion only according to the 
“Pauline paradigm of sudden, dramatic change.” Hood and Chen actually go so far as to maintain 
that this style of conversion “defined the emergence of an empirical psychology of religion in 
America” because the phenomenon served as one of the earliest analytic foci of the fledgling 
science which was “courageous enough” to try to explain such a difficult topic.2 
 For better or for worse Paul’s story essentially occupies the role of Christian archetype for 
the conversion phenomenon. According to the Pauline model of conversion, which dominated 
 
1 Rambo, “Anthropology and the Study of Conversion,” 213. 
2 Hood and Chen, Oxford Handbook of Atheism, 537. 
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early academic studies, the vast majority of which employed psychological methods, there is 
nothing slow, gradual, or subtle about conversion. This type of conversion is exemplified in the 
description given in a key passage of The Acts of the Apostles: “As he neared Damascus on his 
journey, suddenly a light from heaven flashed around him. He fell to the ground and heard a 
voice say to him, "Saul, Saul, why do you persecute me?"3 When this is your standard for 
identifying instances of conversion, it is easy to see how the restrictive pacing could present a 
problem. After all, our own everyday experiences most likely contradict this understanding of the 
timing of conversion, especially since it is likely that we know people who have experienced 
conversions that are far less tumultuous than the one had by Paul. Yet for many years, academic 
studies of conversion disregarded these sorts of situations, limiting themselves to the “classical” 
model epitomized by Paul, although, as we will soon see, the gradual model is proposed rather 
early on (by James), although it is largely relegated to the periphery. 
It should be noted that there are other important dimensions to the classic, Pauline model, 
not all of which directly deal with its immediacy, although most of these are, to be sure, 
correlates thereof. Rambo hits upon these other aspects of the Pauline model as he elaborates that 
“[t]he Pauline model of conversion combines notions of an unexpected flash of revelation, a 
radical reversal of previous beliefs and allegiances, and an underlying assumption that converts 
are passive respondents to outside forces.”4 Thus his theory is that, in addition to its immediacy, 
the “classical” type of conversion involves, first, the surprising and even volatile revelation, 
second, the extreme renunciation of one’s old ways (in terms of the doxic as well as one’s loyalty 
to something or other), and third, the notion that the convert is a vehicle for something external 
 
3 Acts 9:3-4 NABRE 
4 Rambo, “Anthropology and Conversion,” 213. 
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to himself, something that itself catalyzes a change of heart and mind in the convert.5  Here it is 
apparent that the surprise revelation and the passivity of the convert are correlates of the rapid 
pace with which this type of process occurs. 
 There is yet another property that is commonly attributed to the sudden Pauline model of 
conversion and it is the emotional involvement of the phenomenon. Scholars backed with 
contradictory data have debated the extent to which a heightened emotional state is a common 
pre-condition for conversion.6 Typically the sudden map of conversion, with its corresponding 
intense emotions, is understood to be diametrically opposed to any sort of rational or intellectual 
conversion. The idea is that the more gradual conversion phenomenon is one which is sought on 
an intellectual or rational basis. But in fact it is far from self-evident these the emotional and the 
rational should be rigidly distinguished like so, despite the fact that this has been the tradition at 
least since Plato.7 While it might be true that some conversions, like that of Paul, are precipitated 
primarily by emotional factors, it is an error to assume that the phenomenon has no rational 
component whatsoever. Phenomenologically speaking it is apparent that, in a sense, to “feel” is 
(in a way) to know, and this is true whether we are talking about feeling an emotion or feeling in 
a physical, tactical sense. 
 In any case it is with this general “Pauline” model that many early studies of conversion 
were concerned, perhaps, as I have indicated, due to the way in which modern psychology was, 
in its early years, guided by an implicit Christian bias, noted not only by Rambo, whom I have 
already mentioned, but also Hood, Hill, and Spilka.8 This goes even for G. Stanley Hall’s famous 
 
5 Here ‘doxic’ means “that which has to do with belief.” 
6 Contrast Coe’s 1916 Psychology of Religion with Spellman et al., “Manifest Anxiety.” 
7  Jaggar, “Love and Knowledge,” 151. 
8 Rambo, “Anthropology and Conversion,” 213; Hood et al., The Psychology of Religion, 5th ed., 
222-223; Coon, “Testing the Limits of Sense and Science.” 
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1881 lectures on the topic, eventually the focus of his seminal 1904 monograph, Adolescence.9 
Rambo, writing with Charles Farhadian, points out that there is something distinctively 
Protestant about this “subjectivist” reading of Paul’s conversion.10 But while Miller and C’de 
Baca think that this “quantum” model is far wider than religion conversion, there have long been 
concerns that religious or spiritual conversion could occur in a less abrupt fashion. 
 This notion of a more gradual conversion is in fact present right at the start of the 
approximate discipline of conversion studies, defined early on, as I indicated, by the 
psychological approach. It is embodied in the work of William James, whose groundbreaking 
Varieties of 1902 delineates that conversion is a process that can be “gradual or sudden.”11 James 
cites Leo Tolstoy and John Bunyan as examples of gradual conversions and he repeatedly asserts 
the gradual and the sudden as two different types of the conversion phenomenon, but as noted by 
Hood et al., James remains more or less preoccupied with the classical and sudden model of 
conversion, which takes up much more of his time and space in the text.12 In fact it should be 
argued that James seems to find the gradual model of conversion to be obscure, evinced by his 
statement that, “it must be confessed at the outset that it is hard to follow these windings of the 
hearts of others, and one feels that their words do not reveal their total secret.”13 In other words, 
James takes it that the gradual conversion is far harder to analyze psychologically. 
There is also something of a gradual conversion model in the approach of George Coe, 
whose 1916 monograph The Psychology of Religion enumerates six distinct types of conversion, 
 
9  Hood et al., Psychology of Religion, 4th ed., 206. 
10 Rambo and Farhadian, Oxford Handbook of Religious Conversion, 5. 
11 Varieties, p. 150. 
12 Hood et al., Psychology of Religion, 4th ed., 212. 
13 James, Varieties, 145 
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although the author confesses that the term itself is best reserved for the sudden conversion.14 
Really it is not until the 1920 publication of The Religious Consciousness, by James Pratt (a 
student of James), that gradual conversion is given primary focus, but this text was largely 
ignored since, as Anne Taves points out, its gradual model of the phenomenon did not 
complement the more sudden and radical paradigm which lent itself more readily to the “revival” 
mindset that defined the Third Great Awakening (1855-1930).15 More influential was 
Strickland’s Psychology of Religious Experience, in which the gradual model for conversion is 
taken up in a sustained manner. Strickland, like James, contrasts the gradual and sudden models 
of conversion, but whereas James only briefly explores the gradual by way of a handful of 
supposedly enigmatic cases, like Tolstoy, Strickland goes much further in his analysis. Most 
importantly, as Hood et al. point out, Strickland understands that the gradual conversion is one 
wherein the convert is an active (rather than passive) agent seeking out the transformation of 
self.16 
A multitude of examples confirm the aptness of this analysis. Indeed, it is surely possible 
to convert in the absence of the “unexpected flash of revelation,” even in the Christian context 
which has been so often confined to the Pauline model. The gradual variant is typified in the case 
of Edith Stein, who would later become St. Teresa Benedicta of the Cross. Stein’s conversion 
was not enacted by an unexpected flash or revelation but rather a deliberate and intentional 
reading of the autobiography of St. Teresa of Avila. Similarly it must be possible to convert in an 
active and volitional sense in contrast to the “passive” model established in the case of Paul; 
 
14 Hood et al., Psychology of Religion, 4th ed., 212. 
15 Hood and Chen, Oxford Handbook of Atheism, 538. 
16 Hood et al., Psychology of Religion, 4th ed., 215; Strickland, Psychology of Religious 
Experience, 110-11.  
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indeed it would seem that the vast majority of religious conversions in the United States take 
place on the volitional, actively-willed basis, exemplified by various sacramental rites of 
initiation which actually require the consent of the convert—like the Roman Catholic Sacrament 
of Confirmation, or the Ordo Initiationis Christianae Adultorum—in order to be complete. After 
all, certainly Edith Stein chose to read the Avila biography that precipitated her own change. 
In short it is clear that there has been something of a controversy regarding the gradual 
vs. sudden conversion dichotomy, but Hood and Farhadian point out that starting around the 
1970s, psychology and its sudden, Pauline model of conversion began to be supplanted by the 
gradual model that was not necessarily limited to Christianity and which was accompanied by 
new methods from sociology, anthropology, and neuroscience.17 
With so many disciplines vying to give their account of the phenomenon, new struggles 
materialized, even after the gradual model of conversion became the standard paradigm across 
the disciplines. One issue is that a diversity of approaches yields a diversity of differing 
definitions. Rambo for his part suggests that defining conversion just gets in the way of 
examining and analyzing the phenomenon. He suggests that instead of this more specific 
account, conversion should instead be viewed as a “cluster of types of changes that have been 
observed and discussed.” He furthermore adds that the more common sort of conversion is 
indeed the gradual and subtle variety that occurs over a much longer duration and is less extreme 
than the Pauline type. 
But even today the Pauline paradigm should not be entirely disregarded in attempting to 
define the phenomenon. While plenty of studies have been carried out on the Pauline model, 
which obviously originates in the Christian context and has been particularly focused upon the 
 
17 Hood and Farhadian, Oxford Handbook of Religious Conversion, 6. 
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evangelical strand of the religion, the general application of the Pauline figure does not have to 
be limited, and in fact has not been limited, only to the analysis of Christian conversion. Indeed, 
as the counterculture conversion studies of the 60s and 70s grew more popular, these studies 
appropriated the same “radical” and sudden orientation model established in the case of Paul, 
since the “gradual” model simply was not relevant for those cases which could be defined by 
their suddenness and, often times, ephemeral nature. 
In the last analysis, instead of being viewed as competing models, the sudden versus 
gradual paradigms of conversion should be seen as case-specific alternatives. There is no reason 
why one or the other model must be the exclusive option to which researchers and scholars refer. 
A model encompassing both the sudden and the gradual process should be incorporated into the 
transcendental phenomenological reduction of the phenomenon. 
 
General Review of Definitions for Conversion as Offered by the Human Sciences 
 
Now I will turn to the conversion definitions themselves, comment briefly on each one (and, in 
some cases, review significant comments from others), and then attempt to synthesize the 
different definitions into a “master” definition of the phenomenon grounded in phenomenology 
which in turn can be used to establish the limits of the conversion experience, which  will be 
phenomenologically analyzed in the final chapter.18 In other words here I am carrying out an 
 
18 Since I will here attempt to synthesize these definitions, I am following ground already 
covered by the Dutch anthropologist Henri Gooren. The thirteen conversion models that Gooren 
reviews in his 2010 monograph Religious Conversion and Disaffiliation are: James, Lofland-
Stark, Travisano, Straus, Greil, Heirich, Bromley-Shupe, Long-Hadden, Snow-Machalek, 
Richardson, Gartrell-Shannon, Stark-Finke, and Rambo. Here I cover James, Lofland-Stark, 
Travisano, Snow-Machalek, Richardson, and Rambo. 
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historical overview of the different conceptions of the experience in order to sketch out the 
fullest possible account of conversion prior to its phenomenological reduction.19 
 The definitions below come from a diverse set of disciplines, from psychology, to 
sociology, to anthropology, to neuroscience, to even theology. While psychological studies of 
conversion were exceedingly active for a period of time at least beginning with James up to the 
1930s, eventually they were challenged by sociological and anthropological approaches, via 
which there are several well-known critiques of the psychological paradigm for explaining 
conversion. For example, some authors, like Beverly Gaventa, have argued that it is impossible 
to draw psychological conclusions regarding conversion cases in the New Testament based on 
the limitations of scriptural sources. Gaventa and Alan Segal have suggested that there is 
insufficient data to psychologically analyze figures like St. Paul in particular, while others, like 
Zeba Crook, point out that psychological analysis of scriptural conversion should be avoided 
because the texts belong to another historical-cultural period with the result being that a modern 
understanding of psychology simply isn’t pertinent to the source material.20 
 Note that the definitions are for the most part reproduced in their original form below, 
with edits only as necessary, and they are ordered by date of publication: 
 
1. Starbuck (1900): 
Conversion is characterized by more or less sudden changes of character from evil to goodness, 
from sinfulness to righteousness, and from indifference to spiritual insight and activity. The term 
conversion is used . . . to stand for the whole series of manifestations just preceding, accompanying, 
and immediately following the apparently sudden changes of character involved.21 
 
 
19 This historical overview of the definitions for conversion is also instructive in the sense that it 
shows how the concept itself has been subtly re-constituted over time. 
20 Crook, Reconceptualizing Conversion, 28-52. 
21 Starbuck, Psychology of Religion, 21. 
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Here conversion is explicitly construed as a sudden event rather than an enduring or more 
gradual process although it must be pointed out that Starbuck does situate the duration on a 
continuum. It should be noted that Starbuck specifically interprets conversion as a bridge 
between different moral states, and only in the one direction, from “evil to goodness.” Thus he 
thereby excludes from the domain of conversion phenomena the likes of which would later take 
central importance in the scholarly literature on the topic, from disaffiliation to so-called 
“deconversion.”22 That said, it has to be granted that the move from evil to goodness hinges in 
large part upon the perspective and perception of the converting subject, meaning that the nature 
of what is “good” could be entirely subjective or relative, since what one person finds to be evil 
might be what another finds to be good. Thus, while it is almost certain that this is not what 
Starbuck had in mind, we could include within the limits of his conversion definition the idea of 
converting from goodness to evil, with the proviso that the convert does not understand his new 
worldview to be evil or otherwise inadequate—otherwise, if he “converts” to a character that he 
recognizes to be evil and the antithesis of true good, then it would not count as a conversion at 
all, at least not per Starbuck’s criteria. 
 Starbuck’s definition takes for granted that conversion involves a change of character, 
which again situates his theory of conversion within moral limits, and aside from addressing 
“spiritual insight” he does not seem to include “intellectual” conversion within the purview of 
 
22 Disaffiliation refers to abandoning a personal religious affiliation although it does not 
necessarily entail abandoning religious life altogether. When a nun leaves her order but continues 
to practice Catholicism, this is disaffiliation. Sometimes this is referred to as “disengagement.” 
See Ebaugh’s “Leaving Catholic Convents: Towards a Theory of Disengagement.” Deconversion 
is a term that emerges in the 1970s and refers to most often to a general departure from religious 
life. See Campbell & Cole, “Religiosity, Religious Affiliation and Religious Belief.” 
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the phenomenon.23 But what does it mean for a conversion to be “intellectual”? Is not even the 
“moral” conversion one which has some intellectual content? It is clear that the move from evil 
to goodness presumably requires some knowledge in order to be possible, although the content 
of the episteme would again be moral in nature (what is good or goodness?) instead of 
intellectual, at least in any pure sense, like the way in which 2+2=4. This is not to suggest that  
every intellectual pursuit is conversional, such that learning new mathematics could be called a 
conversion—but is it possible that every conversion has at least some “intellectual” content, if 
we use this term to refer simply to knowledge? Is there any conversion that does not somehow 
involve knowledge? For now I will leave this question open-ended, to be resolved after 
reviewing more of the conversion models. 
 What Starbuck fails to recognize is the existence of conversion that some conversions are 
decidedly neutral with respect to morality. Indeed many conversions lack any moral significance 
whatsoever, like the transformation of an individual into a father (which can involve a moral 
change, not to mention physical change, but does not have to), or the sort of change that one 
takes up when transitioning from one gender to another, or even a significant career change.  
 Remarkably Starbuck is one of the earliest scholars to take up conversion, at least in a 
sustained, full-length study, and yet he realizes that the phenomenon is not always fully 
conscious. In contrast to the overwhelming popularity of the early Pauline model, which 
elaborates on a passive conversion that is unexpected but conscious, Starbuck is one of the few 
“early” figures who contends that conversion is not always a fully conscious phenomenon, 
 
23 I take it that an intellectual conversion is one which is deliberate and almost always gradual 
rather than sudden. 
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devoting an entire chapter of his monograph to the “conscious and subconscious elements” of the 
psychology of conversion. 
 Starbuck also addresses the role that volition plays in conversion, which pertains more 
closely to the measure of passivity in the archetypal conversion model.  In what he terms “self-
surrender” he identifies the sort of conversion in which one “gives in” to forces external.24 Even 
though giving in to the forces compelling one’s conversion seems, in a way, to be a sort of 
volition, Starbuck considers self-surrender to be the opposite of the voluntary conversion. Is this 
right? Does St. Paul surrender himself to God? Self-surrender still seems to be a sort of volitional 
conversion. In any case this supposed distinction is an idea which is picked up two years later in 
the Varieties of William James. 
 
2. James (1902): 
To be converted […] denote[s] the process, gradual or sudden, by which a self hitherto divided, and 
consciously wrong [and] inferior and unhappy, becomes unified and consciously right [and] 
superior and happy, in consequence of its firmer hold upon religious realities.25 
 
Unlike Starbuck, who was actually a student of James at Harvard, James encompasses the more 
gradual sort of conversion in his definition, as I noted in the previous section, but he does not at 
all treat it at length in his very influential monograph that defined the nascent field of conversion 
studies for decades and even today retains some authority in the field. Via this theory of 
conversion as the movement from division to union James, unlike Starbuck, is able to include a 
far wider range of phenomena within the limits of conversion experience, including events like 
disaffiliation and deconversion, so long as the state of affairs preceding the conversion was such 
 
24 Starbuck, Psychology of Religion, 117. 
25 James, Varieties, 150. Here I have inserted the conjunction ‘and’ in between the phrases 
“wrong inferior” as well as “right superior.” It is unclear why James uses this phrasing. 
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that the self was in a fragmented state, although James remains obscure on the issue of whether 
the subject is actually aware of its own division, despite the fact that it is clearly conscious of its 
wrongness and unhappiness. For example, James could consider a Roman Catholic’s turn to 
atheism to be a conversion so long as the person’s “self” was split before the unification that 
atheism enacted for the subject, while it remains unclear whether the subject discerned his own 
underlying division, although certainly he grasped that his ways were “wrong” and “inferior” and 
“unhappy.” Assuming that it is possible that James meant to include conversions where the 
divided self is not the object of conscious awareness, his theory resonates with psychoanalytic 
theories regarding the status of a “subconscious” mind or unconscious. Lastly, while the James 
definition concludes with the notion that the self is unified by way of a “firmer hold upon 
religious realities,” James leaves these realities vague, such that I would feel comfortable 
including atheism within the limits of these “realities,” although to be sure in a “negative” sense, 
with a negative orientation toward those realities in question. 
 James also rather astoundingly distinguishes the “volitional” type of conversion from the 
non-volitional, citing Starbuck as one of his influences for the idea.26 This is surprising since for 
so many decades the non-volitional model dominated academic studies of conversion. James, 
however, does not get the distinction quite right. This is because he establishes a tight link 
between the “conscious and voluntary way” on the one hand and the “involuntary and 
unconscious way” on the other. He reasons that the conscious conversion is always one which is 
chosen, which seems like a fairly obvious mistake given the conversion case par excellence 
typified in the case of St. Paul. Paul, after all, does not choose to convert, but nevertheless he is 
most certainly aware of his own conversion. In other words, his conversion is involuntary, but he 
 
26 Ibid., 184. 
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is aware of it. The only way to explain this apparent error is to resolve that by ‘conscious’ or 
‘unconscious’ James refers only to the conscious decision to convert—the volition to do so. The 
“unconscious decision” of course is not much of a “decision” at all, assuming that deciding 
requires making a choice. The unconscious decision, in other words, is nothing more than the 
involuntary variety of conversion, à la the Pauline model. 
 This charitable reading of James’s remarks renders his position far more coherent, but a 
problem remains. James actually cites Starbuck for the idea that something “incubates” in the 
subject unconsciously until it eventually gives way to the sudden conversion event and 
consciousness thereof. This is not at all equivalent with the charitable interpretation of James that 
I offer above. Specifically, James writes that Starbuck: “[s]eems right in conceiving all such 
sudden changes as results of special cerebral functions unconsciously developing until they are 
ready to play a controlling part, where they make irruption into the conscious life.”27Here James 
very clearly suggests that every sudden conversion is in fact far more gradual than we might 
believe. The crucial point to note, however, is that James is specifically referring to a specific 
type of sudden conversion in the work of Starbuck: the “sudden non-religious alteration of habit 
or character.” The idea is that when someone experiences a sudden reorientation of character that 
is decidedly non-religious (or non-spiritual), this is in fact the product of something that has been 
“stewing” for quite some time. These profound changes do not, that is, occur on a purely 





27 Ibid., 164. 
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3. Nock (1933): 
By conversion we mean the reorientation of the soul of an individual, his deliberate turning from 
indifference or from an earlier form of piety to another, a turning which implies a consciousness 
that a great change is involved, that the old was wrong and the new is right. It is seen at its fullest 
in the positive response of a man to the choice set before him by the prophetic religions.28 
 
Nock is often credited with formulating the distinction between conversion “proper”, in which 
one turns from an irreligious perspective to a religious one, and the sort of religious 
intensification that Nock elsewhere (but not in this particular excerpt) refers to as “adhesion.”29 
Some scholars, most notably Roger Beck, have suggested that adhesion is a lesser category that 
only pertains to “cults” instead of the case of Christianity, in which case true conversions occur 
rather than mere adhesion.30 In other words, the idea is that a subject could never “convert” to a 
cult—instead, the subject can only “adhere” to its tenets. Clearly “conversion” has a positive 
connotation whereas the same is not necessarily true for adhesion. Today it is clear that this is the 
obvious manifestation of bias. The Christian who intensifies in his beliefs should certainly count 
as a sort of convert, even if he is different in kind from the atheist who converts to the religion, 
and it is just as apparent that someone who joins a cult and adopts the corresponding set of 
beliefs undergoes a significant change in identity, such that this should be considered conversion. 
 That said, there is an astute anthropological difference in the classical period between 
adhesion and the traditional model of conversion. Zeba Crook maintains that for Nock as for 
James it is emotion that is the “central and defining characteristic of conversion” and this is what 
distinguishes conversion from the “lesser” phenomenon of adhesion.31 He continues, describing 
Nock’s work: 
 
28 Nock, Conversion, 7. 
29 Ibid., 36. More recently Gooren has referred to adhesion as “affiliation.” See Religious 
Conversion and Disaffiliation, 32. 
30 Beck, “Religious Rivalries in the Early Roman Empire,” 241. 
31 Crook, Reconceptualising Conversion, 25. 
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Greeks adhered to religions and cults, according to Nock, they were not emotionally or 
psychologically bound to them, and for this reason one cannot talk about, nor does one find, 
conversion within them.32 
 
These cults were more like tools for the ancient Greeks, in contrast to the various “philosophies” 
that transcended simple utility to the extent that they required fidelity, or as Crook puts it, 
“loyalty.” He argues that in Nock’s model, the emotional dimension of conversion is a direct 
result of this loyalty, and this is why philosophies and later Christianity require investment in 
terms of both “body and soul.”33 Crook points out that in the case of certain philosophies and 
religions one must recognize some sort of “glorious and new present reality,” directly akin to the 
“transcendent field of signification” that we will see in the Baird definition of 1992. As Crook 
suggests, the ascent to the surface world in Plato’s Allegory of the Cave can be read as an 
example of this sort of world-shattering breakthrough.34 Platonism and Neo-Platonism would 
eventually have an enormous influence on the conceptual foundations of early Christianity, and 
this is why Western religions like Christianity more closely resemble the Ancient Greek 
philosophies than they do the Ancient Greek religions, which were topical and ritualistic. 
 Furthermore Nock, like Starbuck, considers conversion only in the one “direction,” from 
a more basic (“earlier”) form of piety (or lack of care, “indifference”) to a new and more 
profound state of piety. Thus according to this criteria deconversion, the event of losing one’s 
faith, would not count as a sort of conversion. Although Nock does not explicitly state as much, 
at least not in his definition, he implies that the new state of piety is more sophisticated, or 
perhaps “deeper” than the earlier form.   
 
32 Ibid. 
33 Nock, Conversion, 14.  
34 Plato’s Republic Book 7.  
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 It also should be noted that unlike both Starbuck and James, Nock stipulates that 
conversion entails consciousness of the change that has occurred since conversion is here framed 
in its “fullest” sense as manifest in a decision (we can disregard for scholarly reasons the 
ethnocentric qualification he provides regarding the “prophetic religions”). In other words the 
most complete form of conversion is that which follows from a rational choice, similar to the 
Gelpi definition found below. 
 
4. Lofland and Stark (1965): 
For conversion a person must: 1. [e]xperience enduring, acutely felt tensions 2. [w]ithin a religious 
problem-solving perspective, 3. [w]hich leads him [or her] to define himself [or herself] as a 
religious seeker; 4. encountering the D.P. [Divine Precepts] at a turning point in his life, 5. [w]herein 
an affective bond is formed (or pre-exists) with one or more converts; 6. [w]here extra-cult 
attachments are absent or neutralized; 7. [a]nd, where, if he [or she] is to become a deployable 
agent, he is exposed to intensive interaction.35 
 
This rich and precise model is considered to be the original “process” model for conversion, and 
it is one of the most frequently appearing definitions present in the secondary literature on the 
topic.36 Like the conversion model offered by James, this account begins with the stipulation that 
the subject who is to convert must start out in a state of pronounced tension—what James calls 
the “divided self.” But for Lofland and Stark the context within which these tensions take place 
is much more specific than what is proffered by James: this tension originates in a religious 
perspective where the focus is on “problem-solving.” Here problem-solving may seem like an 
odd choice of words but the reference is to the existential “situation” to which religion is but one 
solution out of many. Depending on the religion the problematic nature of the existential 
 
35 Lofland and Stark, “Becoming a World-Saver,” 874-5. This definition is specifically derived 
from a study of a minority religious group, but in the summary to their article Lofland and Stark 
indicate that they believe their definition is generalizable to “other types of groups and 
perspectives.”  
36 Gooren, Religious Conversion and Disaffiliation, 1862. 
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situation may vary, but in most Christian contexts the problem would be nothing more than the 
concept of sin or the wish for eternal life, etc. Because the person-in-tension wants to attain a 
solution to some sort of existential (or theological) “problem,” she or he becomes—and self-
identifies—as a “religious seeker.” Of course, then, this would require consciousness of the 
identification, without which no identification could occur at all. At this point the converting 
subject turns to the codified propositions that the religion offers as solutions to the existential 
problem (the Divine Precepts in the specific case of the Unification Church of Reverend Moon in 
San Francisco). Sometimes these precepts are imperative in nature, as in the case of the Ten 
Commandments of Christianity, while in other cases they are more propositional in nature, such 
as the belief that the crucifixion and resurrection of Jesus Christ secured eternal life for mankind. 
Whether the precepts are imperative or propositional, to the extent that they are precepts they are 
instructive and regulatory. In either case the content is decidedly rational, which should not be 
overlooked. No matter the presentation of this moment, when the converting subject 
acknowledges and furthermore explicitly or implicitly pledges fidelity to the precepts, the result 
is a rite of passage for the converting subject and this is what enables the subject to relate, 
emotionally (which is, following the work of Jaggar, not necessarily devoid from rationality), 
with other converts who are “going through the same thing” or at least did so in the past.37 It is 
what the convert adheres to on a fundamentally rational level that establishes the basis of an 
emotional connection with the Other. In the convert’s sense of identification with others in the 
religious community, everything else is, to use phenomenological language, suspended or put out 
of play. In other words, the sort of identification that occurs here on an intersubjective level is 
 
37 See Jaggar, “Love and Knowledge.” Jaggar’s argument is that because emotionality is “active, 
"voluntary, and socially constructed” it is therefore epistemic, utilized in both “evaluation and 
observation.” 
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such that the only means of identification is religiously situated (or limited), to the extent that all 
other defining properties of the Other are disregarded—precisely because in this instance they 
are nothing short of irrelevant. It is the final step of this process that is perhaps the most obscure, 
where Lofland and Stark mandate that the conversion process concludes with “intensive 
interaction” if the convert is to become a “deployable agent.” Lofland and Stark actually 
appropriate this concept from the work of the sociologist Philip Selznick, whose classic 1960 
study of communist propaganda employs the term to simply refer to an adherent who is ready for 
service, to further the larger cause.38 All this means in the context of conversion is, in the words 
of Lofland and Stark, a “total convert” who is willing to “put [his life] at the disposal of the 
cult.”39 Would this apply in addition to the case of the mainline convert who makes the transition 
to a garden-variety denomination of Christianity? Lofland and Stark offer their definition for the 
“conversion to a deviant perspective,” where a deviant perspective is one which is more or less 
obscure, unusual, and/or “socially devalued,” which is to say, one which simply stands in 
contradistinction to a majority group, like Catholics or Communists, and is, in turn, relatively 
unknown and—to the extent that the majority is even aware of it—stigmatized as representative 
of the “fringe.”40 Despite this specific focus in their study, I suggest that this seventh step of the 
process is not only part of fringe conversion phenomena but fundamentally characterizes the 
Christian conversion, wherein one is subject to the injunction to evangelize, as well as the 
Islamic conversion, where it too is the case that adherents to the faith have a duty to seek out 
converts. Often but not always when the facilitation of the conversion of others is something of a 
 
38 Selznick, Organizational Weapon, 18-29. Cited in Lofland & Stark, “Becoming a World-
Saver,” 873. 
39 Lofland and Stark, “Becoming a World-Saver,” 873. 
40 Ibid., 862. 
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responsibility within a faith system, it derives from the dogmatic belief that the religion is the 
“one truth faith.”41 Surely conversions to these two particular religions constitute a large number 
of conversions, but this is not the case with Judaism as well as many other world religions which 
do not actively seek out converts. 
 
5. Travisano (1970): Conversion is “a radical reorgnization of identity, meaning, and life.”42 He 
continues: 
Conversions are transitions to identities which are proscribed within the person’s established 
universe of discourse, and which exist in universes of discourse that negate these formerly 
established ones. The ideal typical conversion can be thought of as the embracing of a negative 
identity. The person becomes something which was specifically prohibited.43 
 
Like the Lofland-Stark definition, the Travisano definition is something of a watershed 
contribution to conversion studies and is heavily cited in the literature, particularly in the fields 
of sociology and anthropology. This definition was so influential because of the way in which it 
identified an important distinction between true conversion on the one hand and the distinct case 
of “alternation” on the other. Whereas conversion is a is a significant and profound change, 
epitomized in the transition from a total lack of religious mentality to a new religious worldview, 
like converting to Islam from atheism, akin to Thomas Kuhn’s famous “paradigm shift” but on a 
personal and self-perceptual level, the phenomenon of alternation is rather different.44 As David 
Zehnder notes, the concept of alternation is adapted from the work of Peter Berger, a sociologist 
who argues that when people are faced with an overabundance of information, much of which is 
contradictory, as a result they tend to “construct several versions of themselves through which 
 
41 “The World’s Muslims: Religion, Politics, and Society,” Pew Research Center. 
42 Travisano, “Alternation and Conversion,” 600. 
43  Ibid., 601. 
44 See Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. 
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they alternate back and forth.”45 This is the fundamental basis for Travisano’s account of 
alternation as distinct from conversion; in the case of alternation the change is less profound, 
involving a shift in what is termed “role” but no significant change in underlying identity, which 
is but a substrate onto which various roles are mapped. The difference between role and identity 
is that the former is the product of—and manifest in—intersubjective relations which are 
themselves partly determined by the identity of the subject, which itself is flexible, but generally 
more consistent—according to Travisano’s theory—than the role. Without identity there could be 
no roles, but for any given identity there are countless roles. While identity in a sense “grounds” 
the possibility of role, significant life changes can be brought about by changes in role with no 
shift in underlying identity.  
 The point is that these role shifts can still be profound but are different in kind from 
identity changes. Within the limits of an identity there are various roles around which a subject 
can rotate. These roles can vary in type; for example, a Christian can alternate from a role within 
Protestantism to one situated in Roman Catholicism, or alternate from regularly attending 
services to failing to do so. Even the decision to become a lector or minister of the sacrament of 
Communion would classify as a change in role. Whether or not it is a “conversion,” however, 
should probably be scrutinized.  
 While shifts like these may resemble conversions in certain respects—when a relapsed 
Catholic decides after many years to return to the Church, this can look like a conversion—
ultimately these sorts of transitions are not true conversions because, according to the theory, 
they do not represent the adoption of a negative identity. Thus mere denominational changes 
within religious traditions are excluded from the limits of conversion.  A radical subjective 
 
45 Zehnder, A Theology of Religious Change, 29. 
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reorientation like the classic example epitomized by Paul would, by contrast, count as a 
conversion on Travisano’s terms. 
 
6. Scobie (1975): 
One common [religious] experience is usually referred to as conversion. It frequently represents 
the beginning of the religious life. Each conversion experience is undoubtedly unique, but we shall 
subsequently suggest that they can be assigned to three broad categories: (1) sudden conversion; 
(2) gradual conversion; and (3) unconscious conversion.46 
 
This definition is not given the attention that it warrants in the secondary literature on 
conversion. Of note first and foremost is the fact that this definition of conversion is very 
general, construing conversion simply as “the beginning of the religious life,” and it is this 
generality that enables Scobie to encompass the notion of “unconscious” conversion within his 
model. Scobie’s 1973 article and subsequent 1975 monograph are two of the only contemporary 
studies in which the idea of an “unconscious” conversion is postulated.47 It should come as no 
surprise that mention of this sort of conversion is highly infrequent in the scholarship on the 
topic. This is because the idea of an “unconscious” conversion is rather counter-intuitive, since 
such a conversion, devoid of awareness, does not seem to be much of a “conversion” in any 
meaningful or substantial sense. It would be very reasonable to ask how one could possibly 
“convert” without realizing it. It is similarly difficult to fathom how volition or will fits into the 
conception of unconscious conversion. On the basis of a cursory examination of the unconscious 
conversion, it almost seems as if the idea can be dismissed outright as incoherent. 
 
46 Scobie, Psychology of Religion, 10. 
47 Both the 1973 article as well as the 1975 monograph are based on work from Scobie’s 1967 
dissertation. 
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 This understandable skepticism should be measured against careful scholarly 
consideration, however, and in fact the unusual and somewhat obscure case of unconscious 
conversion can reveal important but easy-to-miss insights regarding all conversions. 
 The concept of unconscious conversion does not begin with Scobie; I have mentioned 
that it is already present, albeit in kernel form, in the work of William James, and even before 
that, it is found in Starbuck, who inspires James to discuss the same topic. But Scobie’s work, 
dating to the 1970s, takes the idea much further than either James or Starbuck, and when he 
makes reference to unconscious conversion, he does not really intend the same idea as Starbuck 
and James, despite the fact that he suggests that he and James refer to the same phenomenon but 
by different names; what is the “unconscious” conversion in Scobie is the “once-born” 
conversion in James.48 
 Starbuck realized the possibility of the unconscious conversion in a latent but ultimately 
functional sense. He directly associated the unconscious process of conversion with neural 
events (in contrast to a more psychoanalytic conception of the unconscious). According to 
Starbuck’s model, this unusual variety of conversion subsists on a subconscious level via neural 
links and associations, until one day it all violently surfaces on the level of conscious awareness. 
This conversion is typically non-religious, or as Starbuck calls it, an instance of “natural 
experience” meaning that this experience is both “normal” as well as “common.”49 
 The fact that Starbuck’s theory of unconscious conversion dictates that the phenomenon 
culminates with a newfound state of awareness cannot be overlooked. With his theory of the 
unconscious conversion, Starbuck effectively does no more than furnish an additional condition 
 
48 Scobie, Psychology of Religion, 50. 
49 Scobie, Psychology of Religion, 135. 
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that is superimposed upon the traditional “sudden” model of conversion, wherein the reoriented 
individual does not apprehend the progress of his own reorientation and then eventually “passes 
through” a specific threshold, wherein he grows aware of what has occurred. Thus, for Starbuck, 
the unconscious progression of the conversion eventually culminates in intentionality. 
 Scobie, too, understands the unconscious conversion as a process that occurs on a level 
below conscious awareness, but for him the process does not conclude with a violent realization 
or new awareness; while converts of this sort might be made aware of their “conversion” when 
prompted with the right questions by an investigator, these believers don’t really think of 
themselves as converts at all, and they struggle to recall a time in their lives in which they were 
not religious. 
  Similarly, while Starbuck conceives of the unconscious conversion as common but non-
religious, for Scobie the unconscious phenomenon is religious in nature. It must be admitted, 
though, that there is nothing in Scobie’s work that suggests that the phenomenon is only 
religious, despite the fact that he focuses on religious (specifically Christian) examples. 
 For Scobie, contra Starbuck, there is no “passageway” moment or threshold in an 
unconscious conversion. Indeed, for Scobie the unconscious conversion is, in a sense, the 
conversion that never occurred, at least not in any discernible manner, since the “convert” in 
question cannot recall ever not being religious. It must be granted that choosing to refer to this 
phenomenon as “conversion” is rather odd, to the extent that if someone always was a certain 
way, then it doesn’t make much sense to talk of their conversion, which implies a change in the 
way someone is, from his religious or spiritual worldview, to his political worldview, to his 
conception of his own gendered identity. Due to tensions such as this one, Spilka notes that today 
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psychologists are wont to classify this sort of phenomenon as “religious socialization” in contrast 
to authentic conversion.50 
 So why do I bring the Scobie definition before consideration here? Simply put, to the 
extent that, with the exception of monolithic and/or prophetic figures from the course of religious 
history, no person is “born with” religion, even in the case of faith systems such as Judaism, 
where a set of beliefs and practices are superimposed upon one’s Jewish ethnicity. If that is true, 
then all religious believers are ultimately arguably “converted”—at least in a phenomenological 
sense—and without a doubt these conversions are extremely variegated in type and kind. This is 
how some people convert to religion without even realizing it, often while very young, while for 
other people, it is a deliberate and fully conscious adult decision that occurs on a shorter term. 
 Why do I suggest that the former phenomenon is a conversion, when there are no 
antecedent beliefs from which the convert has arrived?  If one of the conditions of having a 
conversion is converting from something, then how is Scobie’s unconscious conversion a 
conversion at all? These are important questions. If this sort of gradual and subtle phenomenon is 
a conversion is one which is so gradual and subtle that it can bring one out of a completely 
neutral (or nonexistent) set of religious beliefs, then it does look to encompass many phenomena 
that resemble traditional conversions even less, to the extent that everyone who is born will 
ultimately, in becoming who they are, experience many conversions. In becoming who they are, 
these people grow into their likes and dislikes, their distinct personality features and general 
dispositions, their political, scientific, and religious worldviews, their philosophies of life and 
living. These people “convert” once as they leave their toddler years for their childhood, then 
again for their puberty, then again for adult life—perhaps with significant changes occurring in 
 
50 Ibid., 210; Jankiewicz, Lived Experience of Conversion, 73. 
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the early twenties, and again with middle age, and yet again in the twilight of one’s being. If I 
accept Scobie’s unconscious model, am I not forced to accept all of these phenomena as 
“conversions”? 
 I am prepared to accept this conclusion, for the following reasons. First, here I am 
examining the phenomenology of conversion, meaning that the phenomenon of conversion is my 
focus, conversion as it is experienced first-hand. What is the phenomenon of conversion in 
general? It is the experience of a certain sort of change immanent to my “self.” Here immanent 
means inherent as we understand in the natural attitude, with the proviso that for 
phenomenology, the experience of that which transcendence consciousness is itself immanent to 
my consciousness. Thus, both the star I see in the sky and the memory I have of my 
grandfather’s face are both “immanent” to my mental experience, but I experience the sky as an 
external object, whereas my retained image of the face is only “inside” my head, since my 
grandfather is deceased. I point out this distinction because there are many types of changes that 
I experience (and regard in the natural attitude) as if at least partly immanent to my self, but not 
all of these experiences are conversional. For example these changes can occur in terms of my 
intuition (like thinking something was the case but changing my mind, like thinking a color is 
red but then deciding that it is purple), my beliefs about my self (thinking I am no good at tennis 
but then deciding after some practice that I am), my beliefs about the world and the Other (I 
thought that a place or a politician was perfect but then I decided that was not the case), my 
awareness and control of my physical body (growing more skilled at one of the important 
movements in a sport), and so on. Not every change in beliefs about myself counts as a 
conversion, in other words—the change must be essential, part of who I am. Thus one person’s 
transformation into a magnificent swimmer might amount to a conversion, while for someone 
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else, this change is merely ancillary, such as the advanced dive training one might receive for a 
career in the emergency rescue profession. 
 But can a change in beliefs concerning an external object count as a conversion? Note 
that some of these experiences I encounter as if they involve an external object, such as my 
judgment regarding the color of something.), and my body I experience as both object and 
subject. Can the experience of change in an external object, or the change in how I judge an 
external object, really be considered a conversion? If the change corresponds with some 
significant change in my identity, then yes. How significant must the change be? While simply 
changing one’s mind is not sufficient for experiencing a conversion, some changes of mind, if 
they are essential, should be considered conversional. This is a relative matter; for example, a 
change of political parties may be an essential change for one person, if he considers his 
organized political ideology to be part of his personal identity, while a party change for another 
person might be a matter of much less significance and commitment. 
 Let us not forget that even though this is the experience of an essential self-change, this is 
not to suggest that the change is necessarily the object of my awareness. This is the significance 
of Scobie’s innovative contribution to the study of conversion. 
 The model also offers a unique alternative to the logic problems raised by the traditional 
models of conversion. While psychologists are keen to distinguish socialization from conversion 
on the basis of temporal duration, this analysis does not fit as well when considering conversion 
from the standpoint of experience. Psychologists before Scobie wanted to stipulate that an 
authentic case of conversion is marked by the subject’s ability to discern the time before the 
conversion as well as the time after the conversion, and according to such a criterion Starbuck’s 
account of unconscious conversion would count as conversion, while Scobie’s model would not. 
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But even if we permit the approximate estimation of the times in question, there are certainly 
some true converts who are incapable of carrying out the requisite dating of significant 
conversion events. Consider, for example, the case of the person who survives an accident in 
which they sustain a traumatic brain injury. Such injuries are well-known to institute radical 
changes in personality—consider Merleau-Ponty’s famous study of Schneider.51 While some 
scholars are probably fine with excluding cases such as these from the purview of conversion 
proper, again this raises the difficult question of whether consciousness and choice are truly 
necessary conditions for conversion. 
 Why do we take for granted that these mental acts (namely those by which the subject is 
able to identity the “before” and “after” of the conversion) are the marks that define the true or 
authentic conversion? Phenomenological analysis reveals the insight that my experience is 
constituted out of myriad elements which are in large part below the surface of conscious 
attention. My world can change in ways subtle or drastic, as I too change with it, but these 
perpetually reordered appearances of the world are not such that I am conscious of every change 
which I experience. Perhaps it is the historical bias of conversion studies, which took for granted 
the paradigmatic status of the Pauline case, that accounts for the difficulty in parsing the 
conversion phenomenon from the conscious awareness phenomenon. But if we again return to 
the early work of James, we find that he gets this point right. As Scobie himself notes, what he 
refers to as “unconscious” conversion is, for James, the “once-born” conversion of the “healthy 
minded.”52 This sort of conversion is not instantiated via a crisis or breakthrough realization—it 
 
51 Merleau-Ponty, PP, 103. I recognize that it may be contentious to identify the case of 
Goldstein’s patient Schneider as an instance of conversion, especially since Merleau-Ponty’s 
main purpose in his discussion of Schneider is to show how his altered motor intentionality 
demonstrates certain phenomenological correlates on the physiological side of embodiment. 
52 Scobie, Psychology of Religion, 50. 
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is Pauline bias that keeps us from considering this less tumultuous phenomenon as an authentic 
conversion. 
 For many religious believers, their relationship with religion is one which has existed as a 
constituent part of their lives from a young age. These religious believers don’t necessarily think 
of themselves as “converts” since their faith life has been part of their nurturing and conditioning 
from very early on. Thus it seems that being introduced to religion as a child is not ordinarily 
understood to fall within the purview of religious conversion, which to the contrary looks to be 
an experience unique to adults and perhaps teenagers. This reflects the everyday wisdom that 
converting requires a more developed and sophisticated understanding, as well as a more refined 
sense of freedom and choice. While it is not forbidden to speak of the conversion of children, it 
has to be granted that the way in which a child “converts” to a different religion is drastically 
different from the more deliberate and conscientious conversion of a teenager or adult. It is 
typically understood that it is not until a person reaches adolescence that a person is capable of 
experiencing a crisis of identity.53 Erikson suggests that for the teenager this crisis comes down 
to the opposition between self-sure sense of identity on the one hand and confusion regarding 
social role on the other.54 But that sort of experience is not unconscious like the account given by 
Scobie. 
 The fact that the unconscious conversion is subtly embedded in a long-term process, the 
beginning of which is not necessarily clearly recalled, can make it difficult to recognize as an 
authentic instance of the phenomenon. The unconscious conversion does not, however, have to 
 
53 There are some exceptions to this, including Freud and Sartre. 
54 See Identity: Youth and Crisis. For Erikson role follows from sense of identity, such that a 
person who is unsure about their identity will also be unsure of how he or she fits into the social 
sphere. 
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be one which is mediated via a long-term process or sequence. It is a problem that Scobie 
specifically conceives of unconscious conversion only as the result of a process and not an event. 
This is misguided. While it may be assumed that the process-based unconscious conversion is in 
fact the more common variety of unconscious conversion, I have already pointed out how some 
conversion cases, as I suggest we classify Schneider, are more sudden (determined in large part 
by a single event or episode) but still unconscious. Make no mistake, however, that the sudden 
unconscious conversion must be the result of physical damage or trauma to the brain and central 
nervous system. It is certainly at least possible that someone could experience a conversion 
enacted by a singular event but could remain unconscious of the conversion change. Consider, 
for example, the retrospective reflection of someone advanced in years who, in hindsight, is able 
to define the specific “threshold moment” that the psychologists maintain to be a criterion for 
true conversion contra mere socialization; this person might have gone decades without realizing 
that he or she had changed in (or became) a specific way that previously was not their own, 
while he or she is nevertheless capable, at least in theory, of identifying that singular moment 
that instituted the deep and significant change in personal identity. Arriving upon the insight or 
realization that one has changed is in fact an incredibly common phenomenon and it might be 
part of normal human development; it may even occur several times as one progresses through 
various phases or stages of life. 
 Lastly, I have to address the question raised by Scobie’s work regarding conversion’s 
requirement of choice, and the extent to which choice is conscious. Ordinarily when we think of 
choice, we assume that it is something that is deliberate and conscious, something of which we 
are fully aware.   To be sure many of the choices that we make on a daily basis are choices of this 
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variety, and there is a common tendency to refrain from calling any action that is not deliberate 
and or/conscious a “choice.”   
 This common tendency is likely misguided. As Elissa Asp shows, there is neuroscientific 
evidence suggesting that “relatively automatized selection” should be part of any “non-
reductionist account of choice.”55 Similar to what Merleau-Ponty achieves with the abnormal 
case of Schneider, neuroscientists have recognized that damage to circuits in the dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex or the anterior cingulate cortex correlates with the slowing of cognition, issues 
paying attention and “reduced initiation.” In other words, choices that seem to be automatic are 
more executive than we thought, based on measured brain activity. Asp cites the work of Michael 
Halliday, who shows that linguistic choices are not carried out on the volition of the speaker (or 
subject) but instead on the grammar of the language spoken. According to Asp, Halliday’s work 
shows that agency does not require intentionality. She points out that other authors, like 
Jackendoff, include intentionality in their requirements for agency, but there is an important 
proviso that must be noted: as Asp puts it, a “doer of an action . . . has the capacity for 
intention.”56 Having the capacity for intention is worlds away from actually exercising 
intentionality. This is not the concept of intentionality as understood in Scholastic Philosophy, 
Brentano, and eventually phenomenology; instead this is the more ordinary and non-technical 
sense of the term, where ‘to intend’ means something more like “to do deliberately.” The point, 
however, is that to do something deliberately one might still be acting more or less automatically 
and with a negligible degree of attentiveness—Asp compares it to the morning habit of making a 
coffee. 
 
55 Asp, “Twin Paradoxes,” 162. 
56 Ibid., 164. 
63 
 This is not so different from certain cases of religious conversion, especially those in 
which a person is raised within a faith system from a very young age. Eventually the habits of 
religious practice start to produce automatized worship behaviors, exemplified in the Christian 
repetition of common daily prayers like the Our Father, as well as the automatic knowledge of 
when to sit and stand during a mass or service, which is sometimes executed on an almost 
involuntary basis.  Thus it is plainly apparent that unconscious religious conversion is indeed a 
coherent and in fact very common phenomenon. But to the extent that this type of conversion is, 
at least at Scobie conceives it, not the object of intentionality, it may prove to be impossible to 
phenomenologically analyze it. In the third chapter I will explore what consciousness of this sort 
of conversion looks like on a first-person basis, and if successful I will attempt to derive 
phenomenological conclusions from the fact that unconscious experience is a real and valid, if 
often largely ignored, phenomenon. 
 
7. Snow and Machalek (1983): “[F]our key properties […] define the convert: biographical 
reconstruction, adoption of a master attribution scheme, suspension of analogical reasoning, and 
embracement of a master role.”57 This contribution from Snow and Machalek is contained in 
their well-known essay “The Convert as a Social Type” and it is at once both similar to and 
different from the earlier traditional models. To begin with, whereas James and Nock both 
describe a turn or re-orientation, the present account specifically frames the change in idea as not 
only a re-orientation but a hermeneutic event, a re-interpretation of one’s self. To the extent that 
one can turn or undergo a shift without necessarily interpreting anew the events of one’s past, the 
Snow-Machalek definition addresses the retroactive perception of personal history in a manner 
 
57 Snow and Machalek, “Convert as a Social Type,” 266. 
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that no earlier definition could capture, despite the fact that they credit James with the term and 
cite how often the general idea appears in the literature on conversion starting in the 1960s, 
including the offering from Travisano, cited above.58 The second condition mandated in the 
Snow-Machalek definition, calling for the “adoption of a master attribution scheme.” This 
sociological jargon simply refers to the way in which a subject explains or makes sense of the 
world—in other words, the interpretive framework of the convert. Here the reference is to a 
framework as a general explanatory model, like a worldview.59 These frameworks are often 
understood to be literal rather than metaphorical (or analogical), as the third condition suggests. 
Converts turn to these sorts of frameworks because they perceive their new religious or spiritual 
views as inconsistent, incompatible, or at the very least, “incomparable,” as Snow and Machalek 
put it, with all alternatives. Thus to endorse an analogy between Christianity and Islam would be, 
as Travisano puts it, proscribed (forbidden.) The reason for this is that the analogy is often 
perceived to constitute a threat to the “authenticity and sacredness of conversion,” since the 
comparison could potentially “invalidate and profane” the experience.60 Lastly when the convert 
takes up a “master role” she or he adopts a new socially-mediated position or duty, facilitated by 
or through the conversion process. It should be noted that embracing a master role is not, for 
Snow and Machalek, the embracing of a master in one’s life, akin to the acceptance of authority. 
To the contrary, the idea of the master role is the overarching “default” way in which one views 
their role in life. This role, to the extent that it is one’s dominant identification, is not 
compartmentalized, despite the fact that, as Gooren notes, the role is specifically situated within 
 
58 Ibid. 
59 It might still be possible that Hegel’s “Lordship and Bondage” story is relevant here to the 
extent that the adoption of a master attribution scheme does require the annihilation, figurative or 
literal, of the subject’s old way of being. 
60 Snow and Machalek, “Convert as a Social Type,” 274. 
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a “specific universe of discourse.”61 Thus in comparison to the account offered by Travisano, a 
shift in role is not just the mark of alternation contra conversion, but instead can define a 
conversion so long as the role change is significant enough—in fact, this take on the “master” 
role is more like a change in identity than a change in role. It would be prudent to add to this 
definition the final qualification that Snow and Machalek place upon their model for conversion: 
“it is the convert’s rhetoric rather than institutional context or ideological content that denotes the 
convert as a social type.” 
 
8. Richardson (1985): 
The old conversion paradigm, with its deprivation and strain assumptions about the passivity of 
human beings, and its overemphasis on the individual, is giving way, at least partially, to another 
view of conversion. This new view stresses humans as volitional entities who assign meaning to 
their action and to the actions of others within a social context. 62 
 
This account is pulled from Richardson’s influential article in which he identifies a “Kuhnian 
crisis” manifest in the switch from the old paradigm that eventually gave way to the more 
contemporary idea that conversion is something that is actively sought out, instead of something 
that merely “happens” to a subject, as is the case with the classic “Pauline” model. 
 For Richardson conversion cannot be framed on a solely individual or personal basis. 
Rather, the interpretive significance of a conversion is such that an intersubjective milieu is 
required in order for the conversion to make any sense at all. Richardson underscores the extent 
to which action plays a crucial role in conversion, which is not exactly a novel contribution to the 
field, present in even the earliest offerings from Starbuck and James, but is nevertheless an 
 
61 Gooren, Religious Conversion and Disaffiliation, 43. 
62 Richardson, “The Active vs. Passive Convert,” 164; Gooren, Religious Conversion and 
Disaffiliation, 46-47. 
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important qualification to add to clarify how conversion is not simply an intellectual change but 
also a change in praxis. 
 
9. Gaventa (1986): 
There are, then, three categories of personal change of which we need to be aware in this study [of 
conversion]: alternation, conversion, and transformation. Alternation is a relatively limited form of 
change that develops from one’s previous behavior; conversion is a radical change in which past 
affiliations are rejected for some new commitment and identity; transformation is also radical 
change, but one in which an altered perception reinterprets both present and past.63 
 
Gaventa is a Bible scholar who has significantly challenged some of the psychological 
assumptions in 20th century work on conversion. As Zeba Crook points out in Reconceptualizing 
Conversion, the 20th century saw an influx of psychology-based studies of New Testament 
conversion.64 But according to Crook, despite the abundance of these psychological studies, 
“there was a growing awareness that psychological assessments of ancient texts and characters 
were problematic…”65 He credits Beverley Gaventa with challenging the notion that conversion 
anecdotes in the New Testament can all be classified as one single type of event. Gaventa, like 
Alan Segal, proposes a sociological reading of these conversions. She argues that there are three 
distinct types of phenomena: the pendular, alternation, and transformation.66 A pendular change 
is a radical movement that requires the rejection of old beliefs, whereas alternation is a more 
practical change that occurs on the basis of cause and effect—like realizing that the commission 
of violent crimes has resulted in one’s incarceration, which makes one unhappy, even if one does 
not go so far as to reject his openness to living a violent life. Gaventa notes that switching from 
one type of Christianity to another, so long as the two are reasonably different (like Mormonism 
 
63 Gaventa, From Darkness to Light, 12. 
64 Crook, Reconceptualizing Conversion, 28. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Gaventa, From Darkness to Light, 8-10. 
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compared with Roman Catholicism) is a pendular conversion, but not alternation, which she 
suggests should not be considered a conversion at all. Alternation is just something that “grows 
out of the past.” 
 Transformation is a third phenomenon in which one does not react pragmatically 
(alternation) or negatively (pendular), but instead “reinterprets and reconstructs” the past in part 
of one’s reconsideration of self and world. Gaventa suggests that this third type of conversion is 
the sort that most commentators tend to focus on in their study of Christian and Hebrew 
scripture. 
 Despite the fact that most commentators focus on transformative conversion, it is 
Gaventa’s own account of transformation that is her most novel and inventive contribution to 
conversion studies.  First, Gaventa calls ordinary conversion a change that is “radical” in nature, 
but unlike figures who share her view, namely Nock and Starbuck, Gaventa indicates that this 
sort of change does not necessarily entail the rejection of one’s prior ways. In this way Gaventa’s 
more open model is closer to that of James. She gravitates toward an understanding of 
conversion that is couched in authentic change in identity rather than the less intense shift of 
role. 
 The only difference between a standard conversion and a transformation is that the 
converting subject reinterprets or “re-perceives” the past but also the present (as most of the 
definitions allow). Unsatisfied with categorizing this sort of change under the more typical 
conversion, Gaventa reserves self-reinterpretation for the special case of true transformation. 
Obviously, this entails the notion that it is possible for a subject to convert without reinterpreting 
everything up to that very moment, but it is rather unclear, despite Gaventa’s use of the 
conjunction “and”, whether the “mere” convert can become a transformed being simply by 
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reinterpreting the past in addition to the present, since, after all, it is hard to fathom how one 
could convert without the simultaneous change in self-perception. It would seem that it is the 
retroactive reinterpretation alone that distinguishes the transformation from the convert. 
 
10. Gelpi (1986): 
I use the word ‘conversion’ … to mean the decision to assume responsibility for a distinguishable 
area of experienced growth and development. Converts turn from irresponsible to responsible 
living…By ‘conversion’ I mean the double decision to repudiate irresponsible behavior and to take 
responsibility for the subsequent development of some aspect of my own experience.67 
 
While the Snow-Machalek and Gaventa definitions are in part noteworthy for their treatment of 
retrospective reinterpretation, the Gelpi model is intriguing for its incorporation of premeditation 
and thoughtfulness.68 This should be considered a relatively “intellectual” or “rational” model of 
conversion since deciding to take on responsibility is the definite result of reflective 
contemplation, especially when the responsibility is taken for a determinate zone of 
improvement, again requiring careful thought.69 But the nature of this rationality is, according to 
Gelpi, ethical. Like the Starbuck and James definitions, this conversion model places moral 
values on the trajectory of the change, wherein one moves from the lack of responsibility to the 
adoption thereof. Thus while it is true that growth and development are relatively situated, 
ultimately Gelpi allows only for the conversion moving in the one (“positive”) direction, rather 
 
67 Gelpi, “The Converting Jesuit,” 4-5. Cited in Understanding Religious Conversion, 146. 
Rambo indicates that Gelpi delineates five “dimensions” of conversion: “affective, intellectual, 
ethical, religious, and social.” 
68 Bernard Lonergan also offers an intellectual account of conversion. See Method in Theology. 
69 For other “rational choice” models see Gartrell and Shannon’s “Contacts, Cognitions, and 
Conversion: A Rational Choice Approach”, 33, as well as Stark and Finke’s Acts of Faith: 
Explaining the Human Side of Religion, 123; Gooren, Religious Conversion and Disaffiliation, 
47. 
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than the more fluid continuum that defines the approach of Gaventa, according to which losing 
one’s religion could count as a conversion phenomenon. 
 This is problematic. Adding a positive value judgment to any conversion model forces us 
to exclude authentic examples from our consideration. Consider, for example, how the accounts 
of conversion offered by the earlier commentators (namely Starbuck, James, and Nock) force us 
to confine the phenomenon to a very narrow range of experiences. While conversion ordinarily 
has a positive connotation, it seems there are major risks that come with assuming that 
conversion is always good. I cannot accept any metaphysical argument that conversion is always 
good, nor can I definitively prove that conversion is an improvement of the individual without 
taking recourse to reductive pragmatic criteria that would radically restrict the number of 
scenarios that I can classify as conversion. For example, I can defend the pragmatic “goodness” 
of the conversion of a violent murderer who turns to peaceful religion. St. Paul essentially fits 
this mold. For a person like that, conversion is good.70 But these are rather extreme existential 
examples; surely it is the case that not all conversions have to involve such complete and 
sweeping change? For example is a Baptist who converts to Catholicism necessarily doing 
something “good” or even definitely improving? This is an entirely relative question—we cannot 
answer it here. 
 But why does conversion have to be good at all? Are not the adherents of worldviews like 
Nazism or fascism, a bit like “converts” to evil? Not only do some conversions have neutral 
value, but it also seems that others amount to the worsening of the individual.  It is an utter 
mistake to assume that religious or spiritual conversion always brings someone to the good, and 
it is a mistake to think that conversion is always a good thing. 
 
70 But entirely or totally good? Here I hesitate to agree that these conversions are totally good. 
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 While it has to be admitted that “being evil” is not a religion or even (necessarily) a 
spiritual worldview, we should carefully evaluate the idea of converting to evil as a valid 
phenomenon. First, simply doing something wrong does not amount to a “conversion” to evil. 
For a person to “convert” to evil, he or she needs to undergo a change in identity or role. This 
change cannot be merely temporary. 
 Second it seems that when a person has an experience like this, of “converting to evil,” 
the experience does not have to be interpreted as wrong or evil.  Ultimately, we have to resolve 
ourselves to the fact that some “evil” people will think of themselves as “good.” Many people 
perform objectionable acts but never think of themselves as evil even though they regularly make 
choices that most of society is prepared to agree are “evil.” As I have argued elsewhere, it is not 
necessary for someone to realize that he or she has converted (to evil) in order for it to be a 
conversion—all that is required are “evil” judgments, choices, or beliefs that ultimately bring an 
individual to a “tipping point” where a change in identity or role is enacted. Thus it is crucial that 
these judgments, choices, and beliefs exert existential influence on the individual.71 
 It is this existential influence, and significance, that enables us to distinguish between an 
individual evil act and the essential evil of an individual. In fact physically “doing” evil is not 
necessary in order for one to “be” (a convert to) evil. While it is tempting to assert that the reality 
of material evil acts (like murder) is what distinguishes true evil from mere daydreaming, in fact 
it is the evil idea that bears the mark of real evil, because without the idea or concept of evil, no 
act could be interpreted as such. The “evil idea” is not the idea of evil as a concept, but instead 
the subject’s having a belief, choice, or judgment that is “evil” (according to social consensus). 
 
71 I do think that it is possible to unconsciously convert to evil, assuming that certain conditions 
are met.  
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Ultimately the subject may or may not interpret his belief, choice, or judgment to be evil. After 
all a child can commit an “evil” act without understanding what he has done. 
 Believing one’s self to be evil is not required in order to have experienced a conversion to 
evil. Just as I argued with the ordinary examples of “unconscious” conversion, it is possible for 
someone to experience conversion by making judgments and choices that are not necessarily 
interpreted as having to do with conversion. The same goes for evil; if someone (of sound adult 
mind) makes judgments that manifest an existential difference, he does not necessarily need to 
judge himself to be a convert or to have converted. Instead the sufficient condition is a judgment 
or series of judgments, a choice or series or choices, or a belief or series of beliefs. 
 One final noteworthy aspect of the Gelpi definition is the way in which it focuses on the 
resolution to change, epitomized in the choice, instead of the event or process of change itself, 
which is the case with the rest of the models I survey here. In this way the Gelpi model 
resembles that of Nock. Thus it is worth emphasizing that transforming into someone evil has to 
come as the result of willful judgments. Becoming evil, in other words, is something that is 
chosen. Here the choice does not help to explain the theology of sin or the problem of theodicy, 
but instead, differentiates conversion from becoming-in-general. I will later clarify this issue and 
offer an extended argument, but the conversion phenomenon has to occur on the basis of 
conscious decision-making, even if, somewhat surprisingly, the conversion itself is not realized 
by the subject. There are many aspects of our selves that are not necessarily the result of our own 
choices, exemplified by the extreme example of a young man who is violent and abusive because 
he was the victim of violent abuse as a child. Surely a situation like this requires some analytic 
nuance— even if the young man has made his own poor choices, it is also true that he did not 
choose parts of who he “is.” This is true to some extent for all of us. And if we do not take this 
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position, consider how this multiplication of the phenomenon weakens the classic concept and 
the examples of it—like the story of St. Paul which, true or false, tells a story of a determinate 
and special phenomenon that should be distinguished from becoming a braggart or a talkative 
person. Include too much under the heading of conversion and the phenomenon becomes 
watered down and impossibly differentiated. Similarly a non-volitional model of conversion 
would require us to classify the forced “conversions” of indigenous peoples as authentic 
conversion experiences. If someone makes you change, this is existentially violent; the “forced” 
conversion cannot be accepted here. 
 
11. Baird (1992): 
Conversion… [is] an experience of disruption in human subjects’ spontaneous self-understanding, 
resulting from a confrontation with an ultimate, transcendent field of signification, which […] 
invites subjects to re-identify themselves in the new context it provides.72 
 
This definition refers to “disruption” reminiscent of the account from James and his divided self, 
but there are several novel dimensions to this contribution from Baird. First, whereas James and 
Lofland-Stark conceive of a self that is divided and then unified in conversion, Baird describes a 
conversion that itself enacts the disruption (i.e. division in the parlance of James.) The object of 
this disruption is also significant, since for Baird it is not merely self-understanding that is at 
play but specifically “spontaneous self-understanding.” In the fragment excerpted above this 
qualification is obscure, but elsewhere Baird makes it very clear that the disruption experienced 
by the subject is precisely one which interrupts what was previously merely or only a 
spontaneous understanding of self, meaning an understanding which was predicated entirely 
 
72 Baird, “Role and Dynamics of Conversion,” 346. Baird continues, “[t]he conversion moment 
proper then occurs when subjects embrace the new context, and indeed re-identify themselves in 
its light.” 
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upon the thematics of autonomous self-actualization.73 This understanding of self is also 
described as “functional.”74 Thus when conversion is here characterized as a disruption of the 
spontaneous understanding it is implied that the new form of understanding is of a higher order, 
more essential and of an indelible nature. This is precisely the idea behind the “transcendent field 
of signification” that catalyzes the process, which is deserving of a few remarks. First the 
inclusion of this aspect characterizes this account as theological in scope. This means that this 
conversion model makes theological assumptions or at the very least takes a theological view of 
its subject matter, which will necessarily differ from a strictly psychological or sociological view. 
Second, this transcendental field makes for a highly restrictive condition imposed upon the 
phenomenon of conversion, since the absence of such a field precludes any shift or change from 
being classified as a conversion. To this limitation, however, one has to wonder what makes for a 
“transcendent field of signification” in the first place. Without a doubt this would include the 
likes of experiencing an apparition, hallucination, or vision, exemplified in the paradigmatic case 
of Saint Paul. But it would seem to be an error to limit the field of transcendent signs to only 
those cases manifest before visual sensation; many times the field is experienced purely through 
tactile correlates of embodiment, through “feeling,” like the overwhelming physical reaction one 
can feel, including but not limited to tingling, warmth, the rush of blood, chills, goosebumps. etc. 
And lastly would it not be possible to encounter the transcendental field of signification through 
purely discursive, intellectual means? Given the wide variety of ways in which one could 
encounter the transcendent field of signification, which enacts and catalyzes the religious or 
 
73 Ibid., xxvii. 
74 Ibid., 163. 
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spiritual change, on a fundamental level the Baird definition is capable of encompassing a wide 
array of conversions. 
 The real question, though, is whether the transcendent field is always passively 
encountered. By “passive” I mean not actively pursued. Certainly St. Paul’s conversion is like 
this. But it is actually very possible that someone could look for transcendent meaning. This is 
exactly what institutional forms of conversion amount to, like the lesson and practices that 
Catholic converts go through in order to become Catholic. The difference is that this sort of 
confrontation is not abrupt and isolated. Instead, this conversion is something for which one 
prepares for many weeks and sometimes years. In short it is easy to interpret Baird’s conversion 
as only applying to the tumultuous, Pauline sort of cases, but in fact she provides the framework 
for situating the profound transformative power of conversion beyond the limits of the passive, 
adventitious conversion. She shows, in short, that the conversion that results from (or is manifest 
in) a transcendent cognition can be one which is tracked, as the object of a desire or motivation. 
 Despite being a theological definition, this definition is not unidirectional, like some of 
the older alternatives, nor, like Gaventa’s model, is it morally situated, as are the accounts from 
Starbuck, James, and Nock. Thus it is becoming easier to identify definite disciplinary trends and 
correlations in the conversion definitions here considered. 
 
12. Rambo (1996): 
… [C]onversion is what a group or person says it is. The process of conversion is a product of the 
interactions among the convert’s aspirations, needs, and orientations, the nature of the group into 




75 Rambo, Understanding Religious Conversion, 7. 
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In addition to this rather open take on the phenomenon Rambo also provides the following, more 
restrictive set of conditions: 
Conversion takes place (1) when a person or group is connected to relationships in a religious 
community; (2) when rituals are enacted that foster experience and action consonant with religious 
mandates and goals; (3) when the rhetoric or system of interpretation of life is transformed into a 
religious frame of reference; and (4) when a person’s role or sense of place and purpose is enacted 
and guided by religious sensibilities and structures.76 
 
Ultimately Rambo’s monograph Understanding Religious Conversion identifies seven overall 
stages of the conversion process and they are as follows: 1. context, 2. crisis, 3. quest, 4. 
encounter, 5. interaction, 6. commitment, 7. consequences.77 
 The first noteworthy feature of Rambo’s well-known conversion definition is the way in 
which it is restricted to conversions in a specific context: institutions and group belonging. This 
is in complete contrast to the Snow-Machalek, Gelpi and Baird definitions which are framed in 
far more individualistic terms. The Gaventa definition mentions affiliation but is less restrictive 
than what is presented here by Rambo. According to Rambo’s criteria there is no such 
phenomenon as the “private” conversion that is not tied to some specific group or institution. 
This most certainly raises an interesting point that heretofore has not been addressed—should it 
be called a conversion if you are experiencing something private? While the early Starbuck 
definition would not allow for such an event, due to the way in which he presupposes religious 
concepts values, e.g. “from sinfulness to righteousness”, which would without an established 
religious worldview have no significance, the more open account of James could fully 
accommodate a private conversion event since ultimately all that is required is the unification of 
a divided self as facilitated through a “firmer hold upon religious realities.” While the descriptor 
‘religious’ has institutional connotations, if it is expanded to include more general “spiritual 
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perceptions,” then the personal conversion can occur. Nock’s model, too, would accommodate 
this sort of phenomenon, even if he sees the Christian conversion as the most complete type. 
 Another sense in which the Rambo definition differs from its forebears is in its 
identification of the importance of rituals to the conversion process, which again limits the 
phenomenon to institutional, organized contexts. For Rambo these rituals are sourced in religious 
communities, so the idea of a “personal” ritual is precluded from consideration. 
 The sequence of steps that Rambo provides near the end of his monograph are less 
restrictive although their concise articulation is subject to numerous elaborations, such that, for 
example, the sixth step of the sequence, wherein one becomes committed to a new worldview, is 
specifically a commitment to a religious worldview. Again the more private and individual sort 
of conversion is thereby excluded from this analysis. Interestingly in his enumeration of the 
major steps of conversion Rambo elects to include “crisis”, which calls to mind the “divided 
self” of James as well as the Nock definition from 1933. As I have indicated, this notion of crisis 
and the divided self has a basis not only in emotional being and loyalty but also in Hegel’s 
analysis of unhappy consciousness. 
 
13. Marion (1997): While he does not directly define conversion per se, Marion’s ideas regarding 
the “saturated phenomenon” are particularly relevant for my phenomenology of conversion, so I 
would like to determine whether aspects of his concept can be incorporated into my synthetic 
definition of the conversion phenomenon. 
 Marion characterizes the basic features of the saturated phenomenon as follows: “The 
saturated phenomenon will be described as invisable according to quantity, unbearable according 
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to quality, absolute according to relation, [and] irregardable according to modality.”78 Here 
Marion employs the Kantian categories of understanding as the basic rubric against which he 
outlines the saturated phenomenon. In short, the idea is that the saturated phenomenon is one 
which surpasses or goes beyond these categories. This is because the saturated phenomenon 
provides—or better yet, gives—an “intuition [that] passes beyond the concept.” For example, 
when Marion indicates that the saturated phenomenon is invisable with respect to quantity, this 
means that the magnitude of the phenomenon cannot be intended (by the phenomenological 
subject). Here Marion is using ‘intend’ in the same sense as Brentano and Husserl—the point 
being that the saturated phenomenon is a type of phenomenon that transcends the ordinary limits 
of our understanding. If the magnitude or quantity of a phenomenon cannot be the object of my 
intentionality, this means that I am encountering an “overflowing” phenomenon that outstrips my 
ability, as a perceiver, to have perceptions “about” the magnitude or quantity of the phenomenon.  
Marion provides several examples of this, from amazement to the Kantian sublime. The same 
basic idea—that the saturated phenomenon exceeds the limits of my understanding—applies to 
the other four features above. While phenomena of this nature cannot be understood, they 
nevertheless furnish the subject with more intuition than can complete his intention; thus, these 
phenomena “overflow” and are “saturated.” But the subject is incapable of determining or 
identifying whether the phenomenon presents an “excess” or a “shortage” of intuition.79 But this 
also raises a paradox: the givenness of the saturated phenomenon at once both intuits an excess at 
the same time that it circumvents intentionality. As Marion puts it, “[t]he visibility of the 
appearance thus arises against the flow of the intention” (225). This is what makes the saturated 
 
78 Marion, Being Given, 363n41. “Invisable” is not a typographical error; it is a conscious choice 
by the translator to try to capture the sense of viser, to aim at, mean, or intend.  
79 Ibid., 245. 
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phenomenon so otherworldly and so unusual. If not for this paradox, the saturated phenomenon 
would not be saturated at all, but would be like any other “common law” phenomenon, which 
Marion stresses would in fact, rather surprisingly, be impossible if not for the saturated variety, 
which offers the subject a sort of standard to which the givenness of the “common” phenomenon 
can be compared.  
Marion dictates that there are five types of saturated phenomenon. They are the historical 
event, the idol, the flesh, the icon, and the phenomenon of revelation (228-34). This last 
phenomenon, that of revelation, is the example par excellence¸ to the extent that it “concentrates 
the four types of saturated phenomena and is given at once as historic event, idol, flesh, and icon 
(face)” (235). Since I am dealing only with conversion it is not necessary to get into the finer 
details of Marion’s argumentation in this regard, but the basic idea is that the revelation 
phenomenon is similar to the four preceding types of saturated phenomena in virtue of its 
aggregation of horizon and narrative (like the historical event), its continual exhortation to be 
observed (like the idol), its capability to dissolve the ego pole (like the flesh), and its power to 
deploy its own gaze instead of merely being seen (like the icon/face). Via its concentration of these 
phenomenological features the revelation phenomenon is a “saturation of saturation” (my italics), 
the very “culmination” of the saturated phenomenon.  
In what way does this relate to the conversion phenomenon? It is undeniable that saturated 
phenomena sometimes but not always catalyze conversion experiences. Saint Paul, for example, 
indubitably encounters a saturated phenomenon on the road to Damascus.80 During this episode 
Paul’s intentionality cannot contend with the overflowing degree of intuition given during the 
 
80 Marion does not reference Paul in Being Given; the present analysis of Paul’s conversion 
follows Marion’s argumentation but is of my own design. 
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revelatory encounter. The manifestation of Christ exceeds Paul’s understanding of quantity to the 
extent that it is a saturation of his vision; Christ’s appearance could not have been foreseen by 
Paul, in contrast to the way in which Paul’s vision can anticipate ordinary phenomena, such as the 
flight of a bird or insect. The manifestation exceeds Paul’s understanding of quality insofar as Paul 
cannot bear the sight of Christ; he is blinded and falls to the ground. Christ’s manifestation exceeds 
Paul’s understanding of relation because of the way in which the appearance of Christ interpolates 
and disrupts Paul’s phenomenological horizon as well as all possible horizons, specifically via the 
way in which the manifestation violates Paul’s understanding of spatiotemporality. Lastly the 
manifestation of Christ surpasses Paul’s understanding of modality through the way in which Paul 
is regarded by Christ and actually constituted by Christ (in direct contradiction of the contemporary 
theory that Paul was merely having an epileptic episode, such that the transcendental ego was 
constituting the appearance of Christ, and not vice-versa). In other words, the manifestation of 
Christ qua saturated phenomenon makes Paul its witness, instead of Paul qua witness making the 
saturated phenomenon/manifestation of Christ.  
While it is certainly the case that conversions often occur without some basis in an 
encounter with a saturated phenomenon, Marion’s concept provides a useful phenomenological 
framework for analyzing the conversion that is accompanied by any variety of spiritual or religious 
ecstasis. Later I will need to determine whether the “garden variety” conversion that is gradual 
and not sudden, the result of reflection and contemplation and not spontaneous insight, 
nevertheless shares some of the features of the saturated phenomenon. 
 
14. Hervieu-Léger (1999): 
 The first [type of conversion] is that of the individual who changes religion […] The second 
modality of conversion is that of the individual who, never having belonged to any religious 
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tradition, discovers, after a more or less long personal journey, that in which he recognizes 
himself and to which he finally decides to enlist himself. […] The third modality of the 
figure of conversion is that of the reaffiliate, of the inner conversion, the one who discovers 
or rediscovers a religious identity which has remained until then formal [nominal], to lived 
practice, in pure communion with the group.81 
 
Like Gaventa, Hervieu-Léger prudently classifies several distinct types of conversion. She 
incorporates into her model the person who moves from one religious paradigm to another, the 
person who turns to religion after previously holding no religious worldview, and the person whose 
faith is intensified or perhaps authenticated or emboldened, without any change from one religion, 
or no religion, to another.  Here, with respect to the last type of conversion, the idea is that one has 
considered oneself to be religious but not in any meaningful sense, such that an enlightening and 
new self-discovery is possible, in which one reorients one’s self toward a more orthodox sort of 
religious worldview, not to mention belonging. The second type of conversion is interesting for 
the way in which it factors in the idea that the convert recognizes a sense of belonging in a religious 
entity. Lastly it should be added that Hervieu-Léger’s conversion model refers to ‘religion’ but 
does not necessarily invoke the idea of religion in an institutional or organized sense, as is the case 
with some of the other models that I have reviewed. 
 
15. Meintel (2007): 
 “Conversion [is usually defined as a] ritually-marked adoption of a new religious 
belonging. […] Conversion so defined normalizes exclusive identities and global (i.e. 
fundamentalist) religious discourse as the “gold standard” of conversion, and, by 
expansion, of religious experience.”82 
 
 
81 Hervieu-Léger, Le Pèlerin et le converti, 121-24. This is my own translation, and it is not one 
which is conducted à la lettre although it does capture the overall sense of the writing. 
82 Meintel, “When There Is No Conversion,” 149, 158. 
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Here the point is that a conversion can occur even in the absence of distinct institutional 
boundaries, as exemplified by the Spiritualist Movement in Montreal vis-à-vis the larger Catholic 
demographic. Meintel argues that these Spiritualists should be considered as converts despite the 
fact that they do not necessarily view themselves as such; they do not think of themselves as having 
left their Catholic faith. This argument is crucial for my purposes here because this directly 
addresses the question of whether a subject has to think that he or she has converted in order for a 
conversion to have occurred. According to Meintel it would seem that the answer to that question 
is no. 
 
16. Gooren (2007): “Conversion . . . refers to a comprehensive personal change of worldview and 
identity.”83 This concise and general definition from Gooren is the result of his attempt at a 
“synthetic” account of conversion. In framing conversion in such a general and broad way, Gooren 
avoids many of the restrictive limitations found in other models, although as a consequence his 
definition is certainly not as rich or nuanced as some of the other offerings. In particular, this 
definition is so broad that it clearly transcends the limits of spirituality and religion. This definition 
could accommodate “conversions” of a political or philosophical nature so long as the conversion 
in question is sufficiently “comprehensive.” Gooren’s model has rich phenomenological 
implications evinced in the suggestion that identity links with worldview; as one changes, so too 
does the other. Gooren contrasts conversion with what he terms “disaffiliation,” which is akin to a 
sort of “negative” conversion in which one leaves a religious or spiritual worldview behind. 
 In his review of thirteen different conversion models, Gooren conspicuously neglects to 
incorporate the unconscious variety of the phenomenon (as discussed by Scobie), probably since 
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he seems to favor the active and rational model, which is of course diametrically opposed to the 
unwitting conversion. Ultimately Gooren attempts his own synthetic approach to conversion, 
bringing together the “basic” and “best” aspects of the historical models that he reviews. These 
aspects are as follows: 1. “emphasis on subjective religious experience,” 2. “conversion in the 
narrow sense should always involve a change in religious worldview and hence a change in 
identity,” 3. a “spoiled identity” produces “changes in levels of religious activity,” 4. some but not 
all spoiled identities embolden subjects into “religious seekers” whose “socialization” and gender 
determines the limits of the “seeking quest,” 5. subjects judge the “cost-benefit” value of religious 
membership before investing completely therein, 6. “religious commitment is built up through role 
learning and mastering,” 7. there is an “organizational side of the conversion process,” 8. a true 
case of conversion must be marked by Snow and Machalek’s “empirical indicators” such as the 
master attribution scheme, 9. “social networks” have an impact on conversion (here, to be clear, 
the reference is to the subject’s social milieu and not electronic social networks like Facebook, 
although the website would certainly count as a digital representation of real interpersonal 
relations, albeit in a possibly contrived or overly-manipulated sense, 10. religious recruitment is 
distinct from but related to conversion, and religious recruitment is a competitive enterprise, 
demonstrated in the concept of the “religious market,” 11. the competitive methods employed in 
the religious market should be analyzed as part of the academic study of conversion, and 12. 
“cultural or societal factors that influence differences in religious activities must be carefully 
described and explored.”84 What Gooren accomplishes here is a significant contribution to the field 
of conversion studies but it is imperative to take note of the fact that a synthetic “approach” to 
 
84 Gooren, Religious Conversion and Disaffiliation, 60-2. 
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conversion is not equivalent with a synthetic “definition” of the phenomenon, which is something 
that only phenomenology can accomplish. 
 
17. Paloutzian (2014): 
 [Conversion is] a more distinct process by which a person goes from believing, adhering 
to, and/or practicing one set of religious teachings or spiritual values to believing, adhering 
to, and/or practicing a different set. The transformative process in conversion may take 
variable amounts of time, ranging from a few moments to several years, but it is the 
distinctiveness of change that is its central identifying element. In contrast to someone 
arriving at a point of belief through the process of socialization and other developmental 
mechanisms, the convert can identify a time before which the religion was not accepted 
and after it was accepted.85 
 
Somewhat problematically this model from Paloutzian is not termed in such a way as to recognize 
the case of the irreligious or atheistic person who resolves to turn to religion. It is hard to fathom 
why such a case would be excluded from the limits of conversion. Of course this difficulty can be 
resolved, so long as one is willing to classify atheism or the lack of religious belief as a “religious 
teaching or spiritual value”, which seems to be a fairly obvious category error. A related issue 
would occur for the case of the religious believer who loses his or her faith; it is hard to see how 
this should be considered a religious or spiritual belief in any meaningful sense of the term. While 
it feels forced to construe atheism as a religious teaching, if by “religious teaching” all that is 
intended is a “teaching regarding religion,” then perhaps the difficulty is not so great. While 
Paloutzian allows for both quick and gradual conversions, going so far as to specify that a 
conversion can take years, he indicates that, in contrast to other sorts of pathways toward epistemic 
states, in the case of an authentic conversion the subject is always able to identify the threshold of 
the event. Whether this has to be a specific moment or not is unclear, although that seems unlikely, 
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but at the very least this suggests that the subject is able to discern the time before his conversion 
and likewise distinguish the time after it. There is no indication that the subject has to be correct 
in his identification of this conversion threshold, but at the very least, he is able and willing to 
divide his existence into two distinct phases. 
 
Conclusions and Classifications Pertaining to the Definitions 
 
There are a couple of general and significant conclusions to draw from this assortment of models 
and definitions before I enumerate the essential, general categories of conversion. First, out of 
the samples I reviewed here, two out of the three theological definitions (Gaventa and Baird, but 
not Gelpi) do not ascribe moral significance or value to the trajectory of conclusion, in contrast 
to what is true for most of the contributions from disciplines like psychology or sociology, which 
do not take gods or other metaphysical objects as their primary object. Gelpi’s work is an 
exception to this, since in his model conversion entails the movement from irresponsibility to 
responsibility. Thus his account of the directionality of conversion is more akin to what is in 
James, Nock, et al., where conversion, simply put, is typically understood to leave one better off 
than when he or she started. The issue with this, in an academic sense, is that this is arguably an 
instance of supposedly impartial academic disciplines granting implicit favor toward one of the 
primary Western religions, Christianity—but this is not something that has been overlooked in 
recent literature on conversion.86   
 
86 See, for example, Gorsuch’s article “Psychology of Religion.” Cited in Hood et. al., The 
Psychology of Religion, 207. See also “Issues in the Psychology of Religious Conversion,” by 
Scroggs and Douglas. 
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 The seventeen models of conversion that I have reviewed can be grouped into eight 
approximate categories or “types.” These types are not necessarily mutually exclusive, meaning 
that any given conversion model can be defined by—indeed almost always can be defined by— 
more than one of these typical properties. These classifications reflect the major trends in the 
history of conversion scholarship. 
 
The Eight Categories of Conversion from the Human Sciences: 
 
1. Character-Identity (Personal) 
• Starbuck, James, Nock, Travisano, Gaventa, Gelpi, Baird, Hervieu-Léger, Meintel, 
Gooren 
2. Role (Intersubjective and Social) 
• Snow-Machalek, Rambo, Meintel 
3. Event (Sudden, Sometimes Unexpected, Often Emotional) 
• Starbuck, James, Gelpi, Baird 
4. Process (Gradual) 
• James, Lofland-Stark, Baird, Gaventa, Rambo, Paloutzian 
5. Active (Volitional and/or Rational) 
• James, Lofland-Stark, Travisano, Snow-Machalek, Gelpi, Gooren, Baird 
6. Passive (Paradoxical, Seemingly Involuntary) 
• Baird, Meintel 
7. Conscious 
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• Starbuck, James, Nock, Lofland-Stark, Travisano, Snow-Machalek, Gaventa, Gelpi, 
Rambo 
8. Unconscious 
• Starbuck, James, Scobie 
 
My synthetic definition should take into account all of these potential features, since I am of the 
opinion that no single approach can or should take on the status of the “master” approach; to the 
contrary, any reasonable and rigorous synthesis of the definitions offered above will have to 
incorporate all eight categories that I have discovered. 
 It must be noted that most of the conversion models I have here reviewed are defined by 
several of these different categories, with some even being sub-types of the others (every process 
conversion is also technically an event conversion, at least phenomenologically—this will be 
shown in the final chapter.) Gaventa’s model, for example, includes aspects of the character-
identity type as well as the process model. Similarly, the Rambo model involves both process 
and role, and the Meintel account involves both identity and role. Some of these typical 
categories are correlated with one another, like the relationship between the active conversion 
and the conscious conversion, but this link is not absolute; in other words, not every conscious 
conversion is the result of a choice, although every active conversion is necessarily one which is 
conscious. The difference between the active and conscious categories is that the former pertains 
to the decision or resolution to convert, whereas the latter refers to the awareness of the 
conversion. Lastly, it is crucial to avoid mistaken pseudo-distinctions from the history of 
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philosophy, such as the idea that the emotional conversion has no rational component (and vice 
versa).87 
 Just as any given definition for the conversion experience can most likely be 
characterized by more than one of these typical features, so too can any given case or example of 
conversion be classified across multiple categories. For example, the paradigmatic example of 
Paul’s conversion on the road to Damascus is a sudden and conscious change in identity tied to a 
singular, emotional event, but it occurs on the basis of a passive impetus. Paul, in other words, 
did not seek out his conversion, but instead, the conversion “happened” to him. 
 While it is evident that not all event-based conversions have to be “passive” in this way, 
exemplified by the counterpoint of the ritualistic or sacramental conversion (like Catholic 
Confirmation, or the Ordo Initiationis Christianae Adultorum), it is far from clear whether the 
event-based conversion must be a conscious conversion. It is at least possible that a potent event 
could set off a gradual conversion without any notion of the process becoming the object of my 
conscious awareness. I will return to this question in the final chapter to determine whether the 
ambiguity is resolved in the phenomenological attitude. 
 Furthermore I can conclude from my review of these various models for conversion that 
it would be a mistake to synthetically define conversion as something specific to—and therefore 
confined by—the limits of religion and spirituality. While some early authors like Starbuck and 
James acknowledge the supposedly “alternative” types of conversion in their work, the 
conversion of religion and spirituality dominated the focus of scholarship for several decades, 
and this is probably an oversight. The criteria that I have enumerated are in fact decidedly non-
 
87 In “Love and Knowledge” Jaggar argues that because emotions are “active, voluntary, and 
socially constructed” they are therefore epistemic. She maintains that emotions are rational, used 
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specific in terms of the general content of conversion. I hope to fill in the nature of this 
apparently indeterminate content using the eidetic phenomenological method, which I will 
pursue in the final chapter.  
 Lastly it should be noted that these categories all apply to experience and the analysis 
thereof. These categories are not, in other words, abstract types that fail to consider the 
experiential nature of conversion. For this reason, these categories can be called existential, and 
the phenomenon of conversion in general can be labeled an existential phenomenon of 
transformation.88 
 
A Synthetic Model of Conversion for Phenomenological Analysis 
 
After classifying the basic type or categories of conversion based on my review of some of the 
common models thereof, synthesizing a general definition for the experience is relatively 
straightforward. I maintain that a comprehensive, empirical definition of personal conversion can 
be constructed as follows: 
A conversion is an existential transformation; it is a change in self that occurs for a subject 
when he or she experiences a shift or transformation in role and/or identity, either as the 
result of (or culminating in) an event or as mediated via a process; this conversion can be 
active or passive, and it can be conscious or unconscious. Both active and passive 
conversions can be either conscious or unconscious.89 An event-based conversion is almost 
always an identity conversion, but a process-based conversion can enact a conversion in 
either role or identity. Event-based conversions as well as process-based conversions 
 
88 Here I do not use the word “existential” to refer to a Heideggerian or Sartrean model of 
phenomenology, but instead, to the more general meaning of “pertaining to human existence.” 
89 While this seems counter-intuitive, it remains possible because the distinction between the 
active and conscious categories is that the former pertains to the decision or resolution to 
convert, whereas the latter refers to the awareness of the conversion. According to this 
conceptualization it is theoretically possible for someone to actively seek out a conversion 
without necessarily being aware of the eventual “flip of the switch” constituted by the conversion 
itself. 
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involve either an active or passive converting subject, and the subject is either conscious 
or unconscious of the phenomenon. Process-based conversions can also involve either an 
active or passive converting subject.90 
 
With this definition I strive to have incorporated all of the possible features of conversion in 
general.  
 
Postscript: Badiou and Agamben on Saint Paul 
 
Despite the fact that “Pauline” conversion has occupied the vast majority of scholarly focus in 
the earliest studies of the phenomenon, here I would like to briefly review one final pair of 
interpretations of St. Paul in order to determine whether these recent and influential readings of 
Paul bear any insights for my phenomenological analysis of the conversion experience. 
 In Saint Paul: The Foundation of Universalism (2003), Alain Badiou characterizes Paul 
as a new “formal figure” of subjectivity. In other words, Paul invents a new way of being a 
subject. This happens via a change in Paul’s “being and acting,” which Badiou describes in terms 
of “situation” and “event.” It is Paul’s famous move from persecutor to acolyte that Badiou refers 
to to as a change in his situation.91 For Badiou situations are, in short, epistemological contexts 
(or knowledge-structures). New situations are instituted by “events” which are, as Badiou 
phrases it, akin to Lacanian ruptures in established systems of knowledge (viz, the previous 
situation).92 The event always “erupts as singular” but in such a way that is “immediately 
 
90 While conscious process-based conversions frequently involve a sacramental event, the 
process conversion is often unconscious as it starts at a young age when the subject is raised as 
religious. 
91 Badiou, Ethics, 41. 
92 Lacan, Seminar XI, 56. 
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universalizable.”93 In Paul’s case the event begins with him, but what happens to him is of no 
significance without its adaptation to everyone; the new truth would lose its meaning. 
 This is why Badiou argues that events are what make possible all “truth processes” (43). 
A truth, as Badiou puts it, is that which is produced by maintaining “fidelity” with respect to an 
event (42). He also calls this “declaring” an event. Thus, while it is the event that makes a new 
truth possible, without a subjective response to the event—specifically, sans fidelity—there is no 
actual change, no production of truth.94 But according to Badiou, this subject does not exist at all 
until he is “induced” via the event. This is why Badiou focuses his analysis on Paul’s reaction to 
the event, evinced through his writings, and not on the antecedent incident on the road. It seems 
that for Badiou, Paul’s actual conversion is enacted through his fidelity to the event, and not the 
event itself. In fact, Badiou would not call the Damascus episode the event at all—Paul’s event is 
Christ’s resurrection (14). Badiou writes: 
What Paul must be given exclusive credit for establishing is that the fidelity to such an 
event exists only through the termination of communitarian particularisms and the 
determination of a subject-of-truth who indistinguishes the One and the “for-all.” [. . .] Its 
bearing, in a mythological context implacably reduced to a single point, a single statement 
(Christ is resurrected), pertains rather to the laws of universality in general. This is why it 
can be called a theoretical break, it being understood that in this instance “theoretical” is 
not being opposed to “practical,” but to real. Paul is a founder, in that he is one of the very 
first theoreticians of the universal.95 
 
Badiou is very clear that truth is subjective, but his novel argumentation suggests that this 
subjective truth is only true because it can be universally applied, insofar as it is “indifferent to 
the situation (15). In Paul’s case his truth is subjective to the extent that it is his own fidelity to 
 
93 Badiou, Saint Paul, 11. 
94 It should be noted that Badiou distinguishes his subject from the subject in psychology in 
addition to the Cartesian subject and the transcendental, Kantian subject. 
95 Ibid., 108. 
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the event that generates the truth—he declares the event, he validates it, he lends it credence. But 
Paul could have been anyone; the truth is universalizable. 
 In a 2005 interview with Adam Miller, Badiou indicates that something becomes 
universal when “differences become indifferent” and new truths are created.96  It is in “living the 
event” of his experience and disclosing or “declaring” the event to the Other that Paul institutes a 
new universal truth. This truth is one which not only transcends Jewish Law but also the 
philosophy of the ancient Greeks. But here truth is not redefined in such a way that it refutes the 
truths of previous situations, because truths are always specific to situations, even if they are 
indifferent to their circumstances. 
 Badiou is careful to distinguish these truths from mere opinions; whereas opinions evoke 
“multiple-being,” Badiou’s event institutes a “new way of being.”97 The difference lies in the fact 
that the new way of being redefines one’s subjectivity, whereas simply taking on a new opinion 
does not. The authentic event redefines the subject because the subject reinterprets himself in the 
new context; it is a constitutive relation. 
 But for this subject to remain stable and intact it is necessary that the subject maintains a 
relation with the event that reoriented or founded the new iteration of the subject. In other words, 
the event requires one to be persistently faithful to it.98 Thus the event, and how one consistently 
relates back to it, redefines the nature of the ethical decision. Badiou uses the expression “ethic 
of truth” to refer to the idea that ethical decisions are those which can be identified by their 
“fidelity” to the truth of the relevant situational event. The significance of the “event” is that the 
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97 Badiou, Ethics, 41 
98 This is the “rule of faithful connection.” Badiou, Being and Event, 239. 
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truth that is generated by the event “renders insignificant” the differences that characterized the 
previous situation.99 
 For Badiou, the “event of the resurrection” refers less to a miracle story than it does to the 
event’s relatability to a subject, which in this case would be Paul himself. Paul’s response to the 
event is one that involves “living the event” by transforming one’s thought in such a way that the 
world itself is altered and no longer looks (quite as) infinitely multiple. This is tantamount to the 
annihilation of difference, exemplified by Paul’s message concerning the event that “[t]here is 
neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither slave nor free, there is neither male nor female” is itself a 
repetition of the event, as an establishment of universal subjective truth. 100 The dissolution of 
these categories of difference yields a new identity, one that is characterized by its transcendence 
beyond the provenance of the prior division. Rather than marginalizing cultural differences in the 
sense of canceling them out, the event and its transmission calls out for each person to reinterpret 
himself or herself qua subject specifically in relation to the transformative event. For Badiou this 
activity is the closest thing we have to immortality, this ability to achieve difference-sublimating 
sameness with an event.101 If every conversion can be construed as an event via which the 
subject is redefined and brought into identity with some new and radical way of looking at self 
and world (one which relegates the old way to a position of nullity), then it is in conversion that 
we have the closest approximation of human participation in truth. I suggest that most 
conversion scholars would agree that without the supersedure of the old (whether in the form of 
denial or reinterpretation), conversion cannot occur. 
 
99 Badiou, Ethics, 27. This move enables Badiou to challenge the particularism and relativism of 
contemporary ethical movements.  
100 Gal. 3:28 NABRE 
101 Badiou, Ethics, 27-8. 
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But is this denial actually permissible? Badiou maintains that “the Pauline break does not 
base itself upon the production of a universal” but rather repeats or performs the law of universality 
itself.102 In fact this supports the understanding that Badiou’s concept of truth (and by extension, 
conversion) does not have to operate by way of paradoxical exclusion of one’s former self or the 
Other (paradoxical because the new paradigm cannot be universal if it does not encompass the 
old); rather, one must take Badiou to mean that the universal truths of subjectivity are wholly 
detached from societal situations or cultural differences. In other words, the new subjectivity 
opened up by the conversion has to transcend or surpass the old subjectivity. This is the precise 
form of Paul’s response to the event. Paul’s message is not introduced to incite political revolt or 
put individuals against one another; rather, its purpose is to create a new identity that is defined by 
its relation to the universal. 
Alain Badiou focuses on Paul’s experience of the “event” on the road to Damascus in a 
way that can enrich my account of sudden conversion and perhaps even enhance my model of 
gradual, process-based conversion. I suggest that Badiou’s reading of Paul as initiator of a new 
universal, yet subjective truth can fairly be considered a theory of conversion in so far as his 
account focuses on a shift in subjectivity that involves a personal reorientation with respect to 
truth. 
 While Badiou describes Paul as a figure of universal address to others, Giorgio 
Agamben’s reading of Paul is markedly different. He argues that “Paul is not an advocate of 
universalism but of radical separation.”103 But in fact Badiou and Agamben are discussing 
 
102 Badiou, Saint Paul, 108. 
103 Agamben, Time That Remains, 46. 
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different facets of Paul; while Badiou essentially treats Paul’s political theory, Agamben focuses 
on Paul’s theology and philosophy of time.  
The crux of Agamben’s argument concerns how Paul contends with the concept of 
“remaining” time, also referred to as “the contraction of time.”104 Agamben writes: 
In defining himself as aphōrismenos, one who is “separated,” Paul thus alludes, in an 
ironic, albeit cruelly ironic fashion to his separation of times past, [to] his segregation as a 
Pharisee. He refers to it and negates it in the name of another separation that is no longer 
a separation according to the nomos, but a separation according to the messianic 
proclamation (eis euaggelion theou). 105 
 
While Agamben is describing Paul’s status as one who is separated, the reason Paul is separated 
comes down to his relationship with two temporal modalities—then versus now.  The 
differentiation between the two is partly juridical. In the “then” Paul was separated for a different 
reason than he is separated in the “now.” The distinction is between being separated by law, 
which characterizes Paul’s old status with respect to the Judaic nomos, and being separated by 
virtue of Christ’s message, which effectively supersedes the Judaic nomos. As Agamben puts it, 
the proclamation of the Messiah “brings down” the old “wall of separation.”  
Similar to Badiou’s account of “declaration,” Agamben maintains that Paul, as an apostle, 
relays this message (regarding separation) to others. To that end he is an essentially Schmittian 
figure—in separating off the past and the old law, Paul institutes what is essentially a state of 
exception; the law suspends itself.106 We can assert that the law suspends itself insofar as Christ 
is a Jewish figure—in other words, Christ is the law. This relates back to messianic time insofar 
as it is only a sovereign—in this case a Messiah—who can activate this exceptionality. Thus it is 
 
104 Ibid., 5. 
105 Ibid., 46. 
106 Britt, “Schmittian Messiah,” 273. See also Schmitt’s Political Theology and Agamben’s State 
of Exception. 
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Christ and not Paul who establishes this exceptional timeframe. For Agamben, again following 
Schmitt, this establishment is somewhat paradoxical; it is the Messiah who renders the law 
inactive and suspended at the same time that only the Messiah can serve as the telos of the 
law.107 The temporal situation in which this paradox obtains is precisely “messianic time”—the 
time that remains, which can be alternatively rendered as “the time of the now.” This “now” is 
not the same as the ordinary present, like the present moment that defines my temporality as I 
write out these words for the first time and glance at the clock on my desk. That is the 
temporality of chronos, which is time in a sequential and quantitative sense. Instead, this 
messianic present is formulated in terms of kairos—the “right” time. 
 This construal of temporality in terms of messianic kairos is readily applicable to the 
phenomenon of conversion. The convert, in separating off some aspect of his old identity or even 
role, suspends not his prior law (as in Badiou’s reading of Paul), but his prior subjectivity. Recall 
that for Badiou there is no subject prior to the event. For Agamben, this suspension would be 
necessary to the extent that if one has converted, the old identity cannot coexist with the new 
precisely insofar as the conversion (and resultant identity transformation) requires the separating 
off of (at least some part of) the old self. Furthermore in conversion one’s old subjectivity needs 
to be made inoperative (albeit to varying degrees, as we have seen—it is certainly not the case 
that the convert must change in every single way in order to be called a convert), at the same 
time that it is the convert himself who is the end or telos of his own subjectivity. To put it loosely, 
the convert has to step outside of his own subjectivity in order to redefine his subjectivity. Thus 
this is a form of radical separation that is not self-destructive but is in fact aimed toward self-
preservation. The result is the “remaining time” which now becomes, for the subject, the “right” 
 
107 Agamben, Time That Remains, 98. 
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time. This does not mean that the converting subject cannot remember his own past, or has to 
deny his personal history, since, as I have argued, sometimes the convert reinterprets his own 
history instead of outright rejecting it. But the subject, precisely insofar as he has converted, 
must inhabit the new temporality comprised by his new identity or role. This new temporality 
results from the convert’s separation of himself from himself. As we have seen it is an error to 
assume that this phenomenon of division is always the object of conscious awareness; that said, 
in the final chapter I will show that the phenomenon does have to be the product of volition and 
judgment. 
 The upshot of this interpretation is that every convert inhabits, on a personal level, 
something analogous to messianic time and thereby adopts the figure of what Agamben refers to 
as the “remnant.” He writes: 
[T]he remnant is closer to being a consistency or figure that Israel assumes in relation to 
election or to the messianic event. It is therefore neither the all, nor a part of the all, but 
the impossibility for the part and the all to coincide with themselves or with each other. 
At a decisive instant, the elected people, every people, will necessarily situate itself as a 
remnant, as not-all.108 
 
This, too, can be applied to the phenomenology of conversion. At the “decisive instant” of 
conversion (the point at which the convert “passes through” from his old identity toward the 
new) part of the subject is subject to division and separation. The remnant is this divided portion 
of the self, which is equivalent neither with the entire self nor the undivided part or portion. It is 
this remnant that helps explain how someone can change without having to change entirely.  
The ultimate significance of the convert’s adoption of the remnant figure is that it is a 
divisive mode that is teleologically oriented toward (self) fulfillment.109 This is why messianic 
 
108 Ibid., 54-5. 
109 Delahaye, “About Chronos and Kairos,” 88-9. 
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time can be characterized as a “threshold.” It is impossible for a subject to convert without 
passing through this temporal threshold. That is not to say that the convert needs to be capable of 
identifying the precise temporal limits of the conversion experience.
98 




This is a phenomenology of conversion, but there are several different “types” of 
phenomenological investigation, each of which is associated with different figures. 
Transcendental phenomenology, associated with Edmund Husserl, might seem like a natural 
starting point with which to begin this study to the extent that conversion itself deals with a 
subject matter that could be considered “transcendent.” In fact, however, “transcendent” and 
“transcendental” are not simple equivalents and, to the contrary, the difference between the two 
terms entails important distinctions. When it comes to conversion, transcendental 
phenomenology can always be used to analyze the phenomenon, but the transcendent nature of 
the phenomenon will vary, taking on different forms. 
 The linguistic congruence between ‘transcendent’ and ‘transcendental’ is somewhat 
misleading; whereas religion and spirituality often deal with the transcendent in the sense of the 
supernatural or mystical, this is not at all the sense in which classical phenomenology is called 
transcendental, which is in fact closer to the meaning of the term in the “transcendental idealism” 
exemplified by Kantian philosophy. Nevertheless it is possible to conduct a transcendental 
phenomenology of a transcendent experience, namely conversion, so long as we regard 
analytically (only) the “givenness” (Gegebenheit) of experience. In other words it is fully 
possible to conduct a phenomenology of an experience that is transcendent, but is not possible to 
conduct a phenomenology of anything that transcends the experience (like the mind-independent 
existence of God).  
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 When it comes to transcendent experience and conversion, I suggest that there are two 
types, but they are not entirely distinct. After all, if to transcend something is to surpass it, then 
transcendent experience is that which surpasses something—but what? The first type of 
transcendence can be reduced to the “interior” domain of identity and selfhood, while the other 
type can be reduced to the “exterior” world. As I will argue, these two types of transcendence 
presuppose each other. 
 First there is the phenomenon of interior transcendence. Conversion, even in its milder 
forms, is equivalent to self-transcendence. While this phrase evokes lofty ideals reminiscent of 
Nietzsche’s Zarathustra, it is important to note that much subtler forms of self-transcendence 
should be included in our consideration, like switching from one Protestant denomination to 
another. In short, any change in self should be considered as self-transcendence, with the proviso 
that such changes can be more or less complete, and therefore more or less profound.  
 The second way in which experiences can be transcendent expands upon the self and 
extends out to the world and “outside” reality, that part of my experience that is shared by others, 
and which itself encompasses my experience of others. In the world, some experiences stand out 
to me as different. These experiences transcend what is normally encountered in what James 
calls “normal waking consciousness.”1 These experiences might be strange, surreal, and even 
frightening. Sometimes these experiences are called supernatural, mystical, paranormal, 
miraculous, or even metaphysical. This type of transcendent experience is exemplified in the 
case of an apparition or the hearing of a disembodied voice.2  
 
1 James, Varieties, 296. 
2 Both pertain to the famous case of St. Paul. 
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 These sorts of transcendent experiences should be qualified on phenomenological terms. 
Here I can take no firm position on the mind-independent reality of anything I encounter in 
experience; all experiences are immanent to consciousness itself, even if the experience 
“intends” toward a so-called object that consciousness can discern is not identical with itself. In 
other words I can determine that the statue that is talking to me is not the same as me, since, after 
all, I perceive it as an object in the world, but I am limited in the metaphysical conclusions that I 
can draw from my perception. According to this view it is not possible to encounter “things-in-
themselves” as they exist independent of or external to human consciousness; to the contrary, the 
world of things and the Other are mediated via consciousness and it is to that domain that their 
ontologies are restricted. In other words, the mind-independent objectivity of transcendent 
phenomena (e.g. “Is God real?”) are of no use here. As we will see, under a classical 
phenomenological paradigm the only thing that could be said to transcend the acts of 
consciousness is the transcendental ego—pure consciousness—id ipsum.3 
  The most general and common sense of “transcendent experience” would be any 
experience which surpasses or goes beyond what is standard—and not simply in the manner of 
deviating from one’s normal routine, like when your car gets a flat tire on the way to work, since 
deviations of that sort are trivial, lacking in deeper significance and meaning. Conversion qua 
self-transcendence should also be grouped into this category of transcendent experience, since it 
is itself something that deviates from a normal day. A truly transcendent experience would be 
marked by a definite intensity and other-worldliness; as Baird puts it, in the conversion 
experience the subject encounters a “transcendent field of signification” that reorders the 
 
3 The classic method of phenomenology gives a general strategy for the “uncovering” of this 
“unconstituted” pure ego, which Husserl calls “transcendence in immanence.” Ideas I §57, 133 
<110>. 
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subject’s own “self-understanding.”4 In other words, it is some new meaning that inaugurates the 
potential for conversion. Thus it should be underscored that a transcendent experience can only 
be categorized as part of a conversion if the effect or result of the experience is self-
transcendence. This transcendence of self is an epistemologically intense experience to undergo, 
to have one’s knowledge (especially self-knowledge) upended. It is tantamount to escaping from 
Plato’s Cave; it is a profound human experience that stands in stark contrast to the banal events 
of everyday life.5  
 With both forms of transcendent experience, it is the confrontation or even violation of 
limits that marks the experience as transcendent. The limit might be who you think you are, or 
what you think is the purpose of existence, or what you are accustomed to thinking is “real.” But 
the limit, which is specific to and relative for each individual, is what defines the norm. It 
follows that what might be a transcendent phenomenon for the first person (e.g. hearing a voice) 
is routine for someone else.  
 But there is a significant problem with an account of conversion that defines the 
phenomenon as self-transcendence; the requisite intensity and depth of change would seem to 
preclude many experiences from being considered as authentic “conversions.” Are we ready to 
dismiss these less intense, more mundane experiences from our analytic consideration? Is 




4 Baird, “Role and Dynamics of Conversion,” xxvi. 
5 While it is among my aims to demonstrate here that not every conversion is at first glance as 
radical as what is recounted in some of the famous conversion stories, like that of St. Paul, I also 
want to suggest that even the “minor” conversion (like switching from one Protestant 
denomination to another) is radical in its own way, after some analysis.  
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The Transcendental Method 
 
When Husserlian philosophy is called “transcendental” something quite different is intended. 
Transcendental phenomenology purports to discover the essential properties of consciousness as 
experienced on a firsthand basis. Husserl, who is often called the founder of transcendental 
phenomenology, could not have taken transcendental concepts further if not for the work already 
done by Kant, for whom transcendental philosophy involves the identification of the conditions 
that make experience possible. Husserl’s work is similar on a basic level but instead of focusing 
on the pre-conditions of experience, he proposes phenomenology as a precise “science” of 
appearances the ultimate insights of which are to reveal “transcendental consciousness.”  
 As I have stated, his phenomenology cannot investigate anything that is transcendent 
beyond experience itself, but it is a “transcendental” discipline by way of what it is to reveal. 
This upshot is attained via the two-part application of what Husserl calls the “transcendental” 
(sometimes “phenomenological”) reduction, whereby one first brackets out everything 
extraneous to a present experience (the epoché) and then leaves behind a remnant of pure 
consciousness—the “transcendental residuum.”6 It is in this residuum that the phenomenologist 
is able to identify the activity of the transcendental subject that is responsible for the constitution 
of all intentional objects. This residuum is not simply theoretical nor is it the result of a logical 
deduction; rather it is a genuine “field” of experience. In the course of this discovery the 
phenomenologist also understands that inter-subjectivity and the life-world are transcendental 
phenomena. Thus the classical, Husserlian conception of phenomenology is understood to be 
 
6 Husserl, Ideas I §33, 58. 
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transcendental in part due to how it explains the very genesis of experience as encountered 
firsthand. 
 Husserl took it that phenomenology could work only as a transcendental philosophy, and 
he expresses in the Crisis that phenomenology was an “endform” thereof.7 But clearly the sense 
in which Husserl understood his philosophy to be transcendental is rather anomalous when 
compared with the tradition, exemplified in his famous expression “transcendence in 
immanence.”8 In several respects his philosophy can be reasonably compared with earlier ideas 
from Kant and Descartes, but ultimately he means something quite unique by ‘transcendental’ in 
his writing. His philosophy is not simply transcendental due to his regard for the transcendental 
ego, which he compares to Cartesianism, nor for his focus on the way in which the intentionality 
of the transcendental ego is a condition for the possibility of experience, but in each of these 
ways, and then some. While some commentators have suggested that Husserl struggled to 
articulate clearly how his phenomenology was transcendental, it was not for lack of ink spilled; 
he would spend much of his career elaborating and revising the methods of transcendental 
phenomenology until his death in 1938. 
 
The Transcendental Phenomenological Framework 
 
Before proceeding to a more technical discussion of the transcendental phenomenological 
method it would first be useful to situate the general framework of transcendental 
phenomenology. There are three parts to this framework—there is the object of the method itself, 
 
7 Husserl, Crisis §14.  
8 Husserl, CM §47. 
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the method’s very way of looking at what it explains, and the way in which the method purports 
to explain the object. It has already been indicated that the phenomenon to be analyzed is 
conversion, but here I will explicitly identify the scope of the phenomenon, the way in which the 
phenomenon is regarded, and lastly the mode of explanation that is to be employed. 
 As we have seen the object (objectum) of phenomenological analysis is always the 
phenomenon. Here we know that the phenomenon is conversion, but the starting point should be 
the way in which consciousness experiences this phenomenon. Thus the various meanings of this 
term should be discussed briefly. In the Theaetetus Plato uses the term to mean “appearance” and 
his connotation is certainly negative.9 For Aristotle it refers to “images apprehended by sense.”10 
Both of these definitions for phenomenon are far too limiting to apply to the case of conversion, 
since prima facie conversion involves some intellectual component that surpasses the merely 
sensible realm. 
 After the phenomenological “turn” that begins with Kant and is realized by Husserl the 
term ‘phenomenon’ is interpreted and defined rather differently. While some writers (like Husserl 
and Merleau-Ponty) may use the term to refer only to what is “given” to or, properly speaking, 
constituted by and present before, consciousness itself, like the red color of a ball that one sees in 
his field of vision, others, like Heidegger, use the term in a more fundamentally ontological 
fashion, whereby the meaning of the word ‘phenomenon’ is closer to “that which shows itself.”11 
With this sense of the term the focus is upon ontologically-posited concepts like care, ready-
 
9 Pl. Tht. 155A, cited in Liddell and Scott. 
10 Metaphysics 338 b23, cited in Liddell and Scott. 
11 In Heidegger’s case he is using this different sense of the term in order to re-frame the 
phenomenological question away from Husserl’s agenda towards his own ontological program. 
The difference in language could reasonably suggest to the inexperienced reader of 
phenomenology a sense of agency on the part of the phenomenon, which would be incorrect. See 
Part II Chapter 1 for much more detail. 
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handedness, and authenticity; Heidegger does not employ the term to focus on a technical 
analysis of the constitutive structures of conscious experience, which is the case with Husserl’s 
transcendental phenomenology. 
 Within the purview of the transcendental method of phenomenology, the meaning of 
‘phenomenon’ is most closely traceable to Kant, as we again note that transcendental 
phenomenology inherits certain aspects of its general framework from transcendental idealism.  
For Kant, the term means “appearances to the extent that as objects they are thought in 
accordance with the unity of the categories.”12 In other words, the phenomenon is an object that 
is experienced and ordered by mind-dependent structures (through sensibility and 
understanding).13 Thus for Kant, an appearance is only a phenomenon if it is delineated a priori 
by the categories, or, alternatively, categorical unity. Therefore, as Nicholas Strang points out, as 
far as Kant is concerned something like a “visual after-image” (such as that which one sees after 
staring for too long at a bright light) is an appearance but not a phenomenon due to the lack of 
congruence between the intuition manifest to sense and its object.14  
 What is this “intuition”? Here ‘intuition’ refers not to the “folk” sense of the word, which 
is often used to refer to a feeling or even a supernatural premonition.15 In the context of 
transcendental phenomenology the term is instead used in a way that relates to the technical 
manner in which it features in Kant’s philosophy. While the precise meaning of the term is 
somewhat controversial to Kant scholars, since we are interested here in Husserl’s reformulation 
of the concept I will just reproduce Kant’s own words from the First Part of his Transcendental 
 
12 Kant, CPR, A249. 
13 Ibid., A320. 
14 Stang, "Kant’s Transcendental Idealism," The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 
15 E.g. “She had an intuition that they were going to win the game.” 
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Aesthetic in the Critique of Pure Reason: “In whatever way and through whatever means a 
cognition may relate to objects, that through which it relates immediately to them, and at which 
all thought as a means is directed to an end, is intuition.”16 Clearly this could take on thorough 
elaboration but what is most important for our purposes is what Kant says intuition cannot do—
by way of his distinction between “sensible intuition” on the own hand and “intellectual 
intuition” on the other, he argues that we possess only the former faculty.17 
 As far as transcendental phenomenology is concerned, there is no such problem because 
there is no such object, if what is meant by object is “thing-in-itself.” While, as we have seen, 
Kant very famously contrasts the phenomenon with the noumenon or “in-itself,” the dichotomy 
is utterly “out of bounds” in transcendental phenomenology, where the internal-external, subject-
object dichotomies cannot be reproduced on the grounds that they would violate the very limits 
what is “given” in sense experience. This is true even if one regards the noumenon only on the 
basis of a logical posit since what is posited is the status of a “thing” independent from the 
human experience thereof.  
 Husserl himself defines ‘phenomenon’ in The Idea of Phenomenology where he writes: 
“The meaning of the word “phenomenon” is twofold because of the essential correlation between 
appearing and what appears. “Phainomenon” properly means “that which appears,” and yet it is 
predominantly used for the appearing itself, the subjective phenomenon.”18 What he is referring 
to is the double reference of the word; to be sure there is, by law, no external or material object 
immanent to the immateriality of consciousness, and yet there are two distinct dimensions to the 
appearance, both the cognition or conscious experience itself (cogitatio) as well as the object of 
 
16 Kant, CPR, A19/B20. 
17 Ibid., A250/B307. 
18 Husserl, Idea of Phenomenology, Hua II 14. 
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the cognition (cogitatum). Understandably it might first be hard to grasp how this isn’t a simple 
reproduction of the same sort of subject-object ontology that Husserl takes pains to condemn. It 
all comes down to the cogitatum, the materiality of which is manifest only in my sensation. It is 
not, in other words, the external cause of the perception but rather is the thing qua perceived. As 
Moran points out, what Husserl had here discovered was that “the “things themselves” manifest 
themselves to us in relation to the very manner in which we are present to them.”19 Failure to 
grasp this phenomenological fact is what leads one to the subject-object dichotomy; in Husserl’s 
framework, the only “object” is the intentional object towards which consciousness points, 
comprising the so-called “noematic” core of the perception (cogitatum). This noematic core does 
not correspond to an empirical/material object with an independent ontological status; rather, this 
core is nothing more than the object of intentionality strictly as it is encountered.  
 The object of transcendental phenomenology, the phenomenon, now clarified, it is time to 
turn to the manner in which the phenomenon is regarded by the phenomenologist. Beyond taking 
no position on the existence of so-called material objects that (might or might not) exist 
independent of human consciousness, transcendental phenomenology calls for faithfulness to 
what Husserl calls “the principle of principles.”20 This principle states that:  
 
19 Moran, Dictionary, 252. 
20 The fact that technically transcendental phenomenology takes no position on certain realist-
empirical problems is sometimes overlooked. Take for example Quentin Meillassoux’s well-
known and controversial After Finitude, which more or less persuasively advocates for a 
mathematical ontology but does not go so far as to demonstrate the invalidity of phenomenology. 
The better reading of this book is that it takes issue that phenomenology takes no position on the 
existence of mind-independent objects, which is of course something that phenomenology cannot 
do, for reasons already stated.  
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[E]very originary presentive intuition is a legitimizing source of cognition, that everything 
originally (so to speak, in its 'personal' actuality) offered to us in 'intuition' is to be accepted simply 
as what it is presented as being, but also only within the limits in which it is presented there.21  
Here Husserl simply indicates that every intuition is to be taken simply as it is given and no 
more.22 These perceptions or appearances do not have to be visual but instead are constituted in 
various manners of sense, from the five senses to pure intellection. According to Husserl’s 
version of the phenomenological method, it is of utmost importance to avoid at all costs the 
adoption, implicit or explicit, of any metaphysical presupposition that is projected onto or 
supplemented into the “givenness” (Gegebenheit) of phenomena as present before consciousness 
itself. In other words the content of consciousness as experienced is understood to be objective 
irrespective of the allegedly concrete and external “cause” of the perception, as something 
outside of consciousness itself which accounts for the appearance of the conscious quality.  
 Thus a perception that one is fairly sure is hallucinatory has, before consciousness as it is 
experienced on a firsthand basis, a deceptive status or “reality.” This is of utmost importance 
since it is easy to fall into concerns over the supposed “external cause” of religious intuition. For 
example one might wonder whether St. Paul “really” hears the voice of Christ when he falls 
down on the way to Damascus, or if it is all just “in Paul’s head.” For the phenomenologist, the 
difference between hearing or seeing something “real” and hearing or seeing something illusory 
comes down to the synthesis of fulfillment. As Jay Lampert points out in Synthesis and 
Backward Reference in Husserl’s Logical Investigations, this is “the relation between intention 
and fulfilment.” He writes:  
 
21 Husserl, Ideas I § 24, 44 <44>. 
22 See the work of Jean-Luc Marion for more on the concept of givenness, especially Being 
Given (1997). 
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An expression has an “empty” meaning-intention for an experiencing subject if it refers to an 
objective state of affairs which he has not intuited; it acquires a meaning-fulfillment if the subject 
has intuitively “confirmed” or “illustrated” its meaning.”23  
 
With St. Paul, then, the problem comes down to whether the voice that he hears is supported by 
his own intuition. As the story goes, Paul’s conversion event has meaning precisely because he 
intuits the presence of Christ. For him this is not merely an empty intuition, but one that is 
intuitively supported. Specifically, this is what Husserl refers to in the Sixth Logical 
Investigation as “categorial intuition.”  
 This is what Lampert, following Zahavi, refers to as “imaginative fullness.”24 This is a 
real problem, since a fantasy can be experienced with the sort of fullness that would suggest that 
the experience has some objective reality, despite the fact that the fullness is not genuine. 
Lampert reasons that the fulfillment has to be structured a certain way: with systematic and 
objective syntheses.25 What this means is that the “objective reference” of an experience belongs 
to a judgment regarding that experience, and not the experience itself (this will be very important 
in the final chapter, where I will argue that all conversions, even those which are rather 
paradoxically called “unconscious” conversions, require judgments.) Lampert points out that 
what girds the synthetic objectivity of a set of judgments (in this case regarding outer sensation) 
is that the constituent theses of the judgments are mutually supportive and foundational, and they 
point back to nomenclature while at the same time the names presuppose the relevant 
judgments.26 Thus in order to judge that an apparition has objective reference, not only do I have 
 
23 Lampert, Synthesis and Backward Reference, 59.  
24 Zahavi, “Constitution and Ontology,” 122. 
25 Lampert, Synthesis and Backward Reference, 38. 
26 Ibid., Reference, 152, 158. The idea is that names have a “backward reference” to an “act” in 
which the properties of an object are determined. This is the synthesis of the object as I 
encounter it. 
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to affirm that what I am seeing is veridical, but I have to name what I am seeing, and I cannot 
make the judgment without naming, nor can I name anything at all without judging.  
 This points to a subtle difficulty in Husserl’s conception of meaning-fulfillment: his 
analysis can easily explain the hallucination or apparition that is identified as such, but it 
becomes difficult to apply his ideas to the more profound and convincing sorts of illusory 
experiences that are not judged. Perceiving and judging are not simple equivalents, after all. 
While it is true that Husserl devotes much time and space to the elaboration of syntheses and 
epistemic fulfillment, with the idea being that the unfulfilled expression is phenomenologically 
distinguishable from the expression that is verified through intuition, in the lived experience of 
religious and spiritual phenomena, this is overly idealistic. The person who is hallucinating is 
most likely not judging what he or she sees, and if they are, then there is no reason why their 
syntheses cannot corroborate what they are seeing. Husserl’s sustained interest in fulfillment as it 
concerns the fleshing out or identification of intentional acts arguably falls short, even if it offers 
a test that can sometimes differentiate the hallucination from the fulfilled intentional act. In short 
the test will only work in relatively mild cases in which the phenomenological subject can 
suspend or push back against the force of his mystical stupor, chemically-induced change in 
mental state, or whatever else accounts for his “wild” perception or intuition. In other words it is 
the nature of hallucination to present itself as if intuitively fulfilled, and it is overly optimistic for 
the phenomenologist to suppose that in the present moment a convincing hallucination can be 
identified as such on the basis of its status as unfulfilled intuition. Perhaps in retrospect the 
phenomenologist is able to conclude that his perception of some voice or vision was unfulfilled, 
but in the moment, this determination is highly unlikely. For the duration of the hallucinatory or 
mystical episode, this rational conclusion is next to impossible. This is the significance of 
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Marion’s “saturated phenomena”—the religious or spiritual experience transcends the typical 
limitations of intuition and intentionality. 
 Indeed it is difficult to even identify any perception as hallucinatory or otherwise illusory 
in the first place to the extent that in the natural attitude the criterion for distinguishing such 
experiences would fall upon the presence of an external cause or stimulus. Often the ecstatic or 
hallucinating individual is incapable of determining whether or not there is such a cause. But in 
the phenomenological attitude, every perception is taken only as a perception instead of making 
assumptions regarding the supposed physicality, materiality, or externality of the thing that is 
perceived. The procedure for assessing the objective reference of an illusory experience involves, 
as I have said, the enactment of judgments, and not the “real” or material external cause of the 
experience (this is what Meillassoux does with the fossil).27 When we restrict ourselves to what 
is “given” there is no room to posit a Kantian thing-in-itself as correlate of the thing appearing to 
us in sense. In more basic terms we can capture the sentiment here with the cliché “what you see 
is what you get.” It is still true that Husserl can differentiate “mere” sense experience from things 
themselves (in other words I can tell the difference between looking at the sun, and the sun as the 
object I am looking at), but it has to be noted that the thing itself is only known through its 
manifestation in sense experience. I would not have any idea of the sun if not for its givenness to 
me in sensation. There is no material thing-in-itself to which we can refer, something that is other 
than the thing that appears before consciousness, the thing that is experienced (in other words the 
thing itself is the object I experience, and the thing-in-itself is illicit, a countersense). In the 
practice of our everyday lives, this is hard to do. We have conversations with people whom we 
assume to exist independently of our own consciousness of them—to do otherwise would be to 
 
27 Meillassoux, After Finitude. 
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fall into the despairing isolation of solipsism—and yet when using phenomenological methods, 
we are compelled to focus on consciousness alone. I know the Other insofar as the Other appears 
to me and I have perceptions of him or her.   
  It is via sensible intuition that our more primitive perceptions (i.e. impressions) are 
conditioned with formal aspects like space and time, without which it would be impossible to 
understand phenomena at all. The point of difference in Husserl’s thought is that through 
phenomenology and the reduction we are able to employ the latter type of intuition, the 
intellectual. Husserl refers to this as “eidetic seeing” (Wesenserschauung).28 Whereas Kant 
indicates that this type of intuition is impossible and aligns it theoretically alongside the 
noumenon which we have already discussed, for Husserl it is intellectual intuition, as specifically 
non-sensuous, which enables us to categorially situate our experiences, to encounter them on the 
terms of their own self-evidence. Whereas for Kant intellectual intuition is creative and the 
province of no less than a God, Husserl’s intellectual intuition simply grasps the categorial 
features of experience. These categorial features refer to the phenomenological “structure” of an 
intellectual intuition, the way in which an ordinary object is, for example, situated in a larger 
contextual environment. For example, when I look at a painting that hangs on the wall, it is the 
painting’s placement against the plane or background (Hintergrund) of the wall that comprises a 
necessary relation for the object (i.e. the painting). The same would be true for a painting 
suspended by wire with no wall immediately behind it; my categorial intuition would still 
apprehend the empty background behind the object. 
 There is more to focusing on the givenness of the appearance as such. It has to be noted 
that there is a precise focus to the manner in which perceptions are analyzed phenomenologically 
 
28 Husserl, Ideas I §3, 8 <10>. 
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according to the transcendental model. As we will see in the next section where we explore the 
specific tools of the transcendental method, the idea of radical doubt is of paramount importance. 
Husserl calls for the adoption of a specifically “phenomenological” attitude that holds in 
suspension our ordinary assumptions about the material and scientific world. In other words, we 
are to leave behind our ordinary naiveté that defines our non-reflective way of dealing with the 
world. Thus when a perception is being analyzed in the phenomenological attitude, everything 
else has to be ignored. This includes the vast body of assumptions that we carry with us as we go 
on living our daily lives, without which it would be difficult to operate as a member of society. 
For example, I ordinarily take it for granted that my campus exists independent of my own 
experience of it—I assume that it is “there” even when I am not. So too do I assume that my 
students exist even when we are not together in the classroom. As we will see, focusing on the 
perception and ignoring the rest is managed through what Husserl calls the epoché, which is used 
to “bracket off” everything extraneous to a perception proper.  
 Lastly there is the overall conceptual framework via which the transcendental 
phenomenologist renders an a priori explanation of an intuition. Early in his career Husserl 
roughly equated his phenomenology with “descriptive psychology.”29 Husserl’s understanding of 
descriptive methodology was influenced in large part by Franz Brentano and his descriptive 
psychology but after the Logical Investigations Husserl moved away from this phrasing, perhaps 
largely in part through his desire to distance himself from accusations of psychologism. Later on 
Husserl would call transcendental phenomenology not a descriptive psychology but rather an 
“eidetic science,” although certainly his method would still necessarily involve linguistic 
 
29 See the first edition of the Logical Investigations. 
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description.30 The difference comes down to phenomenology as Husserl conceived it prior to his 
“discovery” of the reduction (first published in Ideas in 1913 although present in his notebooks 
almost a decade earlier) compared with the later iteration.31 The later phenomenological model 
could more properly be called transcendental, with the only real issue with the “descriptive 
psychology” paradigm being that Husserl wanted to elevate his work beyond that of a “mere” 
psychology. In part his attempt was to remove phenomenology from the limits of the empirical 
and what he refers to as the “scientific attitude.” 
 Ultimately the precise way in which transcendental phenomenology describes and 
explains its objects of inquiry comes down to the telos or proposita of transcendental philosophy 
and phenomenology in particular, and this is why Husserl eventually preferred to use the term 
“eidetic science” to describe his work—instead of aligning it with the descriptive 
phenomenology of Brentano. As we have seen, the ultimate goal of transcendental 
phenomenology is the elucidation of the a priori essential structures of acts of transcendental 
consciousness. Here we are specifically concerned with a very specific act of consciousness: the 
conversion act. The goal is to identify the essential phenomenal structures of any conversion 
whatsoever, but the only route to such a conclusion is through the examination of specific 






30 Husserl coins the term “eidetic” based on the Greek word eidos meaning essence.  
31 See the Seefelder manuscripts of 1905.  
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Conversion and the Phenomenological Method 
 
With my historical outline of the transcendental approach to philosophy as well as a basic sketch 
of the classic phenomenological framework, I can now turn to the particulars of the 
transcendental phenomenological method per se. The most important components of the method 
are the phenomenological attitude, the epoché, the reduction, imaginative free variation, 
intentionality, noesis and noema, constitution, and the horizon. These components all link 
together to comprise the form of the transcendental phenomenological method. 
 The most complete examination of the transcendental phenomenological method should 
begin with an overview of the various “attitudes” that Husserl identifies in his writings. These 
attitudes, discussed at length by Husserl in Ideas I and the late-career “Vienna Lecture,” have a 
deep influence upon a subject’s way of dealing with and experiencing the world (as well as other 
egos).  
 Rather than referring to something like a mood or disposition on the part of one’s 
personality, attitudes are here used in a technical sense, as Einstellung. This term refers to 
outlook or mentality.  For the Neo-Kantians and 19th century psychologists, Einstellung is used 
to refer to overall dispositions of consciousness, like the different and specific ways in which one 
would mentally encounter a math problem versus a beautiful sunset. Against the former I am 
thinking arithmetically and in terms of reason. Perhaps I have a few formulas present before my 
mind as I solve the problem. In the case of the latter I of course take no recourse to arithmetic. 
Rather I am focused on the rich textures manifest in my visual field. I take note of the subtleties 
of color and light. Perhaps I am contemplating the vista conceptually in terms of their beauty or 
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symmetry. These different ways of “looking at” (not only visually) different things are what we 
have in mind when we refer to the attitudes relevant to phenomenological inquiry. 
 It makes sense to begin with the most common attitude, the one that Husserl calls “the 
natural attitude.” In Ideas I §27 he discusses this attitude, which serves as the normal modus 
operandi of our everyday lives. In this attitude the world is “endlessly spread out in space” 
despite the fact that no such indication is explicitly “given” to me in consciousness.32 It is a plain 
assumption on my part that the world simply extends out indefinitely from my vantage point (in 
the phenomenological attitude we can identify the reason for this—this experience is constituted 
in part on the basis of sensation, Kant’s outer intuition.) Objects in the world are “there for me,” 
as are other humans, and I take for granted the material status of the objects that I encounter in 
sense. Husserl points out that in normal consciousness we operate like this at all times—it is our 
default. It is a practical orientation without which we would struggle to live modern lives.  
 In this natural attitude I also carry out what Husserl calls “the general positing” (also 
referred to as the “general thesis” that is posited).33 This is the consistently held presumption that 
the world and everything in it is “factually existing” and actual. To question any of it would not 
occur to me, and even if I did doubt some specific bit of “data belonging to the natural world,” it 
wouldn’t change the fact that I already naively suppose the world to exist in the first place.34 
Thus even if I am faced with a fantastic mirage as I wander about a barren desert, my doubt 
regarding the veracity of my vision does not preclude my normal assumption that the world itself 
is actually “real” in a material sense. 
 
32 Husserl, Ideas I §27, 51 <49>. 
33 Ibid., §30, 56 <52>. 
34 Ibid., 57 <53. 
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 While the natural attitude is our most frequent disposition with respect to the world, it is 
not our only one. Husserl also describes a “theoretical attitude.”35 Scientific knowledge is 
pursued in this non-practical attitude, which involves self-aware detachment from the object of 
study. Here one takes on a position of disinterest and looks at the world as if an onlooker instead 
of an active participant. Even if we are not carrying out scientific experiments in a laboratory we 
still might be in the theoretical attitude, so long as we are seeking out knowledge and doing so by 
objectifying some aspect of our experience instead of “living in” the experience in a primary and 
unreflective sense. Mathematics, science, and philosophy would all, prior to phenomenology, be 
conducted in this theoretical attitude. Without this theoretical attitude there could be no 
phenomenological attitude. 
 Indeed lastly, we must examine the “phenomenological attitude.” Contra the theoretical 
attitude which requires one to view an object of knowledge as if from the vantage point of an 
outside observer, the phenomenological attitude requires the strict adoption of, and confinement 
to, a first-person perspective. All descriptions which are rendered in this attitude must be faithful 
to the experience at hand. In practice this is extraordinarily difficult to do because of how easily 
we dwell in the natural attitude for most of the time. Indeed it is in the natural attitude that 
conversion is experienced. How can we use the phenomenological method to analyze a 
phenomenon that occurs in the natural attitude? 
 The way around this is through the deployment of what is called the epoché. Inspired as 
we have seen by the Meditations of Descartes, in the phenomenological attitude we use the broad 
application of the epoché to bracket off everything that we ordinarily assume about the world 
when we are in the natural attitude. Husserl lifts the term epoché not from the Meditations, where 
 
35 Husserl, Ideas II §3, 5 <4>. 
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it does not appear, but rather from Ancient Greek, where the word refers to “suspension of 
judgment.”36 The founder of transcendental phenomenology is quick to point out that this 
classical sense of epoché  is markedly different from the procedure employed by Descartes, 
where beliefs are explicitly doubted and are the object of skepticism, instead of just being out of 
consideration.37 Husserl claims regarding Descartes that “his attempt to doubt universally is 
properly an attempt to negate universally.”38 To the extent that Descartes entertains the 
possibility of an evil demon who would be tempted to deceive him into believing in the existence 
of things that did not really exist, this seems like a fair assessment on Husserl’s part.39 
 This isn’t at all what Husserl does with his epoché, which is instead a variety of 
“neutrality modification.”40 Most generally what is excluded from judgment (but not outright 
denied) on the basis of the epoché is the general positing of the world that normally defines our 
disposition in the so-called natural attitude.  This is to place on hold the “thetic” nature of the 
natural world whereby that which is presented in consciousness is specifically presented as 
“factually existing actuality.”41 Earlier in the Logical Investigations Husserl had referred to this 
same property of normal consciousness as “belief-character.”42 The idea here is that things 
present themselves to us via our perception in such a way that the very presentation (illicitly) of 
things implies to us their mind-independent existence. The world itself presents itself to us in this 
way. When we perform the epoché we make the conscious and deliberate decision to no longer 
 
36 Pyrrho and Arcesilaus are examples of writers who use the term. See Moran, Dictionary, 106.  
37 The difference is like the contrast between atheism and agnosticism. The former holds that 
God does not exist, whereas the latter refrains from holding a belief regarding God’s existence.  
38 Husserl Ideas I §31, 59 <55>.  
39 Descartes, Meditations, <22-3>. 
40 Husserl Ideas I §109, 257 <222>. 
41 Ibid., §§90, 99; Moran, Dictionary, 107. 
42 Husserl LI 5: §23, 130. 
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permit ourselves to be “seduced” by the perception. We bracket the imagined indication that the 
thing presents itself to us as “external” and independent of sense. 
 As far as some commentators are concerned, the epoché is essentially equivalent with the 
phenomenological reduction. But later in his career Husserl would begin to distinguish between 
the two terms more clearly. Indeed this is why the phenomenological reduction is typically 
characterized as a two-step process that begins with the application of the epoché to the general 
positing of the natural attitude and culminates with the eidetic reduction.43 
 It is the eidetic reduction which, as “an inquiring back into consciousness,” uncovers the 
transcendental conclusion(s) regarding the phenomenon. As Husserl puts it in Cartesian 
Meditations, by the method of transcendental reduction each of us […] was led back to his 
transcendental ego.”44 We have seen that in order to isolate the universal theoretical conditions of 
an experience, any subjective aspect of the experience has to be ruled out. The experience has to 
be taken at face value as it appears to one’s own consciousness but also to any given 
consciousness. In contrast to the metaphysical speculations from the history of philosophy, the 
avenue to this transcendental knowledge lies in a methodological move that Husserl understood 
to be thoroughly scientific. 
 Since it is impossible to transcend one’s own point of view, the way in which the 
phenomenon appears has to be “imaginatively varied” in order to grasp something that isn’t 
simply individual or particular. When the phenomenon is encountered in experience it naturally 
does not present itself eidetically, in term of its essence or its form. So in order to arrive upon the 
eidos—what is necessary and essential—for the phenomenon, this variation has to be performed. 
 
43 Cogan, “The Phenomenological Reduction,” The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.  
44 Husserl, CM §34, 69 <Hua I 103>. 
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Thus this procedure is also often referred to in Husserl’s writings as the “eidetic variation.” 
Occasionally it is referred to as the “free variation” because of the way in which it is “pure”—it 
fully disregards the notion of existence and the “real” or “actual” object. 
 “Free variation” is an essential component of the transcendental method because it is the 
operational tool that carries the phenomenologist from a singular iteration of the phenomenon to 
its form, and yet despite the selection of terms that are used for this activity, Husserl in fact only 
infrequently discusses the technical points of the matter at length in his writings.  
 There may not be much detail in print regarding the variation, but thankfully Husserl 
provides a couple of clear examples of the procedure involved, which is not always the case with 
his other concepts. The easiest way to explain how the variation works is by using the example 
that Husserl provides in Phenomenological Psychology.45 In this text Husserl explains how to 
move from seeing one single hue of red to the eidos of red, i.e., red in general. As one cycles 
through the numerous varieties of red that can be imagined before sense, that which is invariant 
is equivalent with the essential properties of red. It is of course impossible to imagine every 
single red color, and impractical to even garner an attempt, but doing so is in fact not necessary 
in order to grasp the essence of red. I can conceive of a red that is more orange, or a red that is 
more yellow, or a red that is rather dark like garnet or mahogany, or one which is light, like 
scarlet or even salmon. All of these colors are differentiable before my imagination, and yet each 
partakes in that quality that makes it a hue of red. Once I have entertained a sufficient number of 
examples such that I can discern the essence of the color in general, there is no need to continue. 
The form in virtue of which the various hues all appear to me as red is a transcendental insight 
manifest to me via intuition.  
 
45 Husserl, Phänomenologische Psychologie §9, 59; Hua IX 78-79, 82. 
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  In his Cartesian Meditations Husserl furnishes another example of eidetic variation, 
where he explains the process using the perception of an ordinary table: 
Starting from this table perception as an example, we vary the perceptual object, table, with a 
completely free optionalness, yet in such a manner that we keep perception fixed as perception of 
something, no matter what. Perhaps we begin by fictionally changing the shape or the color of the 
object quite arbitrarily, keeping identical only its perceptual appearing. In other words: Abstaining 
from acceptance of its being, we change the fact of this perception into a pure possibility, one among 
other quite ‘optional’ pure possibilities—but possibilities that are possible perceptions. We so to 
speak, shift the actual perception into the realm of non-actualities, the realm of the as-if.46 
 
Here we can see how it all comes together, how the free variation begins with what is established 
by a specific perceptual object but moves to the very essence of the perceptual object in general. 
It is important to note that here when Husserl refers to “[a]bstaining from acceptance” of a 
perceptual object’s “being” he refers to withholding ontological judgment of the object’s 
existence, not its essence—the latter is determined, necessarily, via application of the classical 
method. Husserl points out that the perceptual object with which we begin need not even exist de 
facto in order for this procedure to yield transcendental findings. In other words starting with an 
imagined fantasy object like a hippogriff would not be a problem for the method despite the fact 
that no “real” ontological correlate of the perception “exists.”47 The same goes for the acts of 
wishing or daydreaming, each of which can be eidetically varied. Ultimately even the perception 
of a “factual” or “posited” object involves free variation that is employed entirely on the basis of 
an imaginative act, so the concern over “fantasy objects” is easily resolved. 
 None of this would be possible without the phenomenological concept of intentionality, 
without which consciousness itself would be unthinkable. “Intentionality” refers to what a state 
of consciousness is about; “all consciousness is consciousness of something” is the most famous 
 
46 Husserl, CM §34, 60 <Hua I 104>. 
47This comes down to the difference between “positing” vs. “non-positing” acts. The difference 
between the two comes down to the “matter” of the perceptual act. See Rollinger, Husserl’s 
Position in the School of Brentano, 55. 
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formulation, although it is Sartre’s wording rather than Husserl’s.48 Here when we use the word 
“about” in the first definition, it is quite broad in its reference; consciousness might be of 
something in the visual field, or a number before one’s mind, or the sensation of pain.  
 Husserl encounters the term in the work of Brentano, who develops the concept after 
encountering it in Scholastic philosophy.49 But Brentano remains limited to an understanding of 
“intentionality” that construes the term in an implicitly “representationalist” manner, such that 
“[e]very mental phenomenon includes something as object within itself.”50 By contrast, for 
Husserl intentionality is an “objectifying act” that is neither subject nor object. Instead of a split 
between subject and object, according to Husserl’s understanding of the objectifying act, 
subjectivity and objectify are intrinsically “tied up” with one another. In other words an object of 
experience is only an “object” at all insofar as it is an object phenomenally experienced by a 
constituting subject. This is far different from the notion of an “external” object that exists 
independent of a perception thereof; rather, this object is inherent to the act of perception itself, 
and its only existence of which we validly speak is the existence that is mediated in the 
perception.  
 In his Fifth Logical Investigation Husserl identifies two different modes of this 
intentional object manifest in perception: “the object as it is intended” and “the object which is 
intended.”51 According to the example he gives in the text, the object which is intended may be 
the Emperor of Germany but this object might be intended as “the grandson of Queen Victoria” 
etc. While it may be assumed that here the Emperor of Germany qua object is mind-independent, 
 
48 Sartre uses this wording in his short 1939 article on intentionality in Husserl and he calls it 
Husserl’s “famous phrase,” but the words do not appear anywhere in Husserl. 
49 Husserl, Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, 68. 
50 Ibid., 68. 
51 Husserl, LI 5: §17, 113. 
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this is in fact not the case; Husserl is referring not to the emperor in a material or external sense, 
since that sorts of consideration defines the natural attitude that has been left behind. The object 
instead refers to a presentation, the object of the reference. This analysis will later be revised into 
the noesis-noema characterization that first appears in print with the first volume of Ideas.  
 In the Logical Investigations Husserl goes so far as to say, “each intentional experience is 
either an objectifying act or has its basis in such an act.”52 This is to say that not every directed 
experience is one which refers to an object; in the case of feelings and volition, for example, 
reference is not made to the object but the very presentation of the object is mediated by the 
feeling. Here Husserl is trying to clarify what Brentano refers to as “presentation” (Vorstellung), 
which Husserl found to be obscure, and eventually critiqued in the Logical Investigations. 
Contrary to Brentano’s formulation, for Husserl “objectifying act” replaces Brentano’s 
“presentation” to refer to the act of consciousness whereby the intentional object is made present. 
Not every state of consciousness is one through which the intentional object is made present, 
however. For example, if I experience an emotion respective to the intentional object, like feeling 
happy when I see a shark tooth which reminds me of a childhood family vacation, then in the 
consciousness of the emotion the shark tooth itself is not made present, but the way in which I 
interpreted the shark tooth is.  
 Late in his career Husserl states that intentionality is the correlation a priori between 
subject and world53. Here his wording may be new, but the underlying idea has been present in 
his work for several decades; instead of the modern subject-object split that is instituted in the 
work of Descartes, Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology calls for a conception of subject-
 
52 Ibid., §41, 167. 
53 Husserl, Crisis §46, 159. 
124 
object wherein the two are not distinct but are rather different inherent aspects of consciousness. 
When it comes to conversion this schema “self-contains” the transformation in the mental 
experience of the individual.  
 
Preliminary Analysis of the Conversion Noema 
 
Starting with Ideas I Husserl uses a different term to refer to the object of consciousness: the 
noema.54 This is a term in Ancient Greek used to refer to what a thought is about. The noema, 
simply put, is the object as experienced by consciousness, and Husserl employs this term as a 
replacement for what Brentano would refer to as “content” or “object.” In Ideas I Husserl calls it 
“the perceived as perceived.”55   
 Here we should prepare an advance account of the noema of conversion. First, perhaps 
we imagine that conversion itself is the noema of conversion. But we already saw in the last 
chapter that some empirical researchers do not think that a conversion has to occur on a 
conscious basis. Furthermore breaking down a conversion into a converting act (noesis) and 
conversion (noema) is not particularly helpful because these specific terms need to be 
phenomenologically generalized. What specific type of mental act does conversion involve? The 
second answer to this issue is that the noema of conversion is the self, insofar as conversion 
involves some sort of change in selfhood (this account will be much further refined in the next 
chapter). But in fact the idea that the noema of a conversion experience is always the self is 
mistaken, too hasty; it is not actually necessary to have a perception of the self when converting, 
 
54 Husserl, Ideas I §88, 214 <182>. 
55 Ibid., 216 <183>. 
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so long as one understands that ‘self’ refers to the object of deliberate reflection. As I will 
elaborate later on, following the work of Dan Zahavi, it cannot be the case that the reflective self 
is the only phenomenological self. After all, I do not necessarily have to reflect upon the self in 
order to have an “experience” of my self if by ‘experience’ I am willing to allow pre-reflective 
and non-reflective types of consciousness. While I can deliberately and explicitly think about my 
self and my own identity, I also have experiences of self that are not necessarily the object of my 
conscious awareness. For example, as I sit here and type out these words, this, too, is an 
experience of self, even if I do not think about my own self as I am typing. I cannot, after all, 
imagine sitting here typing these words without it being an experience for myself, so my self 
appears to be an irreducible component in the experiential situation.  
 There are certainly some conversions that involve conscious reflection (see Gelpi) and so-
called “intellectual” consideration of spiritual/religious change and transformation, but plainly it 
is not the case that every convert has his or her self “in mind” (i.e. in a reflective sense) 
throughout the duration of his conversion experience. Even a convert who is required to attend 
classes before his conversion is commemorated in a ceremony as someone who is caught up in a 
longer-term process, even if it lasts only a few weeks or months. He will spend time learning 
about the religion or spiritual worldview (or even philosophy?) for quite some time without 
necessarily reflecting upon his own self, even if those considerations of self are in the 
“background” of whatever he may be learning. Consider also the so-called “spontaneous” 
convert like St. Paul, to whom we will return in depth in the third chapter, whose conversion is 
instituted by an event from without. When Paul falls to the ground, blinded, the noema of his 
experience is not his selfhood. To the contrary Paul is focused at one moment on his lack of 
vision, on the unembodied voice that he hears in another moment. After the episode when Paul is 
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led by his colleagues to his destination of Damascus, he reflects on his own identity and the 
transformation that he has been compelled to make by the miraculous incident. At this time the 
noema of Paul’s experience is the thought of his own self, from his beliefs to his past to his 
personal worldview. Thus I argue that this transformation is still volitional and judgmental, not 
just something that “happens” to Paul as if he is a passive vessel, which is to this day one of the 
dominant interpretations of Paul’s story.  
 While properly understood this phenomenological self can take on several different 
manifestations, like self-consciousness or self-experience (Selbsterfahrung) or even simple, 
cognition-free activities like breathing or becoming immersed in music. That said, we have to 
exclude any sort of self that is subtracted out of or removed from my own lived experience. Thus 
we cannot construe the conversion self in a biological or material sense. In Ideas I Husserl 
indicates that:  
The tree simpliciter, the physical thing belonging to nature, is nothing less than this perceived tree 
as perceived which, as perceptual sense, inseparably belongs to the perception. The tree simpliciter 
can burn up, be resolved into its chemical elements, etc. But the sense—the sense of this perception, 
something belonging necessarily to its essence—cannot burn up; it has no chemical elements, no 
forces, no real properties.56 
 
Here Husserl is not endorsing a physicalist or externalist metaphysics, but instead is doing 
precisely the opposite; he is pointing out that the tree could be damaged or destroyed by fire, and 
of course it would be possible to have perceptions of this damaging process, but those 
perceptions themselves are not subject to the laws of physical nature that lend themselves to fire, 
etc. The object of the perception instead has an immaterial status that cannot be influenced in the 
same way that the tree can be influenced by fire.  
 
56 Ibid., §89, 216 <184>. 
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  It is important, however, that we carefully distinguish the self as intended from the self 
as object of sensation. Sokolowski points out that the object as intended is not necessarily 
equivalent with the object as perceived.57 While at first it might seem as if there is no difference 
between the two, in fact there is a significant point of contrast, and it is already evident in one of 
the examples that Husserl himself provides: the same object, Emperor of Germany, can be 
intended through various references, from “grandson of Queen Victoria” to “son of the Emperor 
Frederick III” to any of the other “properties neither named nor described.”58 Here the noema is 
the object phenomenologically considered, in other words, the emperor. It is the emperor to 
whom I refer with my proposition “grandson of Queen Victoria.” To relate this back to the self at 
the center of the conversion experience, the intentionality of my mental act is just the reference 
or aboutness of the act, in other words, my self, whereas the self as noema can be details from 
my own past, or specifics regarding my beliefs, character, and personality, with the acts 
themselves taking on the status of noesis.  
 In his Cartesian Meditations Husserl indicates that the noema is a “transcendental clue” 
to the range of experiences.59He echoes his earlier remarks as he points out the correlation a 
priori between noema and noesis, which is close to his earlier conception of intentionality as the 
correlation a priori between subject and object. It is in grasping, via the reduction, this a priori 
relationship between the noema and noesis that makes possible, via intuition, knowledge of the 
eidos or essence of the appearance. 
 We can take the schema of noesis and noema and use the previous phenomenological 
example to elaborate. With the shark tooth that we analyzed, the sharktooth as meant object is 
 
57 Sokolowski, Introduction, 59-61. 
58 Husserl, LI 5: §17, 114 
59 Ibid., §23. 
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our noema, whereas the perception of the tooth is the noesis of the perception. Thus the noesis is 
situated with respect to its correlative noema (meaning there can be no noesis without 
corresponding noema). Since the noesis is the intending act, it is the noesis that contributes to 
sense-bestowal; in other words, the noesis constitutes the meaning of that which is apprehended 
in intentionality. Without this noesis nothing would have meaning since devoid of consciousness 
there would be no meaning of which to speak. As Sokolowski points out, we can thank Descartes 
for the ready confidence that we place in our noeses, the underlying implication of which is the 
ready distrust that we place in the corresponding noemas, whereby we doubt that we directly 
engage or know the world, insisting that “an intermediary, a representation” be interpolated 
between ourselves and the “things outside.”60 
 Now we can “zoom out” from the analysis of the phenomenon at the noesis/noema level 
and consider the presentation of the object (the self) in light of the phenomenological concept of 
constitution as it pertains to the transcendental method. In other words, how is the self 
constituted? There are two distinct approaches via which transcendental phenomenology takes up 
constitution, referred to by Husserl as the static and the genetic.  
 Static phenomenology is the term used to refer to the phenomenological study of objects 
as experienced, with no special regard taken to the temporal constitution of meaning, although 
this is not to exclude experiences that occur in time, like watching a football match. This method 
of transcendental phenomenology is the first type that Husserl developed out of the two 
approaches, exemplified in texts like the Logical Investigations and Ideas Pertaining to a Pure 
Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy.61 In these texts Husserl’s goal is the 
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phenomenological apprehension of constitution, achieved via the adoption of the correct 
philosophical disposition (the phenomenological attitude) and through the implementation of 
certain phenomenological tools (the epoché, eidetic variation, etc.) These tools, employed in the 
phenomenological attitude after or concomitant with the reduction, enable the transcendental 
phenomenologist to “pin down” essential insights regarding the constitution of objects as they 
are constituted in a single “snapshot” of experience. 
 A brief discussion of the mechanics of constitution is warranted. The constitution of the 
appearance is facilitated in part by the subject, that is, by and through consciousness, and it is 
only through this involvement on the part of the subject that objects can be encountered as 
phenomena. The specific way in which an object appears to consciousness, for example, the way 
in which one regards a tree from a specific perspective and therefore from a certain optical angle, 
is intelligibly determined by the subject herself, since, after all, aspects of the subject, like where 
she is standing, influence the very appearance of the tree qua object. In this particular example, if 
you notice, the simple physical positioning of the perceiving subject takes a role in the overall 
appearance of the tree, which cannot in one instance be seen from every possible point of view. 
Husserl calls this property of the phenomenal object its “adumbration” (Abschattung).62 Here the 
subject is not constituting the tree by doing something akin to actively creating or constructing 
the tree as object.63 Rather, the vantage of the subject is playing a small part in the composition 
 
62 Ibid., §3, 9 <10>. 
63 This is a popular misreading of constitution, where one interprets Husserl to say that 
consciousness hoists up a world out of nothing like a painter begins a painting with a blank 
canvas. This misreading is tempting because of how it seems to be more faithful to the 
phenomenological principle requiring us to refrain from positing external objects which correlate 
with our perceptions of them and are mind-independent. Moran points out in his Dictionary that 
Eugen Fink, one of Husserl’s assistants and the author of the famous Sixth Cartesian Meditation, 
goes to great lengths to argue that constitution is not a subjective “activity.”  
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of the appearance, since the object could not appear before consciousness without some specific 
orientation of view. 
 But what is here true regarding the way in which an optic orientation can determine the 
appearance of a phenomenal object before consciousness is applicable to numerous different 
aspects of subjective constitution. The constitution of a phenomenon is not the result of some 
sort of “construction” ex nihilo on the part of consciousness, but rather, it is the givenness of 
meaning. No matter what is given in experience, consciousness itself plays a part in the 
structuration of that which is given. This disclosure not only requires a subject for whom the 
meaning is constituted but requires the object to permit its own significant appearance, hence any 
interpretation of constitution as enacted solely on the part of the subject is misguided. For 
example, the appearance of the aforementioned tree is such that the tree “brings to the table” 
certain material aspects to its profile (qua adumbrations) that allow for the phenomenological 
subject to view the tree, in contrast to the immaterial aspects of a geometric shape, namely its 
purely formal properties, which permit one to mathematically intuit the figure. 
 Yet it is imperative to note that the objects that appear before consciousness are not 
simply constituted in one fell swoop, but instead are often the product of stratified levels of 
constitution. The “achievement” of constitution, as Husserl likes to call it, is a complex process 
that often times is passive instead of active. Husserl stipulates that the experience of the world is 
the product of intersubjective constitution, comprised of layers, that is responsible for 
establishing meaning (Sinn) before the subject even enters the scene. Consider, for example, the 
way in which my experience of the world is of an “object” that has been historically constituted, 
molded on a diachronic level. In the present this same world is synchronically maintained insofar 
as I can have a sensible conversation about current events with another mind, not to mention 
131 
observe the same event together in real-time.  Later in his career, when he turns to wider 
considerations regarding phenomenology, Husserl begins to focus on how various dimensions of 
phenomenal constitution are composed via “sources” which are “exterior” to the individual.  
 Indeed if static phenomenology is the analysis of the final constituted object, then genetic 
phenomenology is the analysis of constitution in an active and dynamic sense, typically over the 
course of time and in such a manner that transcends individual solipsistic consciousness. In the 
CM and the Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis, Husserl uses the term “genetic 
phenomenology” to refer to the transcendental ego’s constituted experience of the world and 
intersubjectivity.64 Whereas static phenomenology studies the constitution of intentional objects, 
genetic phenomenology treats objects as we encounter them in the natural attitude, as wholes, but 
wholes which are in flux and subject to time. Genetic phenomenology defines the approach of 
the later Husserl and takes to task historical and time-oriented dimensions of phenomenology, 
like the experience of intersubjectivity and the “lifeworld.” These domains of experience are 
never exclusive products of the individual subject but instead are cooperatively constituted in the 
stream of time.  
 No phenomenology of conversion can be complete without incorporating the approach of 
the genetic method, since change and transformation on a personal level is subject to the passage 
of time and the individual’s active involvement in a lifeworld. In other words there is no 
possibility for conversion without, first, temporality, but second, the phenomenon of the world.  
But in fact the experience of temporality is intersubjective, emphatically so. As Lanei 
Rodemeyer puts it: 
Intersubjective temporality maintains my own self-experience alongside my experiences of 
intersubjective horizons, and it projects beyond my “presencing” of consciousness toward other 
consciousnesses in my experience. It enables my fluid constitution of other subjects, and my 
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experience of the world as shared, co-constituted, and mutually experienced in one temporality 
called world-time. It does not cause my own ego to self-destruct, nor does it disable my ability to 
reflect or carry out the phenomenological reduction. Instead, intersubjective temporality explains 
phenomenologically most of my experiences of the world and any experiences of other subjects.65 
 
Indeed the experience of conversion is one such experience that would not be possible without 
the experience of intersubjective temporality. Rodemeyer’s argument, following Husserl, is that 
consciousness, on a primitive level, is what constitutes time, personal identity (the self), and all 
other experiences, but that consciousness cannot perform such accomplishments without the 
Other. It is the intersubjective aspect of my experience that grounds many meanings, the result of 
my identified association with the Other and the world, which occurs on the level of passive 
synthesis. In a study of conversion this distinction should not be glossed over. Without the co-
constituted world, the individual cannot convert in any meaningful sense.  
 I will conclude with the phenomenological concept of the horizon (Horizont), which 
could have just as easily begun the present exploration of the transcendental method. Indeed the 
horizon is referenced in the very first section of Ideas I where Husserl uses the word to refer to 
the idea of a general limit encompassing the possible.66 There the term is employed with 
reference to all possible areas of inquiry within the natural (theoretical) attitude but more 
generally Husserl uses the term to refer to the limits of experience.  
 But the phenomenological horizon is also akin to the background of the specific object, 
where the background refers not only to the “surround world” (Umwelt) within which the object 
is encountered, but also the myriad other ways in which the object could be encountered. Put 
differently, we could state that any given experience implies other possible ways of experiencing 
the same thing. Consider perception proper, like simple vision. As we saw in our example of 
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static constitution (seeing a tree), whenever you see something in your field of vision, you see it 
in such a way that other ways of seeing it would be possible, whether from another angle or 
perspective, or in different lighting, or at a different time of day. You might recognize that your 
own neighborhood is like this, where it will appear to you in drastically different fashions on the 
basis of only a minor change in weather or light or even mood.  
 This open-endedness is a necessary possibility for the very appearance of the object in 
general. In APS Husserl describes how the horizon is integral to consciousness: 
[E]verything that genuinely appears is an appearing thing only by virtue of being intertwined and 
permeated with an intentional empty horizon, that is, by virtue of being surrounded by a halo of 
emptiness with respect to appearance. It is an emptiness that is not a nothingness, but an emptiness 
to be filled out, it is a determinable indeterminacy.67 
 
This emptiness is akin to a lack or privation; it is to be completed. But the point here is that its 
manner of completion is infinitely variable. It follows that there is no object, 
phenomenologically speaking, which could be experienced in just one way. Thus this open-
endedness is essential to the appearing object and with every experience of consciousness comes 
other possible mods of givenness.  
 Just as experiences are not only perceptual, so too do horizons surpass that single 
category; a horizon can be historical, linguistic, cultural, individual, shared, etc. Late in his 
career these types of horizons would occupy much of Husserl’s attention, exemplified in texts 
like the Crisis.68 These are the phenomenological horizons that are most relevant for my 
purposes here, as no conversion can occur without some fundamental reference to the context of 
the world. In contrast to what is present or immediately given, this horizon determines the scope 
of possibility. This referential milieu is what makes every conversion possible specifically to the 
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extent that it was also possible not to convert, not to transform, not to change. But even the 
conversion that is pursued and experienced is one which occurs on the basis of an infinite 
number of other ways the conversion could have occurred. Similarly the “empty” possibilities of 
a conversion, which regard that which is not perceived, play a role in the experience of what is 
perceived. If we consider the case of St. Paul, for example, we find that these empty possibilities 
take on an especially significant role, since it is Paul’s temporary lack of vision and audition of a 
disembodied voice that take on central importance in his conversion story. Paul has to synthesize 
his experience in order for him to make the judgment that he is experiencing a Christ 
phenomenon. But even in more mundane cases of conversion, such as the decision to move from 
atheism to Catholicism or vice versa, the emptiness of experiential horizons are what ground the 
actual experience as lived; the experience of converting recedes into the hazy and undefined 
horizon of the past, not to mention the future. 
 
Merleau-Ponty and the Transcendental Method 
 
It is important to supplement Husserl’s conception of transcendental phenomenology with the 
ideas of Maurice Merleau-Ponty. That said, commentators disagree regarding the extent to which 
Merleau-Ponty can be properly said to have a “transcendental” phenomenological method. He 
was instrumental in bringing Husserl’s work to the French language and he is often grouped in 
with the “classical” school of phenomenologists. While he does significantly diverge from 
Husserl’s framework and method, as we shall see, his “existential” revision of phenomenology 
retains aspects of Husserl’s model while at other times his thinking is closer to Heidegger. Thus 
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there is some debate over how to classify his work, although here I will endorse the 
transcendental reading of his phenomenology. 
 Merleau-Ponty’s treatment of the transcendental is the subject of debate because, to begin 
with, he understood phenomenology to be “transcendental” in a different manner than did 
Husserl. While each phenomenologist is inquiring about the subjective transcendental 
preconditions of phenomena, for Merleau-Ponty the culmination of the phenomenological 
reduction is not a transcendental ego, but the manifestation of consciousness as deeply and 
complexly entangled with the world of the “natural attitude” (wherein Merleau-Ponty locates 
naturalistic thinking, which for him, contra Husserl, has its virtues). The conclusions of 
phenomenology are therefore qualified in Merleau-Ponty when compared to Husserl, as the 
former would argue that his own philosophy does not resolve into the underlying contradictions 
that define Husserl’s transcendental approach. 
 There are myriad methodological differences between the two philosophers but here we 
will focus on three primary points. First of all, and in continuation of the point regarding 
transcendental thinking, Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological reduction is not identical with the 
version that is employed in Husserl. Second, he emphasizes the embodied, “lived” dimension of 
phenomenology—one of the most basic and fundamental dimensions of our experience—to a 
degree not present in Husserl. Third, Merleau-Ponty incorporates the findings of empirical 
science into his phenomenology, which Husserl, as a matter of principle, does not do. 
 To begin, Merleau-Ponty is generally opposed to the idea of “reductive” science and 
ultimately, he does not use the phenomenological reduction like Husserl, whose version he 
critiques in his Phenomenology of Perception. Merleau-Ponty uses his own reduction to try “to 
rediscover, along with structure and the understanding of structure, a dimension of being and a 
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type of knowledge which man forgets in his natural attitude.”69 This is not exactly the research 
agenda of Husserl, for whom the reduction constitutes a path to the domain of pure 
transcendental experience. Merleau-Ponty is intrigued by that which is prior even to this 
transcendental subjectivity, which he contrasts with what he calls “the idealist return to 
consciousness,” itself producing a transcendental subject that is the result of analysis rather than 
true experience70 As he puts it in the Phenomenology of Perception: 
To return to the things themselves is to return to that world which precedes knowledge, of which 
knowledge always speaks, and in relation to which every scientific schematization is an abstract 
and derivative sign-language, as is geography in relation to the country-side in which we have learnt 
beforehand what a forest, a prairie or a river is.71 
 
Here he is of course repeating Husserl’s slogan, “to the things themselves.”72 But for the 
Merleau-Ponty these in fact are not the same “things themselves” at all, although each writer is 
using the same expression and a phenomenological method. The two writers understand the 
object of phenomenology rather differently, both in a teleological sense (propositum), in terms of 
its goals or ends, as well as the object to be studied (objectum).  
 It would be instructive to follow Merleau-Ponty’s line of thinking here. In the sustained 
critique of the Husserlian model of phenomenology in the preface to Phenomenogy of 
Perception, he stresses that:  
The world is there before any possible analysis of mine, and it would be artificial to make it the 
outcome of a series of syntheses which link, in the first place sensations, then aspects of the object 
corresponding to different perspectives, when both are nothing but products of analysis, with no 
sort of prior reality. Analytical reflection believes that it can trace back the course followed by a 
prior constituting act and arrive, in the ‘inner man’—to use Saint Augustine’s expression—at a 
constituting power which has always been identical with that inner self.73  
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Indeed it could be fairly argued that for Husserl phenomenology, in both its genetic and static 
iterations, is conducted upon the world posterior and not prior to analysis, despite Husserl’s best 
attempts to refrain from supplementing what is purely given. Here the problem is not simply that 
Husserl employs language as part of his descriptive method, since, as Merleau-Ponty recognizes, 
working around language itself would be impossible. “The real,” Merleau-Ponty writes, “has to 
be described, not constructed or formed. Which means that I cannot put perception into the same 
category as the syntheses represented by judgments, acts or predications.”74 Husserl regards 
perceptions, judgments, memories, and so on, as different types of intentional acts, but in his 
analysis of perceptions he does not treat them so differently from the more complex case of 
judgment, which involves volition and reason in a way that pure perception does not.  
 According to Merleau-Ponty’s view, our perceptions of the things themselves are not as 
equivalent with the analysis of the things, as he suggests is the case in Husserl’s thinking. Instead 
of describing the perception precisely as it is given, which is his goal, Husserl elects to analyze 
the givenness of the perception, which is of course not the same thing. Merleau-Ponty points out 
that the result is that, added to the perception itself (qua sensation), there is a link that is 
established to “aspects of the object corresponding to different perspectives, when both are 
nothing but products of analysis, with no sort of prior reality.”75 But the issue is that this link is 
not itself part of givenness. Here Merleau-Ponty is referring to the free variation of an object, 
whereby, as we saw, the phenomenologist uses her imagination to catalog other possible ways of 
appearing for the object. This is truly one of the cruxes upholding Husserl’s entire method, but 
Merleau-Ponty takes issue with it. 
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 Consider this example that we have already considered from Husserl, where he suggests, 
“Perhaps we begin by fictionally changing the shape or the color of the object quite arbitrarily, 
keeping identical only its perceptual appearing. […] We so to speak, shift the actual perception 
into the realm of non-actualities, the realm of the as-if.”76 On Merleau-Ponty’s understanding it is 
unclear why the phenomenologist would go through this procedure; what is revealed in so doing? 
As we know, Husserl was trying to pin down the very essence of the appearance/appearing, but 
the critique focuses on how the essence of the appearing is the result of “synthesis” rather than 
the description of what is in fact given. He accuses Husserl of trying to find the essence of the 
world by “looking for what it is as an idea once it has been reduced to a theme or discourse” 
when what should be done is looking at it “as a fact for us, before any thematization.”77 This 
simple reduction as utilized by Husserl effectively “kills” or flattens the world rather than 
illuminating it.  
 As Merleau-Ponty puts it himself, “When I begin to reflect my reflection bears upon an 
unreflective experience…”78 He is implying a distinction between describing and reflecting, 
where the former is good and is the proper goal, since the latter distorts the phenomenon from 
the form in which it is purely given. Hence the charge is that Husserl approaches the first 
moment of reflection in such a way that the pure, unreflective experience is betrayed. Consider 
for example the place of such concepts as the horizon, adumbration, etc., which are products of 
analytic reflection rather than pure givens. According to Merleau-Ponty it is undeniable that an 
object might appear before consciousness in such a way that implies other views thereof, as 
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depicted via these Husserlian concepts, akin to other ways of experiencing whatever it is, but we 
have to note that the “other” view is in fact synthetic and not itself given and hence it violates the 
guiding principles of the Husserlian method. As Merleau-Ponty reminds us in “The Metaphysical 
in Man,” phenomenological philosophy should describe experience as it is present prior to the 
wide-ranging and deep-reaching (over)-conceptualization of the philosopher, for whom the 
temptation to add to the given is too great, all the while he reminds himself that no assumptions 
are to be made according to the principles of his method.79 
 Rather than take up perception in Husserl’s own sense and use what are understood to be 
overly discursive methods, Merleau-Ponty relocates perception within a different 
phenomenological milieu. He takes perception from the narrow technical sense in which it is 
used in Husserl’s work and expands its limits in every direction. He writes that “perception is not 
a science of the world, it is not even an act, a deliberate taking up of a position; it is the 
background from which all acts stand out and is in fact presupposed by them.”80 In other words 
perception is like a context within which experience can be possible. While this at first sounds 
less technical than the presentation of perception in Husserl’s writing, and perhaps closer to what 
Heidegger formulates in Being and Time, in fact Merleau-Ponty will proceed from these 
preliminary considerations toward a thoroughly empirical and scientific approach to perception, 
phenomenologically considered. Thus while it may be true that, as he says, “perception is not a 
science of the world,” scientific claims concerning perception, especially at the physiological 
level, are vital to his program. But as Jack Reynolds notes, the meaning of “perception” in The 
Phenomenology of Perception and The Primacy of Perception is actually fairly nuanced and even 
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technical, since here perception is not simple vision or even intellection, but instead is an 
intertwined complex of body and world.81 It is by dint of this definition of perception that 
Merleau-Ponty can redefine intentionality from the Husserlian formulation of “consciousness is 
consciousness of something” into “all consciousness is perceptual.”82 Rather than being limited 
to a conception of perception in a narrow sense, including the likes of the faculty of vision, 
physical sensation, and mental intuition, Merleau-Ponty expands perception to encompass all 
fields of experience.  
 Indeed this is because for Merleau-Ponty our experience of the world is mediated 
primarily through our embodiment, which serves as the very source of our perception. Merleau-
Ponty suggests that it is through our physical embodiment, our “flesh,” that we are inserted into a 
world whose “closely woven fabric” predates us.83 This world of which we are just a part, he 
notes, does not await our rationalization before it presents us with phenomena; the “truth” 
inhabits the world and not the isolated cogito, the “purity” of which he will deny. 
 In question of the cogito, the transcendental subject itself, Merleau-Ponty asserts that, 
“[t]here is no inner man, man is in the world, and only in the world does he know himself” (xii). 
This brings us back to the question of the transcendental reduction in his own phenomenology. It 
is readily apparent that he critiques the transcendental basis of Husserl’s phenomenology, and we 
have already shown how he questions the validity of eidetic variation. Furthermore he seems to 
question the idea of any phenomenological reduction whatsoever when he makes statements like 
“[t]he most important lesson which the reduction teaches us is the impossibility of a complete 
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reduction” (xv). He goes on to point that because we are not “absolute mind,” the reduction 
cannot work; we are “in the world,” caught up in “temporal flux” in such a way that inquiring 
into the flux is impossible if the goal is to find a “thought which embraces all our thought” (xv). 
He concludes with a succinct qualification: that the reduction is not a method of idealism but 
instead of existentialism. 
 This does not mean that he does not employ the reduction in his own phenomenology. 
Rather it could be said that he preserves the reduction within specific limits. Indeed the version 
of the reduction which he uses in his own philosophy is one which re-situates phenomenology in 
what could be called an existential context. In his famous discussion of the pathology of the 
medical patient Schneider he actually refers to his descriptions as “existential analysis” (157). 
The term “existential” is fitting to characterize his work since his phenomenology takes to task 
experience as bound up with the world itself, rather than the crown achievement of pure 
transcendental subjectivity, closer to genetic phenomenology than the early-period “static” 
method that defines the approach in texts like Ideas.  
 Despite this fact Merleau-Ponty is presented here along with Husserl because, while his 
work treats “existence” more fully than Husserl’s, there remains a transcendental side to his 
thinking, albeit one that is different. Sebastian Gardner has argued that Merleau-Ponty’s 
philosophy should be seen as a “contribution to a transcendental theory with metaphysical 
implications.”84 In short this argument claims that the method discovers transcendental (“a priori 
and necessary”) conditions, namely the “pre-objectivity of perception” that makes possible 
experience’s “objectual character.”85 Thus while the transcendental upshot of his reduction is not 
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a pure constituting ego, instead he argues that our “pre-objective perspective” itself takes on this 
role.86  
 Ultimately Merleau-Ponty suggests that for all of his measures to avoid the isolated 
cogito of Descartes’ philosophy, Husserl himself winds up dividing subject and world, thereby 
parking transcendental subjectivity in that same problematic view from nowhere which he 
critiques in the Cartesian philosophy. So too does he fail to avoid the subject-object dichotomy, 
evinced by his own phenomenology’s replication of the Cartesian split between mind and body. 
It is contrary to this contradictory schema that Merleau-Ponty first analyzes the body, in The 
Structure of Behavior, and ultimately declares in his own phenomenology “I am my body.”87 
Citing Gabriel Marcel’s inverted analysis of being versus having, Merleau-Ponty arrives upon 
this locution after revising the normal expression “I have a body.” Marcel famously maintains 
that the difference between “being” and “having” can be demonstrated via the exceptional 
example of the body as something that I both have as well as something that I am.88 Instead of 
extracting a pure subject from the body, a subject that is in possession of the body qua object, 
Merleau-Ponty collapses the two sides into one dimension.  In his philosophy, simply put, our 
experience makes it abundantly clear that our minds do not “rule” our bodies. Furthermore it is 
not, contra the rationalist tradition (or intellectualist, as he puts it), via the mind that we come to 
more fully know the body. 
 Analyzing the body specifically as we know it through living, rather than as a removed 
object “out there” in an external world, in his Phenomenology he writes that “[o]ne’s own body 
is in the world just as the heart is in the organism: it continuously breathes life into the visible 
 
86 Merleau-Ponty, PP, 81 (Landes).  
87 Ibid., 151.  
88 Merleau-Ponty, Being and Having. 
143 
spectacle, animates it and nourishes it from within, and forms a system with it.”89 In The 
Structure of Behavior this is the distinction between the so-called objective body as known by 
science, and the phenomenal body as known through experience.90 Hence he manages to avoid 
the subject-object dichotomy by way of this notion of the lived body which subverts the very 
opposition of mind versus body, subject versus object, and inside versus outside.       
 Lastly Merleau-Ponty differs from Husserl in his implementation of the findings of 
empirical science. His orientation toward science is both critical and conflicted, exemplified in 
his critique of naive ontological assumptions that are carried out on the part of science, 
especially, as Landes notes, during the “classical” period, in contrast to his general trust of more 
modern forms.91 Merleau-Ponty is particularly intrigued, for example, by the findings of 
neuropsychology.  
 The most famous example of scientific work included in Merleau-Ponty’s writing would 
be the case of Schneider that is sourced in the work of Gelb and Goldstein. Schneider was a 
German soldier who received a significant traumatic brain injury. What interests Merleau-Ponty 
about Schneider is how he serves as an atypical case of lived experience via his injury; his 
difficulty with respect to sensorimotor control demonstrates how the control of the body is 
mediated via consciousness, thus clarifying “motor intentionality.” Merleau-Ponty’s conclusion, 
in short, is that when I want to move my arm, I move it without first necessarily thinking about 
doing so, although I am able to “virtually” imagine such a movement; his empirical examination 
of Schneider’s consciousness indicates that his inability to take up a virtual orientation with 
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respect to his own embodiment correlates with his inability to perform certain movements in the 
“typical” fashion. 
 But it has to be noted in closing that for Merleau-Ponty modern science is not in itself a 
sufficient source of truth. Irrespective of the historical periods in which various forms of science 
have developed, he questions “the dogmatism of a science that thinks itself capable of absolute 
and complete knowledge.92 Like Husserl, he suggests that the scientific outlook on nature is still 
just a mode of consciousness, situating the discipline of phenomenology in a more primordial 
“space” than the scientific perspective that can only arrive later on.  
 Eventually I will argue, following Merleau-Ponty, that the body plays an indispensable 
role in the experience of conversion, and is no less crucial and necessary for conversion than the 













92 Merleau-Ponty, World of Perception, 36. 
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Ch. 3.  The Phenomenon of Conversion in the Natural Attitude 
 
The Synthetic Definition Considered in the Natural Attitude 
 
In the first chapter I reviewed a diverse set of definitions for conversion and offered a new, 
general definition of conversion of my own. The general definition I compiled is the synthetic 
result of different perspectives on conversion in the human sciences, with disciplines ranging 
from psychology, to theology, to sociology.1 While these fields all belong to the human sciences 
and therefore belong also to the natural attitude, we have not yet considered my holistic 
definition of conversion in the natural attitude, which is only necessary insofar as all relevant 
assumptions and presuppositions need to be identified on a preliminary basis so that they can be 
excluded in the phenomenological attitude. Thus in this chapter I will consider in the natural 
attitude the ordinary assumptions of my synthetic account of conversion, in preparation for the 
phenomenological reduction of the phenomenon. 
 
Consciousness in the Natural Attitude 
 
In order to determine the eidetic form of conversion, it will first be necessary to prepare a sketch 
of conversion as I encounter it in the “natural attitude.”2 This is required so that we can be sure to 
 
1 Significantly, I was not able to consider conversion models from neuroscience, because as of 
this writing, there are none, although the human propensity for religious belief is an active area 
of research. See Grafman’s “The Neural Basis of Religious Cognition.” While our innate 
proclivity for religious belief could be related in a meaningful way to conversion, I cannot draw 
phenomenological results concerning conversion in particular from theories such as these. 
 2 Husserl, Ideas I §27, 51 <48>. 
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exclude all of the particular and empirical features of conversion experience in the natural 
attitude in the interest of securing valid phenomenological conclusions regarding the invariant 
essence of conversion. 
 I will begin in the natural attitude not with conversion but with consciousness, because 
the phenomenon of conversion is a modality of consciousness, the empirical nature of which will 
dictate the specific shape taken by my synthetic conversion model. Insofar as conversion is 
something that happens for consciousness, an empirical explanation of conversion should include 
a natural, empirical explanation of consciousness. What is the empirical ego that lives conversion 
as a concrete experience? 
 In order to answer this, first let us characterize the natural attitude itself.3 In the first 
volume of Ideas Husserl characterizes the natural attitude as the mindset within which the world 
is “simply there” for me, whether I pay attention to it or not. In the natural attitude my 
experience of consciousness is as follows: 
I am conscious of a world endlessly spread out in space, endlessly becoming and having endlessly 
become in time. I am conscious of it: that signifies, above, that intuitively I find it immediately, that 
I experience it. By my seeing, touching, hearing, and so forth, and in the different modes of 
sensuous perception, corporeal physical things with some spatial distribution or other are simply 
there for me, “on hand” in the literal or the figurative sense, whether or not I am particularly heedful 
of them and busied with them in my considering, thinking, feeling, or willing.4 
 
This is the world that I intuitively encounter as I go about my daily life, “living naturally,” as 
Husserl puts it, but also “naively.”5 In this more or less default attitude I take for granted the 
objective existence of the world and everything in it. Husserl calls this a naive approach to 
reality specifically because it is pre-phenomenological; I do not realize that upon closer 
(phenomenological) inspection, the world is not in fact as simple as it appears to be. I essentially 
 
3 David Carr, “The Emergence and Transformation of Husserl’s Concept of World,” 182. 
4 Husserl, Ideas I §27, 51 <48>. 
5 Ibid., §39, 81 <69>. 
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just go along with things without questioning what I am experiencing. If I do question things, I 
do so in such a way that befits the orientation of the natural attitude. In other words if I do 
question anything, I only question it on a superficial or topic level; I do not question the 
existence of any of the objects of my experience, even those I “question” (e.g. is the distant 
shape on the horizon a ship or a landmass?) 
  Later on Husserl distinguishes this type of thinking as belonging to the “theoretical 
attitude.”6 In the theoretical attitude my experience is “performed or carried out in the function of 
knowledge.”7 In this attitude I might question why someone does something, or ask someone to 
explain something to me because I am not convinced (e.g. some cutting-edge scientific theory), 
but these concerns are critical only on a topical level that does not call into question the 
underlying basis of my own consciousness. Husserl takes the scientific orientation of this attitude 
as his model for the orientation of the phenomenological attitude, but the natural scientific 
attitude (within the theoretical attitude) ultimately attempts to eliminate or at least downplay the 
effects of empirical results deriving from consciousness, namely from the perspective of the 
perceiver or observer, which is of course impossible, whereas in the phenomenological attitude it 
is precisely consciousness that is taken up as scientific object. 
 In fact in the natural attitude and even the natural-scientific attitude (a specific mode of 
the theoretical attitude) my naive assumptions about the “external” world are accompanied by 
similar assumptions that regard my own consciousness. When I regard my consciousness in the 
natural attitude in particular, Husserl says I encounter the cogito, which is my default state of 
consciousness in this attitude whether I reflect upon it or not. Husserl writes in Ideas that:8 
 
6 Husserl, Ideas II §2, 4 <2>. 
7 Ibid., II §3, 5 <3>. 
8 Husserl, Ideas I §27, 51 <48>. 
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Living along naturally, I live continually in this fundamental form of “active” [aktuellen] living 
whether, while so living, I state the cogito, whether I am directed “reflectively” to the Ego and the 
cogitare. If I am directed to them, a new cogito is alive, one that, for its part, is not reflected on and 
thus is not objective for me.9 
 
The cogito, or “I think” is whatever my natural consciousness is presently occupied with as I go 
about living. This ordinary, natural consciousness is capable of reflection, as Husserl points out, 
but it is not phenomenological reflection (which involves the eidetic, transcendental tools of the 
phenomenological method). Most of the time this natural consciousness just occupies itself with 
experiencing the world through various different sorts of experience, from “outer” senses to 
“inner” thoughts. As these various experiences are given to me, I accept them at face value. 
 When I do reflect on my “self” in the natural attitude, typically I reflect on my self as an 
object.10 As I continue my sketch of consciousness in the natural attitude, I take note of the fact 
that there are many ways in which I encounter this  “objective” or “objectified” self in reflection. 
For example I can reflect upon my material appearance in a mirror, or I can reflect on my own 
personality or the “way I am like” in the present moment, or I can reflect on the idea of who I 
“was” in the past. Notice that all of these considerations are concerned with things that I assume 
to exist. In all of these cases my intentionality is focused upon my self as if it is an object, whether 
I regard my self in an embodied material sense or in a more abstract, propositional sense, 
exemplified in something like the thought that “I am a good friend.” In all of these examples I am 
experiencing myself as I am some sort of separate “thing.” 
 I also observe even in the natural attitude that I understand my experience to be distinct 
from the world—but not in a phenomenological sense. In fact in the natural attitude my essential 
error is precisely the fact that I regard my consciousness as too distinct and divorced from the 
 
9 Ibid., §28, 54 <50>. 
10 This the type of self-consciousness that Kant refers to as “empirical.” CPR, B132. 
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“external” world of objects. Indeed in the natural attitude I take the world to be a totally separate 
“thing” from my own consciousness, something that my consciousness encounters in a truly 
objective, mind-independent sense. 
 In short, the world is just “there” for me as I go about living my daily life. In this attitude 
I take it that the world is there whether I am or not, or s Husserl puts it, I take the “factual” 
existence of the world for granted.11 This is what he refers to as the “general positing” of the 
world. I ordinarily posit the matter-of-fact existence of the world as I go about living in the 
natural mindset. The fact that Husserl terms this a “positing” cannot be glossed over; my general, 
uncritical sense that the world “exists” is nothing more than an ordinary assumption. Without this 
assumption it would be difficult to participate in human life. I do not doubt the real existence of 
the things that I encounter in the world, and I do not view my own mental life with a critical 
orientation. It is hard to imagine how I might ever experience a conversion if not for the 
assumption that the world exists! 
 Just as my natural consciousness conceives of the “external” world at its face value, 
which is to say, as a mind-independent thing, the same consciousness does not critically regard 
its own analytic structure. Without a doubt I can think about thinking, but this does not 
necessarily involve the phenomenological method; after all, nearly every philosopher from the 
course of history will examine thought in some way, shape, or form, but until the work of Kant, 
Husserl, and a few others, critically assessing consciousness as “phenomenon” was an unknown 
path. This does not mean that all of these philosophers looked at consciousness with the 
transcendental framework of Husserl, Kant, and others. Indeed in the natural attitude my 
experience of consciousness is such that it I am capable of reflecting upon my own experience 
 
11 Husserl, Ideas I §30, 56 <52>. 
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but without transcending my own perspective and determining the essence and limits of that 
conscious perspective. The deeper regard that I can take up in the natural attitude is certainly not 
equivalent with the phenomenological perspective. As Husserl puts it in Ideas, this deeper regard 
qua “self-observation” is not the same as phenomenological reflection. The former belongs to 
psychology and inquires into the “range and the essentially necessary cognitive value of 
existential findings which give expression to the givenness of our (human) experiences of the 
internal—we therefore ask about psychological method.”12 In other words the psychologist 
concerns himself with the assessment and evaluation of actual mental phenomena. Thus this 
particular sort of analytic approach will always confine itself to the concrete. Phenomenology, by 
contrast, inquires into the “essentially necessary possibility and range of essential findings 
which, on the ground of pure reflection, should concern mental processes as mental processes 
with respect to their own being free from natural apperception.”13 Husserl is pointing out that the 
difference between the psychological method and the phenomenological method is that the latter 
transcends the concrete and existential and focuses to the contrary on that which is essential, 
necessary, and possible. 
 Therefore we can see how it is that when I consider my “self” as an abstraction of deeper 
regard in the natural or theoretical attitudes, this abstracted self is not my “self” as conscious 
phenomenon per se, nor my self as the stream of my mental life eo ipso; these considerations 
belong to the phenomenological attitude. Instead the “deeper” self in these attitudes is the self 
that I am always “living,” not only in terms of “sensuous perception” but also the field of 
 
12 Ibid., §79, 81 <152>. 
13 Ibid. 
151 
intuition.14 This is the experience of self that is simply “given” to me, “prior to any ‘theory.’”15 
This self, like the larger world, belongs to the general positing associated with the natural attitude 
and encompasses not only the so-called external world but also the very stream of my own 
consciousness; I do not critically approach either phenomenon. Certainly the failure to regard 
consciousness as origin of knowledge is epistemologically problematic, and the end result of 
such a failure is a system of scientific knowing that rests on a fundamentally insecure foundation. 
As I go about my everyday life, though, this is not a problem, nor is this a problem for the 
experience of conversion. 
 
Conversion in the Natural Attitude 
 
In the natural attitude I understand that conversion is always something that happens for the self, 
whether on the basis of a change in my identity or a shift in my role.16 In this attitude I take for 
granted various aspects of my selfhood the likes of which include my individual and family 
history, my personality, my mannerisms, my temperament, my drives, my hopes and desires, my 
sense of personal purpose, my way of speaking, my way of acting, my idea of my self, my 
philosophical beliefs, my spiritual beliefs, my political beliefs, my body, and my general 
understanding of my appearance to myself and to the Other.  I can experience a meaningful 
conversion in any number of these “categories” of selfhood, but in the natural attitude I 
 
14 Husserl, Ideas I §27, 51 <48>. 
15 Ibid., §30, 56 <52>. 
16 To experience a change in identity is not to annul every previous aspect of identity. Here I am 
using the concept of “identity” to refer to an existentially significant idea of one’s self. An idea is 
existentially significant if it contributes to the subject’s sense of who they “are.” It is clear that an 
idea like this can only belong to the natural attitude. 
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presuppose that all of these ideas and beliefs correspond to concrete actualities in the “real” and 
“external” world. 
 This is because my natural, empirical experience of conversion is probably predicated on 
at least a few metaphysical and ontological assumptions. First, I assume that I exist. Whether I 
am someone who is pursuing a conversion with intent, or someone who is subject to an event 
that brings about a conversion, I make the assumption that I exist, since if I did not, then there 
would be no one to convert. Second, I assume that the world exists. This is the world within 
which I convert. Whether my conversion is something that occurs on the basis of a choice or a 
spontaneous event, the resulting change in my identity or role can only make sense if there is a 
world as a “backdrop” against which my sense of identity or role is given sense. As we have 
seen, I do not have to be consciously aware of the fact that I have converted, but in order for a 
conversion to have occurred (whether I know it or not), I have to be living naturally in the world. 
 If my conversion is one involving organized religion, then the experience likely involves 
explicit beliefs about the underlying “nature” of the world. These beliefs obviously presuppose 
the existence of the world. Often these beliefs entail metaphysical or ontological positions about 
the way things really are. But the same is true for many other types of conversions. A 
philosophical or political conversion (which is a change in identity or role on the basis of a shift 
in philosophical or political beliefs, meaning that it is not a conversion every time I change my 
mind about some little issue here or there, but that it is a conversion if I “become” a Marxist or a 
Platonist or even a nihilist) would by definition include essential beliefs about the world, beliefs 
which would require (i.e. presuppose) that the world exists in the first place. What we mean 
when we say the world “exists” might take on different manifestations, epitomized by the very 
different perspectives of a Thomist and a Kantian. 
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 What about more general “moral” conversions, such as the archetypal “change of heart” 
from a life of wickedness to a life of righteousness and justice? A conversion such as this may 
lack a formal belief system (whether religious, spiritual, philosophical, or political) but it still 
hinges upon a specific ontological orientation: the world exists, and so do I. 
 Thus, it is apparent that the experience of conversion is something that I regard with no 
real phenomenological scrutiny in the natural attitude, since such scrutiny would compel me to 
reconsider my naive assumptions about the world and the ‘I.’ That said, this does not mean that I 
cannot have beliefs about the value of conversion; the point is that these potential beliefs do not 
critically concern the conversion phenomenon at the level of consciousness. If I have any beliefs 
about the value of conversion, they most likely regard metaphysical claims that a personal 
conversion may (or may not) entail. For example, I may be of the mind that converting to 
Christianity is a “waste of time,” because the religion requires one to hold beliefs that I myself 
cannot personally hold (i.e., ‘God exists and has certain knowable properties.’) A similar 
situation could hold for political and philosophical ideologies that offer essential explanations for 
matters in the natural world. 
 It seems that the experience of conversion must occur in the natural attitude, because it 
entails a change in an individual’s identity or role, which are concepts that belong to the natural 
(or scientific) attitude and not the phenomenological attitude. How can I have an idea of my own 
identity without naively presupposing that “I” exist? How can I defend any account of role 
without the concept of the world? If I take up the imaginative perspective of St. Paul as he drops 
to the ground, it seems that the moment I bracket the “universal thesis” that holds that the world 
and the things in it exist, myself included, I disrupt the continuation of the conversion 
experience. In short, I can discern that because conversion is experienced in the natural attitude, I 
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cannot concomitantly experience a conversion as I employ the phenomenological method. 
Critically I note that phenomenology forces me to bracket off aspects of the world that 
conversion seems to require. 
  For example, my decision to convert from Judaism to Catholicism entails numerous 
existential and ontological presuppositions, not only about the way the world “is,” but also that 
the world “is.” Would it even be possible for me to experience the conversion phenomenon 
without holding at least some naive metaphysical assumptions about the existence of a so-called 
“objective” world? Perhaps the one sort of conversion that would seem to operate sans such 
assumptions would be a “conversion” to strict solipsism, and it must be admitted that calling 
such a change in belief a “conversion” would be strange indeed. But even a strange “conversion” 
like that does not require the phenomenological method—the solipsist, after all, is still making 
assumptions about the nature of his own perspective. In the phenomenological method he would 
be afforded no such move. 
 When we consider conversions as events in the third person, we sometimes think of them 
as disruptive or disorienting; in such cases the conversion “shatters” the subject’s very Being and 
replaces it with something “new.” Without a doubt this can feel like a crisis. But on the 
phenomenological level a conversion does not have to be so dramatic, and in fact it seems likely 
that most conversions are of a milder variety. What is surprising is that the change, irrespective 
of its intensity, can occur without the subject’s awareness that a life-altering change occurred. In 
the case of the gradual, continuous conversion, I may not realize that my self has changed until 
late in my experience of the process; indeed I am not always aware of this change until later in 
time. This can also occur when an abrupt event has an impact on me, but not in such a way that I 
realize the significance of the effect. It may be the case that I only realize retrospectively that the 
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change occurred. If I am raised to be religious or spiritual from a very young age, then I may 
never notice my own conversion without being prompted to reflect on the specific subject. 
  While it is my self that changes and is changed, I do not always directly “choose” this 
change. Indeed I can experience conversion without actively seeking out such a phenomenon 
This means that sometimes, causes external to my self are what bring about changes internal to 
my self. I can choose to convert in the world, or the world can affect me in such a way that I am 
converted by the world. When my conversion is enacted through the occurrence of an event, 
sometimes I seek out this event deliberately, while at other times, the event is extemporaneous, 
and it spontaneously enters the trajectory of my existence. 
  When my self shifts or changes, sometimes it is because I am grasping a new personal 
identity. I am redefining for myself that person whom I consider myself to be. Other times I can 
experience this shift without a change in my underlying identity. In these cases what shifts is my 
sense of role.  While I can experience a conversion in my understanding of my role without a 
corresponding conversion of identity, typically when I do convert in identity, a change in role 
follows. In other words a shift in identity entails a shift in role, but the converse is not true; a role 
change does not necessarily include a change in identity, as the concept was formulated 
specifically in order to identify instances of self-understanding which are procedural and 
occupational but not reflective of any identity change. 
 In sum in the natural attitude the experience of conversion is a non-critical phenomenon 
that I (can) encounter as I go about the “active living” of my life. Identity and role are concepts 
that belong to the empirical world; therefore conversion is something that occurs for the 
empirical ego (although, once again, this does not mean that the subject is aware of the change to 
the empirical ego). While I do not (and cannot) consider the conversion at its most essential 
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phenomenological level when (or as) I experience a conversion firsthand, because conversion 
requires either identity or role (each of which require empirical self and world), it is in 
considering the phenomenon of conversion at the phenomenological level that its essential and 
necessary possibilities actually come to light. 
  
Three Modalities of Conscious Experience in the Natural Attitude 
 
We can see that there are three different classes or modalities of experience in the consciousness 
of the natural attitude as conceived by Husserl. If we consider this natural consciousness 
phenomenologically, we can discern significant differences among these three modalities, despite 
the fact that Husserl presents the natural attitude as somewhat homogeneous in constitution, at 
least in the first two books of Ideas, insofar as the variegated experiences that belong to the 
natural attitude can all be grouped under that single heading. While he has reasons for this, he 
actually does identify several important key distinctions regarding natural consciousness. Here I 
want to phenomenologically thematize these distinctions because they hold significant 
implications with respect to the consciousness of conversion. 
 Husserl’s clearest account of these differences in the natural attitude is articulated in the 
first book of Ideas: 
I can let my attention wander away from the writing table which was just now seen and noticed, 
out through the unseen parts of the room which are behind my back, to the verandah, into the 
garden, to the children in the arbor, etc., to all the Objects I directly “know of” as being there and 
here in the surroundings of which there is also consciousness—a “knowing of them” which involves 
no conceptual thinking, and which changes into a clear intuiting only with the advertence of 
attention, and even then only partially and for the most part very imperfectly.17 
 
 
17 Husserl, Ideas I §27, 52 <49>. 
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Notice how Husserl describes three distinct conscious modalities here. The most basic and 
essential modality is my “baseline” consciousness, which is flowing so long as I am awake (and, 
it seems, as I dream.) According to Husserl this is a sort of consciousness that does not involve 
thinking with concepts (but can involve other sorts of “thinking” along the lines of a rationalist 
definition of the activity) nor is this consciousness marked by clear intuiting via my attention. 
Clearly this is related to the consciousness that Husserl describes as “simply there” or 
“immediately there.”18  At the most fundamental level, this is a pre-reflective modality of 
consciousness, although, as we shall see, there are at least two different types of pre-reflective 
consciousness. This is the domain to which the transcendental ego belongs, which cannot be 
determined in the natural attitude, but is made clear via the reduction of the phenomenological 
method. This domain of consciousness, as the manifold stream of “things” that are “present as 
actualities in my field of intuition even when I do not heed them,” is arguably undifferentiated 
because the constituent structures of the experience are not individually acknowledged by me.19 
Husserl even goes so far as to state that this phenomenal field includes that which is “co-present” 
Consider, for example, how I might “mindlessly” gaze out the window of a train as I ride inside 
of it. This example works particularly well because even if I did make the effort to “process” the 
appearances in my sensory field, I would struggle to do so, due to the velocity differential—I am 
traveling quickly and everything in the world outside of the train is standing still. This backdrop 
factors into every experience that I have and is given to me in the background even when I am 
focused in a reflective act. Furthermore, without this background I would have nothing to 
intentionally attend to in the first place; this phenomenological background is a supportive 
 
18 Ibid. §27, 51 <48>. 
19 Ibid. 
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stratum that makes possible the other sorts of experience. Nevertheless this background aspect of 
consciousness must be considered to be a sort of “experience” despite the fact that I am not 
directly “conscious” of it in a reflective sense. Here it is useful to again bring in the concept of 
intentionality: in the first modality of conscious experience in the natural attitude, I do not reflect 
on the contents of my experience, but the experience still has the requisite “aboutness” of 
intentionality, although in such a way that is devoid of my attention, which would furnish the 
experience with “clear intuiting.” 
 The second phenomenological modality is also pre-reflective, but in this modality, I am 
more engaged with and occupied by the “world”—I give the phenomenon my attention.” In short 
this is the level of consciousness that involves a more focused and attentive perceiver, but no 
reflection. For example, if I am a spectator at an automobile race, as I watch the vehicles 
navigate through the twists and turns of the circuit, I am actively perceiving events (as object) as 
they unfold in time. Perhaps I focus upon a single car and follow it along with my eyes. In the 
background of this experience is the same undifferentiated background from the first modality. 
Even as I watch the race there are what Husserl calls co-present phenomenal features in my 
sensory field that come and go, entering the horizon of my experience at one moment, and then 
dropping out of my experience the next. The clouds that float by in the sky are an example of 
that sort of background, as well as what is likely only a vague awareness of the outdoor 
temperature (unless it is very cold or very hot). This modality is also (phenomenologically) pre-
reflective despite the fact that it differs markedly from the baseline modality of consciousness. 
Many conversions that occur within the limits of established, organized religion occur with 
significant activity in this modality of consciousness. These conversions often involve important 
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events that are the object of conscious awareness and mindfulness, although they are not 
necessarily fully reflective. 
 The third type of experience is reflective. When I reflect, I am conscious not of a certain 
sensuous object or even abstract proposition but rather via my reflection I focus my experience 
on experience of the object itself, whether it is a material object that I see or a proposition that I 
am believing or considering. Thus essentially superimposed upon the first two strata of my 
experience to the extent that reflection takes as its object the objectified consciousness of the 
second modality which is itself only possible by way of the non-objectified primary modality. At 
the automobile race I enter this modality of consciousness when my conscious intention is itself 
directed in a self-conscious way toward the experience of being at the race, of following a 
vehicle with my eyes, of the various sounds and smells which are phenomenologically given to 
me as I sit and watch the event unfold. In contradistinction to the first two modalities of 
conscious experience, this modality requires mindful volition from me. I do not accidentally 
reflect upon something, although it might be possible that I can enter the reflective mindset 
without realizing it, as when my mind “drifts off” in its own direction. In the case of conversion, 
that which occurs on the reflective level is perhaps the most meaningful to the extent that it is the 
most volitional and contemplative. That said, there is an argument to be made for the opposite 
end of the spectrum, where a conversion occurs so subtly in the background of consciousness 
that one does not even notice that it has occurred until after the fact. After all, this conversion 
occurs so automatically and smoothly so as to be fairly construed as simply natural. It is the more 
intellectual sort of conversion that is perhaps more tenuous since it follows the essentially 
arbitrary meanderings of the conscious mind. 
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 Two phenomenological modalities lie beyond these three modalities of the natural 
attitude. Beyond the third, reflective modality of consciousness lies the domain of free 
imaginative variation, which Husserl also refers to as “eidetic variation.” If reflective 
consciousness involves the consideration of some specific mental act as it is concretely 
experienced, then it is limited de jure to the sphere of empirical consciousness, whereas eidetic 
consciousness entails the expanded consciousness of the act’s essence or form (eidos) as it 
surpasses the empirical and encompasses all of its fundamental possibilities. In other words, the 
reflection inherent in eidetic variation takes a specific conscious experience and delineates all of 
its possible but necessary appearances or manifestations. 
 We cannot stop there. Beyond even eidetic consciousness there is the domain of scientific 
inquiry the object of which is the eidetic essence of experience. If the eidetic variation can afford 
us the opportunity to determine the essential features of any given conscious act, then it is 
phenomenology that can offer to us a critical discipline that is equipped to assess scientifically 
the eidetic endeavor in the first place. The questions that phenomenology can pose for 
conversion in general are not oriented towards the empirical corroboration of religious, spiritual, 
or metaphysical claims about the underlying nature of self and reality, but instead, they inquire 
into the experiential validity of the conversion experience in the first place. Therefore, even if 
conversion ultimately belongs to the empirical ego, as I have argued, a phenomenological model 






Ch. 4. Self and Consciousness in the Phenomenological Attitude 
 
What Is the Self? A Phenomenological Account 
 
In the natural attitude I understand that when I say that I have converted, this means that my 
“self” is changed, or has changed.1 In the last chapter I showed that this change in self occurs for 
the empirical ego. But how is the empirical ego constituted?  
 Essentially the question regards the nature of the “self,” and as we know, there are many 
answers to this question since it is one of the oldest and most basic—but also most perplexing—
philosophical questions. Here, though, I am interested in a phenomenological answer to the 
“self” question, meaning that I will focus on the eidetic aspects of the self instead of the abstract 
theoretical consideration thereof. A phenomenological account of selfhood can offer something 
that cannot be matched by any of the above examples from the history of western philosophy: it 
refocuses the inquiry upon the essential features of the lived experience of the self-phenomenon.2 
It is indubitable that an analysis of the actual lived experience of selfhood can answer the 
selfhood question on a surer, more “scientific” foundation than what can be offered by traditional 
pre-phenomenological approaches.3   
 As we have seen, Husserl holds that the phenomenon of consciousness takes on many 
different manifestations in the natural attitude, the “actual living” that Husserl references in Ideas 
 
1 A change in self that occurs at various levels of awareness. 
2 As we have noted, this self (or ego) cannot be confused with the empirical ego. 
3 Here I suggest that both metaphysics and ontology are “traditional” pre-phenomenological 
approaches. By metaphysics I refer to the speculative mode of inquiry As Husserl maintains in 
“Philosophy as Rigorous Science,” by situating its basis in “consciousness itself” any science can 
secure its own phenomenological validity on the most “scientific” of grounds. See p. 259 <301>. 
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§28. But in addition to my propositional thoughts my consciousness also encompasses many 
different types of experience, including sense perception, memory, fantasy, emotion, 
embodiment, willing, desire, and so on. Husserl makes it very clear that all of these “complexes 
of my manifoldly changing spontaneities of consciousness” can and should be grouped under the 
heading of cogitare.4 We need to determine what it is that these various cogitationes have in 
common, looking beyond their empirical specificity. As Husserl poses the question in Ideas, 
“What can remain, if the whole world, including ourselves with all our cogitare, is excluded?”5 If 
there is some “thing” that remains, then it surely is of a different status than the empirical 
contents of my experience. 
  In order to answer this question and determine the eidetic structure of consciousness it is 
first necessary to radically alter my perspective and enter the phenomenological attitude. I have 
to leave behind the natural attitude and all of the ordinary assumptions that the attitude involves. 
The “thing that converts, the “self,” now has to be considered as a phenomenological structure. 
Thus all aspects of the empirical self (or ego) immediately fall away. A new, phenomenological 
“self” (if by ‘self’ we mean pure consciousness) is revealed in the phenomenological attitude; it 
is the very givenness of consciousness itself. Thus, the remainder that persists after we bracket 
off the various empirical cogitare is the general presence or givenness of consciousness: 
“consciousness has, in itself, a being of its own which in its own absolute essence, is not touched 
by the phenomenological exclusion.”6 This means that there is an aspect of my consciousness 
 
4 Husserl, Ideas I §28, 53 <50>.  
5 Ibid., §33, 63 <58>. In the Copy A version of Ideas I, Husserl puts it thus: “What can still be 
posited as being if the worldly All, the All of reality, remains parenthesized?” Here it is most 
obvious that the phenomenological method is a method that operates by way of a procedure that 
is partly “negative,” at least in the sense that its conclusions are ultimately ascertained via the 
sustained suspension of the majority of the empirical beliefs that I entertain in the natural attitude.  
6 Husserl, Ideas I, §33, 65 <59>.  
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that endures even after I bracket the existence of every correlate of my conscious acts. This 
enduring aspect has a certain sensuousness in and of itself; there is a qualitative “way” that my 
consciousness is. This is the immediate givenness of consciousness as a general phenomenon. 
 This givenness is the constituted product of what Husserl terms “pure” or 
“transcendental” consciousness starting with his Ideas. We can see that this is what remains and 
therefore is “revealed” as “phenomenological residuum” after the enactment of the epoché.7 As 
something that is “revealed” this transcendental ego is technically a sort of phenomenon, but it is 
very different from other phenomena insofar as it is not directly “given” but instead the very 
presupposition of givenness.8 Here we will take it that this is the most primitive stratum of the 
“self,” phenomenologically understood, which is to say, non-empirically. Husserl writes: 
The epoché can also be said to be the radical and universal method by which I apprehend myself 
purely: as Ego, and with my own pure conscious life, in and by which the entire Objective world 
exists for me and is precisely as it is for me. Anything belonging to the world, any spatiotemporal 
being, exists for me—that is to say, is accepted by me—in that I experience it, perceive it, remember 
it, think of it somehow, judge about it, value it, desire it, or the like.9 
 
My experience of the “I am” is a transcendental experience of self, and it is this self that makes 
possible my experience of the world. It is this self that is oriented with objects and things 
according to the law of intentionality. This is the phenomenological self, a consciousness that 
grounds my experience of the world in addition to my experience of self.  
 While in the passage quoted above it may seem as if Husserl is situating empirical 
consciousness in the phenomenological stratum of experience,  that would be a misreading based 
on what we know distinguishes phenomenological consciousness from psychological “self-
observation” and ordinary “actual living” as an empirical ego; in the phenomenological attitude 
 
7 Ibid.  
8 Breazu, “The Question of Violence,” 164. 
9 Husserl, CM §8, 21 <60>. 
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what is significant is the mineness of the perceptions and experiences through which I encounter 
the supposedly “objective” world, such that this world really is not so objective after all.10 Recall 
that the significance of this is that in the natural attitude the world is naively understood to be 
simply “there” but I do not view it as an “achievement” of my own consciousness. It is the 
apodictic and immediate givenness of this self, as phenomenological Ego, that makes it possible 
for phenomena to appear for me. As we have seen already, some commentators have suggested 
that this forces Husserl to deny outright the existence of a “natural” mind independent world (cf 
Meillassoux), but this sort of critique misinterprets the fundamental orientation of classical 
phenomenology: the world as phenomenon originates, by definition, in consciousness—without 
consciousness, there is no phenomenon as such. Is there a non-phenomenal world? Husserl’s 
phenomenology will not and cannot answer that question.11  
 To the contrary what we can be quite sure of is that, in the phenomenological attitude, this 
pure consciousness that I apprehend, through which the world is constituted for me, is marked by 
what appears to be a dual nature. Husserl indicates that: 
If we retain a pure Ego as residuum after our phenomenological exclusion of the world and of the 
empirical subjectivity included in it (and an essentially different pure Ego for each stream of mental 
processes), then there is presented in the case of that Ego a transcendency of a peculiar kind—one 
which is not constituted—a transcendency within immanency.12  
 
What Husserl is saying is that the pure ego is “alive” in every immanent conscious moment. But 
all of these conscious moments are part of a larger, single “stream of mental processes” that is 
itself constituted by the very same ego. This is why the ego transcends the individual, immanent 
moments of conscious subjectivity.  
 
10 Husserl’s critics challenged him to consider the phenomenon of the world more fully after Ideas 
I was interpreted to be an account of an isolating idealism. Heidegger is perhaps the best example 
of such a challenger. 
11 Strictly speaking the question seems to invoke a pseudo-problem in Wittgenstein’s sense. 
12 Husserl, Ideas I §57, 133 <109>. 
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 Thus we can see how on the phenomenological level an entirely new terrain emerges. I 
note that all of the myriad experiences that I consider to be part of my essential selfhood, 
whether as identity or role, are mapped upon the more fundamental aspect of my Being that is 
my transcendental ego’s unification of experience. This transcendental self is non-objectified and 
non-reflective and therefore becomes something different as soon as it is considered as if it is an 
“object.” Like Kant’s conditional transcendental ego, it seems to me that this self qua ego is also 
a necessary thing for experience, but via the phenomenological reduction I am afforded an 
analytic “view” of the phenomenon the likes of which Kant could not have imagined. There is no 
experience that I can have that lacks this essential component of experience; this ego is the 
ubiquitous feature of every possible consciousness. 
 It could be objected that this ego is in fact only a modality that consciousness deceptively 
hoists up as a stable omnipresent feature of experience. For example, what can we say about the 
phenomenon of deep dreamless sleep? While I am not consciously aware during this experience, 
it is still an experience, is it not? The truth is that while we must grant that this sort of sleep is an 
experience, it is only retroactively identified as such. I can only infer indirectly that I have had 
this experience after it has occurred. It is countersensical to speculate that the deep sleep is 
experienced as it occurs, since deep sleep is by definition a state of rest that involves no 
experience, no appearance of consciousness whatsoever. It is only the transcendental ego that is 
able to make the inference that what must have occurred during the episode of dreamless sleep 
was dreamless sleep in the first place. Thus a closer inspection of this sort of objection reveals 
that it ultimately only serves to reinforce the point that it purported to contest. 
166 
 But one problem is that beyond grasping the givenness of its appearance subsequent to 
the reduction, it is difficult to say much more about this ego. It is on the subjective end of my 
experience, but it is not itself an experience per se, despite the fact that it appears: 
After carrying out this reduction we shall not encounter the pure Ego anywhere in the flux of 
manifold mental process which remains as a transcendental residuum—neither as one mental 
process among others, nor as strictly a par of a mental process, arising and then disappearing with 
the mental process of which it is a part. The Ego seems to be there continually, indeed, necessarily, 
and this continualness is obviously not that of a stupidly persistent mental process, a “fixed idea.” 
Instead, the Ego belongs to each coming and going mental process; its “regard” is directed 
“through” each actional cogito to the objective something. This ray of regard changes from one 
cogito to the next, shooting forth anew with each new cogito and vanishing with it. The Ego, 
however, is something identical. [. . .] [I]t [the ego] cannot in any sense be a really inherent part or 
moment of the mental processes themselves.13  
 
Thus the ego occupies a rather unique place in Husserl’s phenomenology. It is, after all, what is 
left behind qua “phenomenological residuum” is what essentially makes the entire 
phenomenological method possible; it is via the epoche and the resulting residuum that “ ‘pure’ 
consciousness, and subsequently the whole phenomenological region” are made accessible.14 
Despite the fact that the transcendental ego cannot be directly experienced in isolation, it is 
sedimented in every possible experience and it appears to me. It is at once the foundation of 
subject as well as object. Indeed this is one of the reasons why Husserl elects to describe it as at 
once both immanent and transcendent.  
 It is the transcendental ego that carries out the objectifying act in virtue of which 
consciousness can move from one cogito to another. This transcendental ego always appears to 
me as inextricably bound to some mental process. It is the transcendental ego’s status as linked 
to, but not identical with, mental processes that compels Husserl to relate the ego itself to a larger 
structure that he refers to as the “ego pole.”15 We can see Husserl elaborate on this concept, 
 
13 Ibid., §57, 132 <109>. 
14 Ibid., §33, 66 <59>. 
15 Husserl, CM §31, 66 <100>. 
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absent from the earlier Ideas, in his Cartesian Meditations, where he indicates that it is the ego 
pole that is executor of intentionality:  
The ego is himself existent for himself in continuous evidence; thus, in himself, he is continuously 
constituting himself as existing. Heretofore we have touched on only one side of this self-
constitution, we have looked at only the flowing cogito. The ego grasps himself not only as a 
flowing life but also as I, who live this and that subjective process, who live through this and that 
cogito, as the same. Since we were busied up to now with the intentional relation of consciousness 
to object, cogito to cogitatum, only that syntheses stood out for us which “polarizes” the 
multiplicities of actual and possible consciousness toward identical objects, according in relation 
to objects as poles, synthetic unities. Now we encounter a second polarization, a second kind of 
synthesis, which embraces all the particular multiplicities of cogitationes collectively and in its own 
manner, namely as belonging to the identical Ego, who, as the active and affected subject of 
consciousness, lives in all processes of consciousness and is related, through them, to all object-
poles.16 
 
Here Husserl again describes the ‘I’ that maintains a sense of identity through the flow of time. 
But this time Husserl elaborates more completely on the nature of this temporal ‘I.’ All relations 
to given objects are linked to this ego pole, which Husserl points out is itself never empty (as in 
Kant) but is to the contrary always marked by content, as Husserl puts it, “determined by. . . [its] 
abiding habitus or state.”17 The ‘I’ has a personal identity, in other words. The identity is 
constituted by the various actions and beliefs of the ‘I’. These actions and beliefs leave behind a 
trace or “sedimentation” the result of which is the ongoing development of the transcendental 
ego. The habitus or state is the transcendental generation that results from my acts and behaviors, 
via which I take on “abiding propert[ies]” that leave their mark behind18 But it is certainly not 
the case that I have to constantly and continuously “fill” immanent time with mental processes 
that maintain or even just reinforce my habitus. This is why the term “sedimentation” is used by 
Husserl to describe the way in which bits of “knowledge stemming from previous thought-
 
16 Husserl, CM §31, 66 <100>. 
17 Ibid., §32, 67 <101>. 
18 Ibid., §31, 66 <100>. 
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activity adhere to what is in each case actually experienced.” 19 The transcendental ego is thus 
determined by the effects of sedimentation with no conscious involvement from me.20 In other 
words, I do not have to resolve to keep existing in order for my transcendental ego to carry on. 
Husserl indicates that the ego itself works the same way—it is related to the “stream of 
subjective processes” but not equivalent therewith.21 It is apparent how such a situation lends 
itself to the conceptualization of a “transcendency within immanency.” At once the 
transcendental ego surpasses the immanent experience of consciousness, at the same time that it 
is manifest, in a limited sense, in those same immanent moments. Therefore, for Husserl, the 
transcendental ego is, rather paradoxically, what grounds my concrete existence.22 In the next 
section I will examine more closely the technical details concerning the constitution of 
consciousness on the basis of one interpretation of synthesis.  
 
The “Backward Reference” Interpretation of the Synthesis of Consciousness 
 
All of this is relevant for our present purpose to the extent that we have examined conversion as 
a phenomenon that occurs at the level of the empirical ego. Until now we have not been able to 
link the general conversion experience, which occurs on an empirical basis, to the essential 
phenomenological processes that actually make possible the empirical transformation. The 
relationship between these two levels of experience is starting to become clearer; while 
conversion occurs at the level of the empirical ego, it can only do so on the basis of the ongoing 
 
19 Husserl, Phenomenological Psychology, 42 <57>. 
20 This is a major point of similarity between Husserl’s phenomenology and Freud’s 
psychoanalysis.  
21 Husserl, CM §32, 67 <101>. 
22 Carr, “Kant, Husserl, and the Non-Empirical Ego,” 687. 
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interpretive nature of consciousness at the transcendental level.23 This “interpretive 
consciousness” is self-constituting over the course of time, and without this constitutive role 
played by the transcendental ego, there could be no conversion.  
 So how exactly does this interpretive consciousness operate? Or rather, how does it 
sustain itself? Husserl was exploring this aspect of consciousness even in his earliest published 
writings, including the Logical Investigations.24 There and elsewhere the term that Husserl users 
for this activity is “synthesis.” Lampert calls Husserl’s  synthesis a “self-propelling dynamic of 
interpretive consciousness dominated by systems of forward and backward reference.”25 This is 
an essentially logical endeavor; in short consciousness constitutes and sustains itself by way of 
relating its meanings and intuitions, qua individuals or particulars, to universals.26 Without such 
objects that hold intuited meanings that surpass the limits of their own concrete presentation, 
consciousness would not be able to make much sense of the world. 
 On the empirical level there are several distinct ways in which this reference can occur, 
although I will not take up their exegesis here. On the phenomenological level though, Husserl 
stipulates that the reference occurs on an ideal (therefore not concrete) basis: 
[W]e are dealing with the acts in which general names achieve their direct relation to specific 
unities, and also with the acts which belong with these names in their attributive or predicative 
function, in which, therefore, forms like an A, all A, some A, S which is A etc., are constituted; and 
lastly with the acts in which the objects apprehended in these manifold forms of thought are self-
evidently ‘given,’ with the acts, in other words, in which our conceptual intuitions are fulfilled, 
achieve self-evidence and clarity. Thus we directly apprehend the Specific Unity Redness on the 
basis of a singular intuition of something red. We look to its moment of red, but we perform a 
peculiar act, whose intention is directed to the ‘Idea,’ the ‘universal.’ 27 
 
23 To be clear, the transcendental ego does not itself “interpret” anything; it temporally grounds 
the continuity of conscious experience by “referring backward” to its own source as if given 
before itself. See Husserl, Ideas I §124, 296 <258>. Cited in Lampert, Synthesis and Backward 
Reference, 202.  
24 Later on, Husserl is more interested in passive synthesis in particular. 
25 Lampert, Synthesis and Backward Reference, 9. 
26 Husserl, LI 2: §1, 239. 
27 Ibid., §42, 312. 
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It is apparent that this explanation is supposed to encompass all the different empirical references 
to universals. But unlike empirical reference (which is really empirical apprehension of a 
universal), which holds that the universal is not a universal at all but rather a distinctive 
particular which is concrete and in the world, and therefore (at least according to logic) 
encounterable via sense, for Husserl the presentation of red is not grounded on some curious 
particular, but instead, an ideal universal.    
 To the extent that consciousness grasps meaning, Lampert is right that (logical) reference 
in both directions makes these meanings possible, although it would seem that backward 
reference is far more instrumental in the constitution of the majority of the meanings that we 
encounter as given in the present.28 If this is what makes meaning possible, then it follows that 
this is also the way in which consciousness is able to relate to itself, since without so doing it 
would not be much of anything at all, since the very idea of meaning (and other types of 
conscious content) require such inter-referentiality.29 But furthermore this is what enables 
consciousness to have experiences of consciousness in its own past, as well as to anticipated, 
“futural” experiences of consciousness in the future.  
 As Lampert puts it, synthesis is ultimately “the combination of one experience with 
another” and he explores the way in which this activity raises certain problems regarding 
possibility, necessity, and limitation (35). He suggests out that some of these problems eventually 
only raise other problems, such as the way in which the positing embodied in backward reference 
posits as possible a meaning or intuition that is not present. How are these meanings “stored” by 
 
28 This is why it is odd that more attention has not been given to this topic in the LI; without 
backward reference there is no meaning for consciousness.  
29 Lampert, Synthesis and Backward Reference, 49. 
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consciousness? In Logical Investigations Husserl offers no answer to this, as the model of 
consciousness that he offers is one that is comprised of a countless number of conscious instants, 
the unification of which is left unresolved. But Lampert points out that Husserl manages to solve 
this problem with the account of pure consciousness that he presents in Ideas. This pure 
consciousness is the unity that results “as synthetic interpretations “draw back” or “withdraw” to 
the ground of their own self-articulation (viii). But the ground of this synthesis is intriguing: I am 
able to apprehend the universal, Lampert argues, via my synthesis of acts of apprehension of 
individuals (62). Eventually my “synthetic combinations” start to take on certain patterns which 
eventually start to operate like universal laws. But crucially it is the backward, “reflective 
reference” to the syntheses of my individual apprehensions that makes it possible to refer to a 
universal as such (63). Effectively the ground of the universal category is the framework of the 
individual (67). 
 Ultimately Lampert contends that for Husserl synthesis is “cognition’s [own] self-
critique” (194). That is just the thing, really: consciousness is not just the product of logical 
reference, but it is actually conditioning its own possibilities on the basis of these references 
(accordingly it is a kind of “critique” in the Kantian sense.) Indeed without this internally 
referential nature, consciousness would not be able to undergo a conversion, because it would 
lack the mechanics via which conversion could occur.  But the “backward reference” reading of 
synthesis itself is not enough for us to experience consciousness as we do, even if it does explain 
how we encounter a world with logical meaning. How do I track these meanings throughout time 
and make them part of my own personal history? And while backward reference can explain the 
typification of one conscious act into a category of meaning, how is it that all of these meanings 
are brought together under the concern of a unified phenomenological subject? As we continue 
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on in our examination of consciousness in the phenomenological attitude, we find that there are 
two distinct phenomenological aspects of the transcendental ego that really explain how we are 
able to have rich and complex experiences like conversions: absolute time consciousness and the 
unity of the ego. 
 
Absolute Time Consciousness and the Unity of the Ego: Toward the Reduction of Conversion 
 
We can isolate the transcendent immanence of the pure ego in the very constitution of time 
consciousness. Furthermore we can see that the transcendental ego is not manifest in any one 
moment of reflection despite the fact that the stream of the (empirical) ego’s experience requires 
the succession of moments. It is through this succession of moments that the transcendental ego 
is solidified as an identity which maintains a sense of unity throughout time.  
 This unity is partly captured in my own experience of having a personal history. Husserl 
writes: 
The ego constitutes himself for himself in, so to speak, the unity of a “history.” We said that the 
constitution of the ego contains all the constitutions of all the objectivities existing for him, whether 
these be immanent or transcendent, ideal or real. It should now be added that the constitutive 
systems (systems actualizable by the Ego), by virtue of such and such objects and categories of 
objects exist for him, are themselves possible only within the frame of a genesis in conformity with 
laws. At the same time they are bound, in their constituting, by the universal genetic form that 
makes the concrete ego (the monad) possible as a unity, as having particular constituents of his 
being that are compossible. That a Nature, a cultural world, a world of men with their social forms, 
and so forth, exist for me signifies that possibilities of corresponding experiences exist for me, as 
experiences I can at any time bring into play and continue in a certain synthetic style, whether or 
not I am at present actually experiencing objects belonging to the realm in question. It signifies 
furthermore that other modes of consciousness corresponding to them—vague intendings and the 
like—exist as possibilities for me, and also that these other modes of consciousness have 
possibilities of being fulfilled or disappointed by experiences of predelineated types. This involves 
a firmly developed habituality, acquired by a certain genesis in conformity with eidetic laws.30  
 
 
30 Husserl, CM §37, 75-76, <109-110>. 
173 
This ego endures through time irrespective of my attention or my oblivion. It should be noted 
that the ego subsists on an entirely involuntary basis; it requires no volition from me in order to 
continue on. As we have seen, even if I am to attempt to focus on the transcendental ego, I can 
note its experience but only as it is mediated by some object pole, even if the object pole 
corresponds only with the momentary presence that I can seemingly isolate in the stream of my 
conscious flow. When I focus on this phenomenon, I am not grasping the transcendental ego 
directly and in itself, otherwise it would not be transcendental at all. When Husserl references the 
“new” cogito that is “alive” when the intentional object of my reflection is the ego or the “I 
think” and notes that this cogito is “is not reflected on and thus is not objective for me” he is 
pointing toward the constitutive work of the transcendental ego.31 This is not to suggest that the 
transcendental ego and the cogito are the same thing (in fact they are not), but instead, to point 
out that it is the activity of the transcendental ego that makes possible the reflection of reflection. 
 The transcendental ego is related to (but not quite equivalent with) what is, in classical 
phenomenology, referred to as “pre-reflective self-awareness.” Pre-reflective self-awareness has 
actually occupied a somewhat controversial position in the secondary literature on Husserl. 
Many commentators have suggested that Husserl lacks any theory of such a self-awareness prior 
to reflection. These commentators essentially have argued that there is no non-objective 
consciousness according to Husserl’s philosophy, and that therefore the only consciousness for 
which he can account is that which is objective, which is to say, reflective. The issue that these 
commentators take with what they allege to be Husserl’s stance (which I will contest) is that they 
take for granted the phenomenon of pre-reflective consciousness. Thus they construe a 
 
31 Husserl, Ideas I §28, 54 <50>. 
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deficiency in Husserl’s thought on the basis of his supposed failure to account for such a 
phenomenon. 
 The issue here is that Husserl does not in fact deny the existence of the variety of 
consciousness that these commentators describe, although it should be noted that pre-reflective 
consciousness should probably not be considered to be an ego.32 David Carr attempts to show 
that the transcendental ego is the “intentional ego” that guides the direction of our acts of 
consciousness; indeed I do not have to reflect on my intentionality in order to constitute the 
intentionality of my consciousness.33  
 Consider, for example, how the awareness of self manifest in the experience of certain 
affective phenomena, including anxiety and fear. The appearance of these phenomena are not 
subject to reflection because they are examples of phenomena that are “felt” rather than thought. 
Certainly, it is possible to think about or reflect upon one’s anxiety or fear, but it would be a 
mistake to forget that anxiety and fear, as affects, precede their contemplative objectification. 
They do not have to be thought about in order to be felt. But here the distinction between that 
which is thought and that which is felt hits precisely upon the actual problem: what is being 
contested is what can be called “consciousness” in the first place.  
 Dan Zahavi is one of the most prominent defenders of pre-reflective consciousness in 
Husserl’s work. Zahavi points out that many commentators, including Heidegger, Tugendhat, 
Heinrich, Frank, and Gloy have suggested that Husserl does not conceive of a non-objective 
variety of consciousness, a sort of consciousness that subsists outside of reflective 
 
32 Lampert says many commentators make this mistake. Synthesis and Backward Reference, viii. 
33 Carr, “Kant, Husserl, and the Non-Empirical Ego,” 687. 
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intentionality.34 But as Zahavi shows, this is far from a reasonable interpretation of Husserl. Take 
the following quote, for example, wherein Husserl writes: 
The lawfulness with which we have become acquainted in the structure of perceptions easily reveals 
its universal significance as a primordial lawfulness of the life of consciousness in general. For the 
latter is not only a lived-experiencing continually streaming along; at the same time, as it streams 
along it is also immediately the consciousness of this streaming. This consciousness is self-
perceiving, although it is a thematically executed awareness on the part of the ego only in 
exceptional circumstances. Belonging to the latter is a reflection that is possible at any time. This 
perceiving that presents all lived-experiencing to consciousness is the so-called inner consciousness 
or inner perceiving.35 
 
It is apparent that the inner consciousness that is immanent to all lived experience is only 
occasionally reflective, and thus only occasionally thematic. Alas as far as we know it is the 
potential for thematization that makes our experience “consciousness” in virtue of which we 
distinguish ourselves from other animals.36 But insofar as consciousness is able to thematize any 
strand of experience, it is the temporal flow of experience itself that makes it possible to perform 
this thematization in the first place. Indeed without this inner consciousness no self-reflection 
would be possible at all.  
 Because my sense of inner time is not thematized until my consciousness intends toward 
it, it can be easy to misinterpret Husserl to mean that internal time consciousness endures outside 
of the limits of self-awareness. I think that this is precisely the view that leads some 
commentators to charge Husserl with failing to recognize the stratum of pre-reflective 
experience. But as the above quote shows, Husserl takes it that inner consciousness (of time) is 
still “self-perceiving,” just not in the reflective sense. What he means is that lived experience is 
fundamentally self-perception even when the self is not being mindfully perceived. We can 
 
34 Zahavi, “Inner Time-Consciousness and Pre-reflective Self-awareness,” 157. 
35 Husserl, APS, 607 <320>. 
36 Of course this might be a mistaken. We might not be right to make this distinction since by 
definition we do not know, and cannot know, on a firsthand basis what it is like to have the 
mental life of other animals. 
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corroborate this intuitively; it surely is not the case that we no longer continue to be ourselves 
during the intermittent episodes in which we do not consciously think about or reflect upon 
ourselves.  
  This latent sense of background, primitive “awareness,” epitomized in the flux of 
temporal consciousness, is one of the phenomenological features that renders possible the 
experience of subjectivity. On the most basic level, this is the self, stripped down with8 neither 
description nor consideration. In his early philosophy Husserl conceives of this self as the source 
of conscious acts, but later in his career Husserl pivots away from acts and focuses instead on 
how the ‘I’ is, as Elisabeth Ströker puts it, “a field of experience … that by means of its sense-
constituting achievements . . . gains its own characteristics, thus revealing itself as a concrete 
ego.”37 To be “self-perceiving,” then, is (at least in part) to constitute self-characteristics 
throughout time. As I have indicated, the transcendental ego is determined by the sedimentations 
of conscious experience; it is what Zahavi calls a “developing structure.”38 This is not at all an 
entirely conscious process; to the contrary, it is mostly outside of our conscious awareness.  
 Admittedly, it is a slight issue that Husserl’s remarks in this text are, by design, not really 
focused on the objective side of intentional acts. The result is that the way in which Husserl 
describes subjective phenomena takes on a different framing. Thus one could fairly object that 
the present characterization of subjectivity is not necessarily indicative of the more general 
thought of Husserl. Even if this is true, however, there is nothing that outright contradicts in a 
logical sense Husserl’s other writing from the same period. We cannot look at the different 
perspective from which subjectivity is here approached, namely, that of foundational 
 
37 Ströker, Husserlian Foundations of Science, 83.  
38 Zahavi, Self-Awareness and Alterity, 256n4. 
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consciousness of inner time, as less authoritative or important than his remarks elsewhere. These 
remarks are as significant for phenomenological subjectivity as the rest, but in a different way, 
due to the difference in what is actually being explained.  
 In any case the living present is the ego’s experience of time; it is the ego’s “internal” 
perception of time as synthesizer of experience. In other words the ego experiences the “present” 
as a continuous stream of time that includes the protention of the future in addition to the 
retention of the past. Without this dual nature that involves the anticipatory nature of protention 
in addition to the “slipping away” of the present by way of retention, I could have no experience 
of the present “moment.” While the living present can be seized upon momentarily in such a way 
that it appears to be standing still, it is also always in a state of flux whereby it continuously slips 
away.  
 Husserl concludes that the experience of a unified living present is made possible by 
“absolute time consciousness,” which constitutes the ego’s very experience of temporality. 
 In other words, absolute time consciousness is self-securing. But in order to perform this 
accomplishment, absolute time consciousness has to itself be atemporal, otherwise 
consciousness would not be capable of grounding itself. This is because it would always be 
subject to the same temporal laws that define the constitution of its objects. In order to serve as 
the foundation for temporal consciousness, absolute time consciousness has to transcend the 
temporal limits of its presentation.  
 Husserl writes: 
There is one, unique flow of consciousness in which both the unity of the tone in immanent time 
and the unity of the flow of consciousness itself become constituted at once. As shocking (when 
not initially even absurd) as it may seem to say that the flow of consciousness constitutes its own 
unity, it is nonetheless the case that it does. And this can be made intelligible on the basis of the 
flow’s essential constitution.39  
 
39 Husserl, PITC §39, 84 <80>. 
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Here Husserl describes the way in which the stream of consciousness is experienced as a unity at 
the same time that consciousness guarantees this very same unity.  We experience the temporal 
unity of consciousness in such a way that we can “track” its constitutive role as it unfolds for 
itself. This is epitomized in Husserl’s example of the consciousness of a (musical) tone. I 
experience this tone via a temporal succession of conscious moments. This is the “flow” of my 
conscious stream. One of Husserl’s most important breakthroughs is the realization that the flow 
itself, and not merely the object of consciousness (of a tone or whatever else), can be rigorously 
analyzed. Not only does the perceptual object straddle the “flow” of conscious duration, but the 
flow itself follows the same rule of presentation. It is arguably retention that performs the most 
work here since it is the retention of consciousness-just-past that enables the ego to synthesize 
the experience of itself as a unity instead of just a series of unrelated conscious “snapshots.” 
While we could not experience consciousness without the protention of the future to come, 
retention is especially vital since it is what enables consciousness to enjoy the relative stability 
(in unity) that originates in the identification of some prior conscious moment with the present 
conscious moment.  
 In fact the idea that consciousness is a unity is a matter of much debate. As I have 
indicated already this is something that I intuitively understand even in the natural attitude. 
Indeed several writers have challenged the extent to which this level of consciousness could be a 
unity, with some going so far as to call it a “myth.”40 I have noted that the essential nature of 
consciousness determines the essential nature of conversion, since conversion is a specific 
modality of consciousness, so I am obligated to determine whether consciousness is in essence a 
 
40 Evans, “Myth of Absolute Consciousness.” 
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unity or not before I can proceed. Thus let us consider the argument that consciousness it not a 
unity.  
 Sartre is one figure who advances such an argument. He contends in The Transcendence 
of the Ego that the transcendental ‘I’ is in fact temporally divided because his interpretation of 
Husserl’s model of the ‘I’ is such that the ‘I’ cannot be the unifier of all consciousness because, 
in short, it is consciousness that unifies the ‘I’ and not the ‘I’ that unifies consciousness. Sartre 
maintains (perhaps misguidedly) that the transcendental ego performs no such function if it is as 
Husserl and his followers describe, and that it is actually consciousness itself that performs the 
unifying role for the ‘I.’ Here he presupposes (as does Husserl) that consciousness is 
consciousness of something, in other words, of an object. Sartre’s alternative explanation for the 
unification of consciousness suggests that it is in fact the achievement of consciousness’s 
relational nature, namely with respect to the object, like the subway I pursue as I run late, that 
unifies my temporal consciousness, and therefore my subjectivity is grounded by objectivity, and 
not my subjectivity qua transcendental ego, manifest in the absolute living-present.41   
 Whether Sartre misunderstands Husserl or not, this dispute forces us to confront the 
difficult problem of resolving the issue of whether consciousness, without anything of which to 
be conscious, would be consciousness at all. For Husserl, the answer would be yes, because on 
his account the transcendental ‘I’ makes possible the phenomenon of consciousness. It follows 
that consciousness is an effect of temporal subjectivity. But isn’t it true that by definition 
consciousness can always at the very least take itself up as object? If so, then for Sartre the 
answer is no, that this sort of consciousness is logically problematic and impossible. For a 
moment it almost seems as if Sartre could be right, since he raises what appear to be pertinent 
 
41 Sartre, “Transcendence of the Ego,” 3-4. 
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mereological problems regarding how consciousness could grasp itself by itself, without in fact 
being non-equivalent with whatever it is that it manages to grasp as itself. 
 But the problem is that Sartre is not really referring to the same level of consciousness as 
Husserl. It is true that the object of his critique is clearly the multiplication of conscious states, 
but in the phenomenological attitude these states are not multiplied, nor are they divided—indeed 
this is Husserl’s point. For Husserl it is the ego itself that constitutes time, and the differentiation 
between retention, protention, and the “now” are not multiplications of consciousness itself (as 
per Sartre) but are to the contrary the eidetic features of the flow of absolute time. Indeed to say 
this is to admit that the pure ego is itself also a unity that is produced via synthesis. With his 
alternative, Sartre elaborates on the mechanics of the process via which consciousness qua living 
present is given depth, but his approach simply cannot unify the subject. Sartre does not seem to 
totally accept that consciousness is fundamentally in flux; if we are to grant that he does accept 
this, then we must insist that he does not reasonably discern the consequence of this flux. 
 While Sartre is prepared to argue that it is the object of consciousness that gives 
consciousness its depth, for Husserl it is the dynamic constitution of the living present that 
performs this function, and in so doing, unifies my conscious life. Lanei Rodemeyer explains in 
Intersubjective Temporality that for Husserl it is the unity that is partly constituted through 
retention that gives “depth” to consciousness.42 In other words a consciousness “reborn” in every 
moment, with no possible recourse to the consciousness of the past, would be a strange 
experience; indeed, we would resist the impulse to identify such a strange, perpetually-new 
mental life as “consciousness” of any sort recognizable to us. Curiously, this is precisely the sort 
 
42 Rodemeyer, Intersubjective Temporality, 81. 
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of model that Sartre claims to plague Husserl’s work, despite the fact that it is his own alternative 
theory that seems far more likely to raise the concern. 
 But one issue with Husserl’s account is that retention is not something that is indefinitely 
“held” by consciousness. Eventually what is retained falls away and has to be recollected. 
Husserl is not wrong about that. But Rodemeyer addresses the concern, articulated by David 
Carr, that Husserl likely interprets retention too strictly to the exclusion of phenomena that are 
retained but are not as temporally proximate to the present as Husserl suggests.43 In a nutshell 
Carr is of the opinion that Husserl fails to realize the variability of retention and mistakenly 
overemphasizes, as Rodemeyer puts it, the “more immediate, lived aspect of retention.” Thus, 
Carr suggests, Husserl fails to account for consciousness’s retention of that which is more distant 
from the immediate present, supposing instead that these intuitions must be recalled. Rodemeyer 
suggests that this more inclusive model of retention is reasonable, but comes at the cost of a 
“trivialize[d” account of retention in the more immediate, “just-past” sense. Rodemeyer argues 
that: [T]here must be some “in-between” that exists between immediate retention and 
recollection, an “in-between” whose activity makes possible my comfortable, and usually 
effortless, dealings with common and familiar objects.44 The point here is that my relatively 
adroit dealings with the world of things is accomplished in part via the retained “presence” of 
certain “habitual objects.” Thus Rodemeyer ultimately distinguishes two varieties of retention in 
Husserl’s phenomenology, “near” and “far,” with Husserl actually using this terminology in his 
own APS. There are several important things to note here with respect to the present 
phenomenology of conversion. First, it is undeniable that without retention, there can be no 
 
43 Carr, Interpreting Husserl.  
44 Rodemeyer, Intersubjective Temporality, 86. 
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conversion. But our specific experience of consciousness is such that retention requires 
protention, and vice-versa. Second, insofar as retention and protention belong to the domain of 
“passive” experience, there can be no conversion phenomenon without passive synthesis. As of 
yet it remains to be seen whether the same is true of active synthesis, but I will return to this 
question in the final chapter. 
 Recall that we were originally lead down this path in the pursuit of an answer to the 
question: is consciousness a unity? Put differently, the question is: how is consciousness 
constituted for me—as a unity, or not? Presently, though, these questions are framed in an even 
more specific context, namely, is the phenomenon of conversion something that occurs for a 
unified consciousness, or not? At first glance we were tempted by this question insofar as the 
very existence of “conversion” seems to imply that consciousness is not a unity, or at least, not 
an inviolable unity insofar as the occurrence of conversion seems to problematize the idea of a 
rigid and homogeneous consciousness. Furthermore we have already seen that some of the 
earliest conversion studies presupposed that some sort of divided or split consciousness defines 
the pre-convert. 
 Sartre merely offers his own account of how consciousness is afforded with depth—but 
not self-constituted. His notion of consciousness as “being-for-itself” is not equivalent with the 
consciousness to which Husserl refers, which is, at least in his early work, a consciousness that 
for better or for worse is situated in a domain that is essentially compartmentalized from the 
Sartrean (and Heidegerrean) phenomenon of the “world.” This early conception of pure 
consciousness has no technical need for the world, which Husserl determines to be just a 
“correlate of consciousness.”45 He even goes so far as to famously declare in Ideas that 
 
45Husserl, Ideas I §47, 105 <88>. 
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consciousness would endure even after the “annihilation of the world,” by which he refers to the 
reduction of the world to a “mere” thought thereof.46 While his wording here may be a bit too 
strong (and he later considers the world to be much more important in his later phenomenology), 
his point is that transcendental consciousness has no need for the empirical consciousness of the 
world. Technically, he is correct. 
 When Husserl later incorporates the phenomenon of the world more fully into his 
thinking, he indicates that the transcendental ‘I’ always appears in the world. Thus according to 
this later model of phenomenology, the possibility remains that in some cases my experience of 
consciousness is unified (at least in part) by phenomena on the side of the world.47 It has to be 
admitted that when this unification occurs, it is not explaining the same phenomenon as 
Husserl’s account in Ideas or The Phenomenology of Consciousness of Internal Time; it is in the 
latter text that Husserl indicates that “absolute time consciousness” is “not an object.”48 Sartre 
himself admits that consciousness cannot be its own object.49 After all, there can be no doubt that 
without the pre-reflective temporal flow of my consciousness, it is far from clear how I could 
ever pursue any train of thought at all. The transcendental ‘I’ makes possible this experience; it is 
obscure how (my consciousness of) the object could produce the ‘I’ when consciousness is a 
power of the ‘I’ and not of the object. In short, Sartre’s critique of Husserl seems to miss its 
target. 
 
46 “[W]hile the being of consciousness, of any stream of mental processes whatever, would indeed 
be necessarily modified by an annihilation of the world of physical things its own existence would 
not be touched.” Husserl, Ideas I §49, 110 <92>. 
47 Sartre claims that even in CM Husserl still holds the view that temporal consciousness is self-
unifying. 
48 Husserl, PITC Appendix 5, 117 <112>. 
49 Sartre, Transcendence of the Ego, 5. 
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 That said, it is not completely unreasonable to question the extent to which my 
consciousness is a unified whole. After all, my “stream” of consciousness is constituted out of 
flux and change on a temporal level; I am conscious, in other words, in and through time. We 
have already examined how it is temporality that contributes to the unity of consciousness, but 
my present concern is to show how the phenomenon of conversion suggests that the unity of 
consciousness is a qualified sort of unity the integrity of which has to be essentially fluid in order 
for the unity to undergo what can reasonably be called an existential change. 
 Husserl writes in his Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis that: 
Perception is a process of streaming from phase to phase; in its own way each of the phases is a 
perception, but these phases are continuously harmonized in the unity of a synthesis, in the unity 
of a consciousness of one and the same perceptual object that is constituted here originally. In each 
phase we have primordial impression, retention, and protention.50 
 
It is the impression of the “now” moment along with the corresponding phenomena of retention 
and protention that structure my experience of the flow of time. At a fundamental level retention 
and protention are the two functions that constitute this flow for me. When I direct my 
intentionality toward my own experience of experience (i.e. conscious sentience), I become 
aware of the manner in which the phenomenon of consciousness flows through time itself, but 
not like water through a pipe, but instead as a flame consumes its fuel. Intentionality itself is 
circumscribed within temporal limits. I note that, somewhat paradoxically, this phenomenon of 
the present moment does not persist simply on the basis of that which is immediate and imminent 
for consciousness, since protention and retention continually rotate in and out every single 
passing instant.  
 Husserl indicates that: 
[T]he most general aspect of the ego’s form … [is] the peculiar temporalization by which it becomes 
an enduring ego, constituting itself in its time-modalities: the same ego, now actually present, is in 
 
50 Husserl, APS §16, 107 <66>. 
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a sense, in every past that belongs to it, another—i.e., as that which was and thus is not now—and 
yet, in the continuity of its time it is one and the same, which is and was and has its future before 
it.51 
 
It is true that I cannot experience absolute time “directly.” I can only manage a sort of snapshot 
moment that is singular and fixed, despite the fact that to the contrary I experience conscious life 
in a much more fluid and continuous manner. But regardless of the fact that the snapshots on 
their own are not consciousness but instead require succession via the temporal flow, I am 
nevertheless able to isolate any given instant when I seize upon the immediately present moment. 
As “ego pole” I am “sovereign” over that instant to the extent that I can momentarily pick it out 
as an instant, but my momentary grasp of it evinces what is ultimately my utter lack of control 
over the onset of time. Indeed as I experience consciousness through an infinite series of “now” 
moments that proceed from the imminent, each moment passes away as it gives rise to the next 
one, which, if I focus on nothing but my own consciousness and awareness of the flow of time, I 
am unable to differentiate, formally, from any other.52 To describe this phenomenon Husserl uses 
the terms “retention” and “protention.” 
 Thus while I experience, typically, a stable and unified conception of my own ego as 
present to my consciousness, it is apparent in the phenomenological attitude that this presence of 
my self to my self is, in fact, not a solid whole, but to the contrary, the result of a succession of 
intentional moments. In other words, as we have already seen, pure consciousness is the product 





51 Husserl, Crisis §50, 172.  
52 Husserl, Ideas I §77, 175 <145>.  
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Ch. 5.  Conversion as Embodied Phenomenon 
 
Realism, Material Science, and the Mind-Independent World 
 
There is an ostensible problem for Husserl’s “grounded” view of scientific philosophical 
analysis, despite the fact that his phenomenology does manage to avoid some of the errors of the 
older philosophies. While Hallward is astute to point out that many scientific claims arguably fail 
to reach objective status due to the fact that they are based on arbitrary measurements that make 
sense to human consciousness, there are at least some scientific claims, mostly in the realm of 
material science, that seem to be of a more fundamental type.1 These claims are still claims made 
by consciousness, but they are significantly different in kind from many other scientific claims, 
and therefore present a conspicuous problem for Husserl’s ideas. This is essentially the critique 
of Quentin Meillassoux.2 Consider, for example, that archaeological science suggests that there 
are trees which pre-existed humans and therefore human intelligence, consciousness, by many 
years, dating as old as 385,000,000 years ago.3 It would certainly appear that this sort of ancient 
archaeological object is mind-independent. Alas even this it not true without major qualification. 
This approximated dating is only realized within the continuum of consciousness. As Husserl 
puts it, “Objects exist for me, and are for me what they are, only as objects of actual and possible 
consciousness.”4 Furthermore this fact can only be uttered, as a true proposition, by 
 
1 Hallward, “Review of After Finitude.”  
2 Meillassoux, After Finitude. 
3 Stein et al., “Giant Cladoxylopsid Trees Resolve Enigma,” 904–907. 
4 Husserl CM §30, 65 <99>. 
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consciousness in the present. It is a deeply-ingrained fidelity to the ontological assumptions of 
the natural attitude that makes it so hard to grasp this actuality.  
 We have to be careful to avoid interpreting this phenomenological view as one which 
holds that the world is entirely constructed or constituted by consciousness.5 This is not at all 
what Husserl intends. As J. Leavitt Pearl notes, for Husserl it is not that givenness is created from 
consciousness, but rather that givenness is presented to it.6 To take the former position is to 
maintain that consciousness itself “makes” the world. By way of intersubjective verification we 
can determine very easily that that is false, though. I do not seem to craft the world ex nihilo, but 
it can be difficult to see how this is not tantamount to the admission of a material, mind-
independent world. But aside from ostensibly existing in a material sense, these ancient trees had 
no real “properties” but instead just a primitive and intrinsic “nature,” since no consciousness 
existed at this time to afford the tree with properties. Consciousness cannot be conflated with 
Nature, which itself knows no concepts and no divisions.7 When consciousness makes claims 
regarding pre-conscious objects, it still does so on the basis of mind. Thus radiocarbon dating 
discloses approximate dates that do not prove the material existence of an arche-object that 
predates conscious humanity, but to the contrary, become valid and universal perceptions as soon 
as they are manifested by consciousness. It is the difference, in short, between the bald existence 
of the natural object and the “dating” that does not “exist” until consciousness employs its 
methods of dating. 
 
5 I will elaborate on this issue when I present my eidetic conclusions in the seventh and final 
chapter. 
6 Pear, “After Finitude and Phenomenological Givenness,” 14. 
7 Nietzsche, “On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense.” 
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 What is most noteworthy is that these epistemological restrictions and qualifications 
apply not only to the world of so-called external objects but also to my self. Givenness can be 
thought like a shadow, which requires something to cast the shadow as well as someone to see it. 
While it is tempting to post the existence of the shadow as seen by no one, this must be avoided 
at all costs. Givenness is always framed against the backdrop of a horizon, meaning that to 
follow through with the same metaphor, givenness takes upon a specific silhouette depending 
upon the perspective of the person who beholds it, since horizons shift with vantage.  
 This of course also goes for the phenomenon of self. Indeed my “self” is given to me, as 
are all phenomena; the self “appears” to consciousness. Despite the fact that my self is given in a 
rather unique way to me when compared to other phenomena, it nevertheless remains true that I 
am not “given” to myself beyond the way in which my “self” appears before consciousness. The 
sole “exception” to this would be phenomenal features of my self-givenness itself, like the 
horizon, which is itself still intuited and therefore “appears.” But contra Kant’s indication, there 
is no “way I really am” that occupies some more fundamental and absolute epistemic level. Thus 
to conceive of the way in which I “am” irrespective of consciousness is, in other words, 
incomprehensible. This is difficult for consciousness to grasp since, confined within its own 
limits, the tendency of consciousness is to deny the existence of its parameters. It is tempted, for 
example, regarding that which transcends itself, despite the fact that it can have no access to such 
a realm. Phenomenology wards off this temptation by examining only that which is 
phenomenologically “given.” In fact it is the misinterpretation of this position that yields 
incoherent conclusions the likes of which are shown in Meillassoux’s After Finitude. Simply put, 
I am the way in which I appear to myself, because the transcendental ego constitutes that 
phenomenon for me.  
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 Realism and materialism are still important topics to address phenomenologically. In the 
next section I analyze how my embodied, material existence informs my conscious experience 
and how this in turn plays a role in phenomenology of conversion.  
 
Embodied Conversion and the Conscious-Body: Matter, Habit, Space 
 
It is possible to incorporate material considerations into this analytical phenomenology of 
conversion from another angle, inspired by the philosophy of Merleau-Ponty, as the intertwined 
complex of body and world. According to this view consciousness can only be approached as 
embodied and intrinsically worldly. I designate the term “conscious-body” to refer to this 
embodied analog to consciousness.8 In this section I will examine some of the ways in which the 
experience of conversion can be phenomenologically manifest in embodiment. The primary 
point that I wish to demonstrate is that, in short, when ‘I’ convert, my body converts, necessarily. 
This conversion plays out in different ways. There is the material and physiological dimension to 
embodied conversion, which encompasses my body’s psychophysical relation to my 
consciousness, but there are also the aspects of embodied conversion that come down to my 
body’s habits as well as my body’s orientation and/or relationship with respect to worldly space. 
 There are many ways in which conversion is mediated through my body, or otherwise has 
some physical correlate on the level of my material organism. First and foremost there is the way 
in which my body places a vital role in the constitution of consciousness. Not only do my five 
 
8 It should be noted that the conscious-body is not always conscious in the sense of awareness, 
but is at least capable of focusing on its own bodily consciousness, like the way something feels. 
This is not an instinct, as it might be in other types of animals, which is why I suggest that we 
conclude that the conscious-body is a human phenomenon. This phenomenon may exist in other 
animals with “higher-intelligence.” 
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senses require their corresponding organs, but even my purely intellectual experiences, are 
correlated with observable cerebral events. While I do not want to go so far as to maintain that 
conscious experience (i.e. having a “mind”) requires a brain, my specific way of experiencing 
consciousness is ostensibly the result of various physical processes. I cannot know whether other 
types of consciousness could be possible without such a basis in physical matter. At the very 
least as an embodied conscious being, I find it impossible to conceive of consciousness without 
my extension. Even accounts of out-of-body experiences, wherein a subject experiences 
consciousness as if detached from his usual sense of physical existence, are correlated with 
specific neural events. Furthermore the person who encounters this phenomenon still lives out an 
experience of embodiment, only as if the conscious-body is outside of itself.  
 So I can take my personal account of what experience is like and examine it in terms of 
the physical phenomena that are involved, although it goes without saying that I am not 
consciously aware of the vast majority of the physical events correlated with my consciousness. 
There is an empirical-scientific approach to this area of inquiry, and it can be used to supplement 
my phenomenological analysis of embodied conversion. Indeed Merleau-Ponty is particularly 
well-known for his implementation of scientific and medical research into his phenomenology. 
Using a transcranial magnetic stimulator (TMS), researchers are able to inject electrical current 
into a waking brain to observe its reaction, as well as into a sleeping brain—without waking it 
up. They do this to observe the way in which the cerebral cortex reacts to the input, the hope 
being that the cortex will be observably “different” in states of consciousness and 
unconsciousness.9 
 
9 Extensive damage to the cerebral cortex permanently renders a person unconscious 
(vegetative), whereas the complete removal of the cerebellum, which has even more neurons, 
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 Electrodes on the TMS measure activity changes in the brain. A pulse of magnetism 
(researchers call it the “ringing of a bell”) lasting 100ms causes neurons in a small section of the 
cerebral cortex to “fire.” When the TMS is fitted to someone who is awake, this “firing” is 
signaled to other neurons, which proceed to fire as well. The resultant complex pattern of neural 
activity fans out to cover around about 1/3 of the cerebral cortex, and the signaling (“firing”) 
endures for around 330ms. When the TMS is fitted to someone who is in unconscious deep 
sleep, there is no reverberation after the initial signaling of the first neuron that fires. Lastly and 
most importantly, when the TMS is fitted to someone who is in an REM dream state, the 
reverberation and primary “firing” return—as does a form of consciousness, experienced in 
dream form by the sleeping subject. 
 Giulio Tononi and others have inferred that while the brain in deep, unconscious sleep 
may be “active” to some extent (demonstrated by the presence of the initial “firing” even when 
no reverberation/echo occurs), it has ostensibly lost the ability to share information between its 
parts. This is why there is no observable reverberation.   
 There are several important conclusions that should be made from the experiment. First, 
conscious experience is correlated with physical events in the body, specifically the brain. 
Therefore mental life (as I experience it) is associated with physical correlates in my organism. 
Second, when there is no physical event observed in the brain/body, there is no report of 
consciousness or experience in the sleeping subject. It follows that without a body, a 
phenomenological subject will not have experience—at least not any sort of experience that 
would closely resemble what I enjoy today. Tononi’s experiment suggests that the sharing of 
 
does not have much effect upon consciousness at all. See Tononi, “Consciousness as Integrated 
Information: A Provisional Manifesto.” 
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neural information is a key ingredient for the appearance of consciousness. When the sharing 
occurs, consciousness occurs, and when the sharing does not occur, as is the case in deep sleep or 
after extensive damage to the cortex, then there is no occurrence of consciousness. The idea that 
a phenomenological entity could have an experience separate from its body is thus refuted. It 
would be utterly impossible for phenomena to “appear” to that which is not predisposed to 
experience phenomena.10 
 This “Information Integration Model” shows the intrinsic link between conscious events 
and physical events, although of course it cannot offer any description of what these experiences 
are like for the subjects who live them. Only a descriptive phenomenological method can give an 
account of consciousness as lived experience. But in looking at the conscious-body as a scientific 
object, we can uncover import insights regarding embodied conversion. If there are physical 
processes that correlate with conscious experience, then my experience of a phenomenon like 
conversion can be phenomenologically analyzed in light of scientific research. For example, in 
2011 a group of researchers discovered that certain “religious factors” correlated with atrophy of 
the hippocampus.11 One of the religious factors with the single biggest impact on hippocampal 
size was “life-changing religious experience.” The authors suggest that this might be the result of 
stress. The hippocampus, situated in the temporal lobe’s inner medial region, plays a crucial role 
in the limbic system, assisting in the regulation of emotional responses.12 In 1953 Henry 
Molaison’s hippocampus was removed in a surgical procedure the result of which was 
 
10 Here it should be noted that experience is not equivalent with observation; scientific 
instruments are capable of “observation” evinced by the factor that electronic sensors play in 
contributing to the so-called “observer effect” exemplified in the famous “double-slit” 
experiments. 
11 Owen et al., “Religious Factors and Hippocampal Atrophy in Late Life.” 
12 Yassa, “Hippocampus.”  
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anterograde amnesia.13 This means that he was no longer able to create new memories. Despite 
this, most of his mental operations were unharmed. Depression and stress have been correlated 
with hippocampal decline. All of this research seems to suggest that religious experience can 
correlate with stress, the effect of which is essentially diminishment of the physical organ that, 
among other things, helps to found memories and control emotion. I will leave aside the question 
of whether religious/spiritual conversion is inherently stressful, but prima facie a shift as 
significant as phenomenological conversion would seem to require, for many if not all of the 
types I have delineated, at least some degree of stress (if not outright crisis, as in the case of the 
sudden and unexpected conversion.)  
 Suffice to say that in at least some cases, the experience of a religious phenomenon such 
as conversion can actually make present life events harder to remember and can make it more 
difficult to moderate emotional impulses. It should be noted that this is not something peculiar to 
religious experience or even necessary across all subjects; to the contrary, the reduced volume of 
the hippocampus is ultimately correlated with high stress levels. Nevertheless the fact remains 
that a stressful experience like conversion can have a physical impact on the brain’s structure. To 
the extent that one could be aware of the reduced ability to form new memories, it can be said 
that the phenomenon of conversion can produce a neurophysical change that itself carries 
phenomenological consequences. 
 But the authors of this same paper suggest that this insight should be carefully 
considered; they point out that “some religious variables have been found to be associated with 
positive mental health” citing a 2001 paper from Koenig and Larson.”14 Belief in God has 
 
13 Corkin, Permanent Present Tense. 
14 Owen et al., “Religious Factors and Hippocampal,” 2, 5n59. 
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actually been correlated with reduced anxiety and stress, in contrast to the findings we just 
examined.15 More recently the neuroscientist Andrew Newberg has shown how certain religious 
practices like meditation can correlate with physical changes in the brain, often associated with 
an increased ability to focus.16 So while some religious variables like conversion or minority 
status correlate with stress and therefore correlate with hippocampal decline, some religious 
beliefs and religious practices correlate with reduced stress or increased focus. The latter case, 
like the former, is another example of an experience producing a neurophysical change with 
phenomenological consequences. After all, going about in the world with less stress or more 
focus is certainly tantamount to a change in one’s very subjectivity.  
 In both of these types of cases, the one which can be reduced to improvement and the 
other to decline, we observe the sort of effects that my consciousness, my experience, can 
produce on the very materiality of my existence, especially the structure of the brain. The 
changes to the material basis of my consciousness themselves correlate with shifts in my 
subjective orientation, like my mood or disposition, or even my mental functions, like focus. 
 Consequently there is an apparent feedback loop between my conscious experiences and 
my physiology, where mental events produce physical effects that in turn influence the events 
that constitute my experience. This is in fact a very common and general phenomenon, not just 
limited to religious or spiritual experience.  I can discern many hypothetical situations in which I 
am first aware of some sort of physical experience that tends toward a mental effect. For example 
I might feel an eerie physical sensation that prompts me to recall a traumatic event from my past. 
After lounging on the couch for too long I may find it difficult to think in a clear and efficient 
 
15 Inzlicht et al. “Neural Markers of Religious Conviction.” 
16 Newberg, Principles of Neurotheology; Newberg, How God Changes Your Brain. 
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fashion. After drinking alcohol my sense of inner time consciousness may slow down, and the 
rate of my thoughts slows down in consequence. If I sit with better posture, then I may have 
more positive ideas about my health and image, etc. In all of these examples my physical 
experience is associated with a mental result in such a way that the “mental” experience almost 
seems to follow from what at first appears to me as physical, through my body. 
 At other times my physical experience appears to follow from what begins as mental. If I 
am thinking about a traumatic event from the past, I may shudder. If I am feeling lazy, I find it 
not only difficult to think but difficult to get up off the couch. If I decide to ingest alcohol, then 
my perception of time may slow down. If I consider myself to be in good physical shape, then I 
am more confident in my body and carry myself differently, walking differently and so on. In all 
of these examples we can observe a changing perception of my body that is the result of a mental 
process. Even this mental process has a physical correlate, but it is not one that I can sensuously 
feel, like I can feel heat or something soft, or feel what it is like to touch my own two hands 
against each other. The fact that we can observe these relations in both directions indicates 
something important. Namely, the question of cause and effect is of no use in this particular case 
since my experience suggests that mental and physical processes often occur in simultaneous 
concert.   
 As Ted Toadvine indicates in reference to the thought of Merleau-Ponty, what I have 
termed a “feedback loop” inherent in and intrinsic to the conscious-body can be aptly 
characterized as a dialectic relation, between “the present body (characterized, after Husserl, as 
an “I can”) and the habit body, the sedimentations of past activities that take on a general, 
anonymous, and autonomous character.”17 This is essentially analogous to the passive synthesis 
 
17 Toadvine, “Merleau-Ponty.”  
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that Husserl describes, although there is no indication that he really had embodiment in mind in 
his discussions of the topic, since his commentary regarding passive synthesis is limited to the 
more traditional model of “mental” consciousness, which has, in Western philosophy, tended to 
take on a privileged position at the cost of the marginalization of the philosophy of the body. 
 But to the opposite extreme it cannot be the case that physical conditions alone suffice to 
establish the experience of conversion. A medical patient who has inflicted a traumatic brain 
injury resulting in a major personality change is not someone who has “converted” according to 
the criteria presently under consideration. The difference between a case such as this and an 
authentic conversion, broadly construed, is that an actual conversion has to be an existential 
transformation, meaning that it has some basis in experience, even fantastic and hallucinatory, 
and cannot be the pure result of a physical process. Even cases that may have some medical 
explanation, like those regarding the potential epilepsy of Saint Paul, involve significant and 
profound experiential correlates that carry much meaning for the subject. This does not mean that 
the change is one of which the individual is aware, although in Paul’s case it certainly is the case 
that it is. The point is that a traumatic injury or disease that “flips a switch” in the subjective 
constitution of an ego cannot itself serve as the singular cause of conversion. Even if Paul’s story 
can be reduced to a neurological account, such a simplification that dispenses with the 
experiential content and significance for Paul is nothing short of an absurd interpretation. 
Badiou’s atheistic reading of Paul serves as an excellent counterpoint to the idea that the 
profound lived experience can be distilled into a “scientific” account like cognitive science, 
neurology, or psychiatry. Even the unconscious conversion of the lifelong religious believer is 
the result of experience.   
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 In any case the “habit body” is such an important concept because it captures how 
sedimented meanings do not just map onto mental consciousness but in fact apply to my physical 
experience as well. This habit body is a vital aspect of what I have been referring to as the 
conscious-body. We can see the habit body play out in something like muscle memory, where my 
body moves more or less automatically, without conscious deliberation from my “mind.” After 
repetition the practice starts to become customary for me, almost automatic, as if my body is 
manipulating itself without any personal involvement from me (i.e. it is anonymous). We often 
think of physical habits in terms of special technique, like riding a bike or playing a musical 
instrument. But in fact these habits can be far more general, like knowing how to walk or sitting 
with a certain posture when reading at a desk. Even partaking of the Sacrament of the Eucharist 
is asedimented physical habit in this way, from the procession to the other movements de 
rigueur, like bowing and performing the Sign of the Cross, to the physical act of consuming the 
host. Meditation, yoga, and prayer are much the same—all of these spiritual and religious acts 
have physical correlates on the level of embodiment. In other words there is a physical feeling 
associated with being involved in these acts. After I perform these activities a certain number of 
times, their habitual repetition starts to affect my body in such a way that my experience of the 
body takes on a different physical “feed.” Almost paradoxically this change is often one that 
comes down to reduced conscious awareness of some physical practice, like subconsciously 
sitting and standing at the right times during a church service. As my mental awareness of the 
practice is diminished, my physical awareness picks up the slack. The enactment or manipulation 
of the practice is turned over more fully to my organismal side. The point is that the 
phenomenological subject’s mental and physical habits sediment themselves onto the conscious-
body over the course of time. 
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 But this is not at all equivalent with the phenomenon of conversion according to the 
“classical” model exemplified by St. Paul. In that case it is not that Paul loses conscious 
awareness of some physical practice that starts to become rote, but instead that he experiences an 
interruption of his habit. His physical practices, namely the persecution of Christians, are 
interrupted by the apparition of Jesus Christ, who interrogates Paul (at that time Saul).  Thus 
instead of establishing a habit the sudden conversion case is defined by the disruption of a habit. 
But in fact, all conversions result from some sort of disruption of the subject’s prior habit body. 
Even the case of the gradual or unconscious conversion is one which is marked by substantial 
change in the habit of the subject; it is just that this change was so gradual that the subject was 
not attentive to its occurring as it unfolded in present time. 
 This all ties into conversion because it shows (again) how my mental life and my physical 
being cannot be easily disentangled from each other. Since I have never experienced without my 
body, it is impossible for me to imagine how unembodied experience could be possible at all. 
Even a so-called “disembodied” experience is sensible to me insofar as I have the sensation that 
my body is alien or Other to myself. I can only have this experience in virtue of the fact that I 
remain nevertheless “in” my body, otherwise I would have no basis to make the judgment that I 
was allegedly “out” of it. This example shows what in fact applies in all cases of experience: my 
experience of my body presupposes my experience of “inner” mental life, just as my experience 
of inner mental life presupposes bodily experience.  
 There are other ways in which conversion is mediated through the body. Via this passive 
and latent constitution of the habit body, the phenomenological subject and his body are situated 
in both the spatiotemporal present as well as the non-present, or perhaps, the psychophysical 
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retention of the unfulfilled present. This reveals the fact that a conversion is made possible not 
only by temporality and my experience thereof, but also by spatiality and my experience thereof.  
 Merleau-Ponty indicates that the body is vitally involved in the constitution of my 
experience in space. He writes: 
[T]he life of consciousness—epistemic life, the life of desire, or perceptual life—is underpinned by 
an “intentional arc” that projects around us our past, our future, our human milieu, our physical 
situation, our ideological situation, and our moral situation, or rather, that ensures that we are 
situated within all of these relationships. This intentional arc creates the unity of the senses, the 
unity of the senses with intelligence, and the unity of sensitivity and motricity.18 
 
The claim is that it is not only intellectual consciousness that is capable of relating via 
intentionality toward objects; to the contrary, this operation belongs also to the body. This 
intentionality is neither cognitive nor Cartesian. The body’s intentionality derives from its motor 
potential, the actualization of which realizes external space for me. In short it is the power of the 
body that grounds its intentionality. As Merleau-Ponty puts it, “there would be no such thing as 
space for me if I did not have a body.”19 Space, in other words, is phenomenological. This does 
not mean that space is merely a mind-independent construct, however. Rather, the idea is that 
space is known to me in such a way that reflects my embodiment across the three dimensions of 
space. Clearly this manner in which space appears to me is different in kind from the bare 
mathematics of space, which are perhaps known by my intellect but also interpreted in applied 
form in my lived experience. In short, the way in which I can know space is radically different 
from the way in which an unembodied intelligence could conceive of the same.  
 It should be pointed out, though, that the hypothetical unembodied intelligence is the bare 
minimum when it comes to conceiving of space, despite the fact that its understanding of space 
would be radically different from my own. While claiming that a mind is required for an idea 
 
18 Merleau-Ponty, PP 137 <169-170>.  
19 Ibid., 104 <132>. 
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sounds tautological, this is often the subject of consternation. It is certainly the case that a mind 
is required in order for a thought to exist, so it follows that the conception of space requires 
consciousness. This is emphatically not the same as the claim that space in-itself, if there is such 
a thing, requires consciousness in order to exist. As we have seen, if there is such a space-in-
itself, then by definition we can know nothing of it. The point is that space as an idea is not the 
same as space as such. It is useful to compare Merleau-Ponty’s view to that of Kant: 
Space is not something objective and real, nor a substance, nor an accident, nor a relation; instead, 
it is subjective and ideal, and originates from the mind’s nature in accord with a stable law as a 
scheme, as it were, for coordinating everything sensed externally.20 
 
Merleau-Ponty would agree in principle with most of this. But crucially he has to add that it is 
specifically via the body that the mind is afforded with the “stable law” that permits coordinated 
external sensation. While space can be construed in terms of pure mathematics, the math rests on 
a foundation established by consciousness on both the intellectual as well as material levels. The 
mathematics in virtue of which space is construed is still true a priori, but until consciousness 
enumerates all of the axioms that would in cooperation with one another establish a system of 
rules, math as “undiscovered” is “known” by no one. It is after conscious synthesis that the entire 
domain of mathematized space is uncovered, and it is via my embodied consciousness that I 
know what space feels like. My knowledge of space is not just propositional, in other words. My 
consciousness knows space in such a way that reflects that I am conscious in space, through my 
body. 
 The idea here, in short, is that the body is space, it “inhabits” and “assumes” space in 
such a way that it establishes the very basis of the phenomenon for consciousness. Without 
space, after all, there would be no experience. Merleau-Ponty uses the term “body schema” to 
 
20 Kant, AK, 2:403 
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refer to this “practical system” comprised of “bodily space and external space.”21 It is by way of 
the body schema, as my space, that I can have an understanding of external space. On a material 
level, my knowledge of the latter is derivative from the former, from my conscious embodiment. 
 Thus while it can be easy to interpret these words too strongly, one should not 
misunderstand Merleau-Ponty to suggest that space is just a mind-dependent construct. 
Consciousness cannot fabricate space without there being some appearance or phenomenon 
before consciousness that itself establishes the idea. So the present thesis, that space requires 
consciousness, has to be supplemented with a second thesis, that space also requires the world. It 
is through the body that consciousness knows the world.  
 Kant points out that the concept cannot just be empirical, however. Space informs my 
outer experience in such a way that space cannot itself be something I derive from experience. 
Kant writes:  
Space is not an empirical concept which has been derived from outer experiences. For in order that 
certain sensations be referred to something outside me (that is, to something in another region of 
space from that in which I find myself), and similarly in order that I may be able to represent them 
as outside and alongside one another, and accordingly as not only different but as in different places, 
the representation of space must already underlie them. Therefore, the representation of space 
cannot be obtained through experience from the relations of outer appearance; this outer experience 
is itself possible at all only through that representation.22 
 
Here he points out that the concept of space is not extrapolated from experience, since 
experience clearly already requires the representation of space in order to be sensible in the first 
place. Instead, the concept structures the experience itself. If it was any other way, then I would 
not be able to have the experience of space. 
 If my experience presupposes the experience of space, then my ability to experience 
conversion relies in part upon my body’s engagement with space. There are two different ways in 
 
21 Merleau-Ponty, PP 105, <132>. 
22 Kant, Inaugural Dissertation, 203 
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which my body’s engagement with space changes in significant ways as the result of spiritual or 
religious conversion. First there is the embodied-phenomenon of my own body within space, and 
second there is the embodied-phenomenon of “outer” space (meaning space external to my own 
body). 
 Conversion affects the way that the conscious-body, the body-phenomenon, is present to 
me. With my Cartesian-influenced understanding of my “self” as both mind and body any 
significant change of mind brings about a reordered perception of my body. If a religious change 
precipitates a change in my personal identity, this change most likely but not necessarily entails a 
difference in the way in which I interpret my own body as well as its ultimate significance. This 
can also be seen in the theological concept of the “sanctity” of the body. In some cases of 
conversion the body is perceived in a new way as a result of the change in spiritual identity. In 
some of these cases, especially in Christianity, the body is professed to be a sacred physical 
counterpart to the intellectual soul. Often times this doctrine is related to moral teachings 
concerning chastity, but a new understanding of the corpus sancti can also institute changes in 
dietary habits, exercise habits, and so on.  
 This does not necessarily mean that the body will develop into something that I come to 
prize or value. To the contrary it can start to become something that I regret, lament, despise, 
deny, etc. This understanding may be one of positive or negative appraisal, something via which 
the soul can reach some higher plane of Being, or, conversely, something in spite of which the 
soul will strive to reach the same. Thus it is apparent that instead the relevant general 
requirement is that when there occurs a phenomenological conversion, it also, by strict necessity, 
brings about a change in the conscious-body’s understanding of itself, albeit to varying degrees 
of awareness.  
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 If the conversion is not one of identity, but rather one which pertains to role, then there 
still results a difference in the phenomenon of personal embodiment. If my role has changed then 
the functionality of my body has changed. My body has taken on some new important purpose 
that plays a part in the very constitution and definition of myself, even if not on the level of 
fundamental “identity.” For example if I was always a Catholic but only very recently became a 
Eucharistic Minister, then my underlying identity, as a Catholic, has not changed, but one of my 
roles has—I am not the facilitator of a Catholic sacrament to my peers. By our criteria this has to 
count as sort of conversion. This conversion or change in role brings about a series of subtle 
changes in my perception of my body, including the directional practices I abide by during a 
Mass, i.e. where I stand in the sanctuary, as well as the precise movements that my body 
performs as I administer communion, sometimes dividing a singular host by halves or even by 
fourths, i.e., the way in which I perform the repeated motion of repeating with my mouth certain 
sacramental words, repeatedly placing a host in the hand of he or she who receives communion, 
as well as the way in which I understand my own physical presence in the liturgical space, 
namely, as a minister of the sacrament.  
 In all of these situations there is a correspondence between my purely conceptual 
understanding of my self and my conscious-body, in other words, my embodied self. Often times 
these two, exemplified in the appearance of inner consciousness and the appearance of the 






Ch. 6. Saint Paul: A Phenomenological Case Study 
 
The Conversion of St. Paul: Free Will, Judgment, and the Body 
 
In this chapter I will phenomenologically analyze the famous case of the conversion of Saint 
Paul. Here my objective is not to produce an eidetic explanation of Paul’s empirical case, but 
rather, to present a phenomenological reading of the most influential conversion anecdote of all 
time. 
 According to my synthetic phenomenological model of conversion, Paul undergoes his 
conversion when he experiences a radical change in identity that is mediated by a transcendent 
perceptual event. But what exactly does it mean for his conversion to be mediated—or otherwise 
“involved” with—this event?  There are at least two different ways to attempt an answer to this 
question.  
 The first explanation essentially holds that Paul’s conversion is equivalent with the event, 
meaning that his conversion is entirely passive. According to this view, Paul is converted in and 
by the transcendent event. Paul does “do” anything. He is converted “by God” as if he is a 
passive recipient, a “lightning rod” through whom the divine conducts a radical and 
instantaneous transformation. This is the “standard” or “traditional” model of Paul as passive 
convert. This interpretation epitomizes the view of some eminent commentators, the likes of 
which include St. Thomas Aquinas, who writes, “Paul, suddenly when he was in the midst of sin, 
his heart was perfectly moved by God.”1 There are weaker versions of this explanation, such as 
the one we saw in the first chapter as characterized by Rambo, who defines the Pauline 
 
1 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia IIae, q. 112, art 2.  
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conversion as one which involves a “passive respondent to outside force.”2 Rambo grasps the 
need to incorporate Paul’s response into his conversion sequence, which is arguably further than 
St. Thomas is willing to go, but he ultimately characterizes the respondent as passive, which is 
utterly incongruous. What does it mean for someone to respond passively? Is this equivalent to 
responding out of instinct or automatic response? “Passively responding” could benefit from 
further analysis, but at least at first glance this account of Paul is inadequate. The idea that Paul 
is just a passive respondent downplays and arguably undermines the extent to which his 
conversion is so profound and meaningful.  
 Ultimately, while neither of these accounts make for unreasonable ways to analyze Paul’s 
example, there is another, different way of examining his case. This second, alternative 
explanation suggests that Paul’s conversion is set in motion by the transcendent event but is not 
entirely reducible to the event’s occurrence. This view also holds that Paul is more than a mere 
“passive” respondent to a transcendent or supernatural event. While the view of Aquinas bolsters 
the significance of divine omnipotence and grace, it arguably undermines the extent to which 
Paul is free. Without Paul’s freedom there is no conversion at all. If Paul is forced by God’s grace 
to convert—with no possibility to do otherwise—then on a phenomenological level, he is no 
different from a medical patient who is “converted” through subjection to electroshock therapy. 
The forced and manipulated alteration of his consciousness is difficult to reconcile with the idea 
that he has attained a new identity. The forced alteration of consciousness is a case in which the 
subject responds to an imperious assertion from without; the subject is named or identified, but 
from the outside. This is not conversion. While identity is not something that is constituted on a 
 
2 Rambo, “Anthropology and the Study of Conversion,” 213. 
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basis that is entirely conscious or aware, it is not extrinsic to the subject, either. Existential 
identity must emanate from existence itself, not from something that transcends existence. 
 Without a doubt we can be sure that St. Thomas realizes this, but he mandates along 
typically Aristotelian lines that God “moves” Paul’s free will. It is certainly unclear whether 
Thomas thinks that Paul could have rejected God’s grace in this case, even though the Council of 
Trent established that grace can be rejected by the will. Looking at Paul’s case in this way 
imparts much theological significance and allays certain metaphysical questions regarding the 
causal source of his conversion, but from the phenomenological perspective it only offers an 
incomplete analysis of Paul because it does not take up his consciousness firsthand.3 Setting 
matters of faith and theology aside, strictly speaking it may or may not be the case that God 
“moves” the will of Paul, but even if God does, phenomenology can assert as much only if this 
divine movement is “given” or appears. 
 So is it true—does Paul in fact convert through something that follows from the 
transcendent phenomenon, such that his “actual” conversion occurs not in the instant of his 
transcendent experience but rather in the way in which he responds to the event? According to 
this interpretation Paul’s conversion would be actuated or incited by the spectacle he encounters 
via his sense, but not itself equivalent with or reducible that sensory “spectacle”—or whatever 
divine force is the supposed cause thereof.4 In a way this is arguably similar to the account of 
Aquinas, wherein God is the efficient and final cause of Paul’s conversion, with the proviso that 
the “principle of principles” precludes us from grasping outside of Paul’s conscious experience 
 
3 Indeed the experience is ultimately theologically significant in itself, although it is not being 
analyzed here for such a reason.  
4 Here I deliberately use Guy Debord’s term “spectacle.” Culture is arguably preoccupied with 
the image of Paul on the ground on the road.  
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in search of objective “causes.” Thus the metaphysical claim concerning the ultimate causality of 
the judgmental act is reduced to a “mere” belief. The corollary of this is that any supposed 
“cause” is just a belief evinced in an act of consciousness—in other words, a mere perception. 
Certainly, Paul determines that the transcendent event that he witnesses is the manifestation of 
divine grace, but according to the phenomenological perceptive that is a perception, an 
appearance. So at least for now this opinion regarding the cause of the belief is to be bracketed, 
despite the fact that it is often the case that the Pauline conversion story is recounted with a 
definite focus on precisely this aspect of the account, namely, the way in which it purportedly 
occurs involuntarily, as if for a passive subject whose transformation is the wholesale effect of 
some outside impetus. Now, to be sure, to eliminate the transcendent phenomena at the 
beginning of the story would constitute a violent redaction of the tale, so I do not mean to 
suggest that it bears no importance to the overall picture. This is not at all the case. Rather, it is 
that the “divine interaction” in Paul’s story can be reduced to sensory events that feature 
centrally in Paul’s story but do not themselves constitute anything remotely proximate to an 
authentic existential conversion. In short, when we examine Paul’s phenomenology, we find that 
the sensuous correlates of his conversion entail a rather minor role in the grand scheme of things.  
 Make no mistake, it has to be granted that the transcendent phenomenon conspicuously 
imparts the potency of divine power. Paul’s very will is overpowered by the appearance of “a 
light from the sky … [that] flashed around him.”5 God’s will, in other words, trumps that of the 
convert. Paul even uses passive language to describe the epistemological side of the experience: 
“… I want you to know, brothers, that the gospel preached by me is not of human origin. For I 
did not receive it from a human being, nor was I taught it, but it came through a revelation of 
 
5 Acts 9:3 NABRE 
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Jesus Christ.”6 But at the same time, there is another sort of violent redaction that is committed 
by depicting Paul’s conversion in such a way that it is the result of divine force alone and not 
also Paul’s own free will. The Aristotelian account of the efficient cause behind Paul’s 
conversion is all well and good, but Paul’s conversion is misinterpreted if the result of God’s 
grace is Paul’s choosing to believe is passed over. Paul does choose to convert, after all, even if 
divine intervention pushes him into the scenario where he must make his choice. The issue is that 
if Paul’s possibility of rejecting grace is not admitted, then neither nor his choice nor his 
conversion are really free. But if my interpretation of his example is reasonable, then his famous 
conversion is passive only in a limited sense, while it is quite active in other respects. I will 
demonstrate this by showing how Paul’s partly “passive” conversion is impossible without 
multiple “active” judgments on his part. If I can show that this is true in all cases and not just 
Paul’s, then I can reasonably conclude that the active vs. passive conversion schema constitutes a 
false dichotomy. Conversions always involve volition.7 
 It is certainly true that Paul does not seek out his transcendent roadside event on the way 
to Damascus. Having been a regular aggressor toward Christians a conversion to Christianity is 
not something in which Paul is interested; conversion is not something for which he is “looking.” 
To the contrary Paul says that he is “called. . . through his grace.”8 This call is interpreted by Paul 
in such a way that it is understood to be what is, in the natural attitude, referred to as an “outer” 
appearance. This means that the phenomenon results from “outside” of the subject himself. But 
 
6 Gal. 1:11-12 NABRE 
7 Even the unconscious conversion is one that involves volition on some level. For example, 
even if an adult cannot remember ever being not religious, and therefore cannot identify any 
conversion in his or her past, the adult’s previous practices were volitional.  
8 Gal. 1:15-16 NABRE 
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to the extent that this identification is an interpretation that Paul makes, it is not really “manifest” 
until a judgment is made on Paul’s part. 
 Paul makes further judgments throughout the course of his conversion. When he 
eventually stands up from the ground, he can “see nothing.” While it must be admitted that the 
“matter” of this act, as Husserl puts it, does not follow from a judgment that Paul makes (i.e. the 
sensuous visual appearance); it is nevertheless apparent that the verbal or even mental expression 
of his blindness entails a judgment, in this case just the statement of the obvious, that he is 
“seeing nothing.” Judgments such as these are extraneous to the fact of Paul’s blindness. In other 
words Paul’s judging that he is blind does not make it so—his words do not have this power. 
Sensory deprivation, even unexpected, is not enough in itself to precipitate a change in identity. 
Thus it is as Paul is led in blindness to his destination that the most important and meaningful 
judgment of all takes place. It is via this judgment that Paul is actually converted, at least in a 
phenomenological sense.9 
 It is undeniable that Paul “sees” something, and then “hears” something, and makes at 
least a few judgments pertaining to these appearances, but the real conversion, his conversion 
proper, resides in the radical result of these “outer” appearances, which is Paul’s judgment to 
become Christian. This is why his conversion is in fact achieved not in his reception of the 
transcendent event, but in his answering to the “call” that the event constitutes. His answer is of 
course the result of a series of profound judgments that he makes regarding his identity. The 
transcendent event can also and should also be framed as part of the phenomenological re-
 
9 By “phenomenological sense” I mean the sense in which the experience involves appearances 
that are “given” to consciousness. These appearances can come from within or without but an 
appearance that seems to emanate from an external source cannot itself manifest a conversion 
without a corresponding belief in the ego.  
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positioning of Paul, to the extent that the sensuous and transcendent appearance does play a role 
in the conversion, despite the fact that it does not (and cannot) play the sole role in a conversion. 
Along the same lines one could fairly call the transcendent phenomenon a conditioning event; it 
sets the scene for what is to follow via judgment.  
 It must be admitted, however that not only are Paul’s conversion judgments existential 
and volitional in nature, but they are also thoroughly rational and intellectual. When Paul is 
directly presented with an appearance that he judges to contradict what he had previously held to 
be the truth, this is so groundbreaking for him that he is compelled to revise his beliefs. Paul 
judges his sensuously-given to be direct experience of the divine, and he deems it only rational to 
reconsider what he had previously held to be true. He is presented, after all, with what appears to 
be external, “material” counter-evidence to his previous religious worldview.10 It is not that naive 
belief in the “external world” is necessarily a rational judgment, but instead that concrete 
phenomenal evidence compels Paul to alter his beliefs—it would be irrational for Paul to 
continue along in his old ways of believing. 
 These judgments are Paul’s own, the product of his own volition and liberty. So while 
Paul’s conversion is commonly construed to be a sort of personal subjective crisis caused by an 
external force, on the phenomenological level the crisis in fact comes from within, not from 
without; Paul is not a forced convert. The critical event disrupts Paul’s perception of himself to 
such a degree that he no longer conceives of himself as a separate individual but to the contrary 
as a member of a universal affiliation. This too is a judgment.  Like Descartes, he begins to 
question everything he previously took to be true, the result of which is the careful 
reconsideration of all of his prior judgments.  
 
10 Here “material” does not mean physical. 
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 These judgments are what comprise the sustained self-inquiry of Paul. They result from 
the transcendent event and they culminate in, and constitute, Paul’s complete existential 
transformation. In other words, Paul’s experience of consciousness, his awareness of his own 
body, and his engagement with the world all change as a result not of his encounter with the 
transcendent, but more properly with his judgments regarding that encounter. While it is true that 
it is the transcendent event that, as Badiou suggests, produces a “tear” or rupture in the very 
fabric of Paul’s subjectivity, Paul, as phenomenological subject, is the executor of this subjective 
tear.  
 Paul’s conversion thus restructures the frameworks and limits of his own consciousness. 
This radical existential shift comprises for him a complete phenomenological reorientation.11 
While attempts have recently been made to analyze Paul’s conversion using the methods of 
psychiatry and neurology, ultimately the most “scientific” account of Paul’s story, at least in a 
Husserlian sense, is that which focuses on the first-person perspective with respect to the 
experience. The root cause or inspiration behind the experience, whether it is metaphysical or 
neurological or otherwise, is irrelevant.12 This is because no matter the ultimate cause (if any) of 
Paul’s mental states, the conscious determinations of these mental states, i.e. the judgments, are 
the true vehicle for his conversion.  
 But the reason why these judgments are too often overlooked is in light of the undeniable 
effect that the transcendent event produces upon Paul. Even if Paul does not convert on the mere 
basis of the sensory event, he cannot convert without it. Thus our attention should be called back 
 
11 As we have seen, not everything in my lived experience is the object of conscious awareness. 
To the contrary much of my life eludes the focus of my attention. 
12 Landsborough, “St. Paul and Temporal Lobe Epilepsy,” 659. 
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to where we began, with the catalyzing sensuous phenomenon that inaugurates Paul’s episode—
the Damascus incident.  
   
The Conversion of St. Paul: A Phenomenology of Light and Voice 
 
While Paul is often called a “passive” convert, I have suggested that his conversion is actually 
constituted by a series of judgments that he makes regarding his own identity (in crisis) and thus 
his true conversion should not be deemed to be equivalent with or reducible to the supernatural 
phenomenal events that he experiences. It is true that his conversion begins with a “passive” 
positioning of his subjectivity. It is the “external” event that conditions his existence in this 
moment. Indeed at the time of the transcendent event his subjectivity is defined as “passive” in 
relation to an adventitious impetus; if we isolate this single instant, we can see Paul (as Saul) as 
just someone to whom the event “happens.” 
  As I have argued, the real change in Paul materializes through his reaction to what 
happens to him on the road to Damascus. He quickly transcends the passive conditioning of the 
event via the judgments that he makes concerning the transcendent event. His subjectivity 
thuswise exercises its sovereignty over the contents of its experience—as transcendental ego. It 
is this ego’s judgments that themselves enact the conversion proper, which involves, as I have 
shown, not only intellectual and/or spiritual changes, but also changes to embodiment as 
experienced.  
 But just as any account of Paul’s conversion that ignores or downplays his judgment is 
arguably inadequate, so, too, is any account of Paul that ignores the sensuous correlates of his 
experience. Here I have treated the former first because my argument is that it is more primary 
213 
and essential, but my phenomenological study would be incomplete if it were to focus solely on 
the experience of conversion judgments and did not include an analysis of the “outer” sense 
experiences involved in the conversion. It would be a grave oversight to ignore the fact that the 
transcendent phenomenon makes the conversion possible, despite the fact that it is judgment that 
makes it actual.13 
 Let us begin with Paul’s first-person consciousness and from there proceed toward the 
specific sensuous phenomena that are relevant to his case. From this viewpoint conversion is a 
first-person experience that is tied to a definite and determinate event, occurring in real time, in 
what appears for Paul to be the present or “now” moment of his conscious stream. As Paul is 
walking along his way to his destination his ordinary mundane experience is suspended by an 
extraordinary sensory event. This event is disruptive in nature, its disruption enacted via the 
temporary debilitation of Paul’s sensory experience. Thus it is the interruption of Paul’s 
ordinarily experienced and anticipated “outer sense” that makes possible (but does not itself 
execute) the complete reordering of Paul’s identity.  
 As we have seen it is the judgment that executes the conversion proper, but these 
judgments cannot be made without the occurrence of the phenomenon from which Paul first 
concludes that his previous ways were wrong. The existential judgments follow from what 
begins with the judgment that the sensuous phenomenon is the provenance of (the Christian) 
God. All of Paul’s conversion judgments can be traced to this single sensuous moment.14 But the 
significance of this is that Paul’s conversion is both intellectual and sensuous; its rational 
dimension is opened up by the sensorial. Here I will more closely examine this sensorial 
 
13 In other words it is judgment that actualizes what is only the potential for conversion. 
14 It is this sensuous moment that, theologically speaking, demonstrates the potency of divine 
grace. 
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“moment” using the methods of transcendental phenomenology. I will focus on the two modes in 
which the event is sensuously given to Paul: via his vision and his hearing.  
 Let us begin with Paul’s visual experience of the phenomenon of light: “a light from the 
sky suddenly flashed around him.”15 It is especially significant that it is via the appearance of 
light that Paul’s conversion is initiated. Light is a curious phenomenon as it is at once both that 
which makes possible the phenomenon of sight while it is also a possible object of sight—at least 
in a limited sense, since I cannot see light in the same way that I can see trees or my desk. In the 
natural attitude I may operate under the pretense that I see light, but in the phenomenological 
attitude “seeing” light is in fact heavily qualified. In short, I do not see light in the way that I see 
objects. My experience of light is different from that of ordinary objects because even in the 
natural attitude I understand that my experience of light is not of light in itself, of light qua 
material object. Light is something that I see in that it is part of what I see, but I cannot (even in 
the natural attitude) see light itself. In the natural attitude, light seems to “fill” the air without 
being materially present to me. 
 It is apparent that my perception of light is different in kind from material perception. But 
sometimes phenomena that are related to light can be confusing for analysis. We cannot let these 
initially confounding examples undermine what is a reasonable analysis. It is imperative, for 
example, that we do not confuse brightness, such as the brightness of the sun or the screen of an 
electronic device, with the (direct) perception of light. Light has to be reflected; it requires an 
object in order to be perceived. Like color, my perception of it cannot be removed from the 
objective phenomenal world.  
 
15 Acts 9:3 NABRE 
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 Projected light can also be confusing. I encounter projected light all the time, like the 
light that emanates from the lamp in a room that is already well-lit. I can see this light as cast 
against the wall. But in other cases, especially those where my environment is poorly lit, 
projected light can appear as if it is an object. Consider for example the bright output of a 
spotlight against a dark night sky. In this example do I not see light directly? In short, no—in this 
case light is discernible for me only in virtue of the fact that it is cast across the sky as a sort of 
background object. Thus it is a background in a visual sense and not a physical sense, although 
physical properties of the “empty” sky do affect my perception of light, such as the particles in 
the air that account for the red appearance of a setting sun. Thus these exceptional cases of light 
perception can be explained in the same terms as background light. It is worthwhile to state the 
obvious here and point out that we do not perceive light in the way that we perceive material 
objects since, after all, light is not material. This is confirmed by my sense of touch, although I 
am not capable of physically encountering every material object, at least if a physical encounter 
requires a discernible sensation on my part, since I can “touch” microscopic particles that will 
appear to me through the assisted vision of a lens, and yet I cannot feel them when I touch them. 
 It is apparent even to so-called “common sense” that light is not a thing, not a material 
entity—and yet I still see it. What exactly do I see if light has no material status? In the natural 
scientific attitude it is understood that light, as energy, cannot be directly perceived, not only by 
virtue of its physical properties but also my own physiological constitution.16 While light does 
not have mass, its objective “existence” is grounded in its perpetual motion. Light is always 
 
16 Sometimes it is suggested that energy cannot be perceived at all, but this argument is a gross 
distortion of something manifestly true in the phenomenological attitude, namely, that with my 
eyes, brain, and central nervous system I am not capable of seeing light as “what it is,” energy. I 
am to the contrary seeing the effects of the energy.  
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moving. It moves in waves and while I can feel the effects of these waves, I do not regard the 
massless object directly (I cannot do so). While I can feel the effects of some but not all of the 
various wavelengths of light that surpass the capabilities of my vision, even the wavelengths that 
I can “see” are interpreted as such by the brain. Outside of this interpretive milieu the light itself 
has no color. The color of the world is confined to the limits of consciousness and perhaps 
instruments for detection, which obviously cannot “experience” the color in sensuous fashion, 
despite the fact that they may be able to “identity” the color on the basis of measured 
wavelength. 
 In the phenomenological attitude, things change. Despite the fact that I do not experience 
light as an object in itself, light is still a phenomenon that I recognize and face on a daily basis. 
While I may not technically see light in itself, at least according to the natural and theoretical 
attitudes, light often appears to me in a primary way. Phenomenologically speaking, I do see 
light and I can direct my intentionality toward its manifestation(s). I see light coming out of the 
fixtures in the room, I see the light of my computer screen as I type these words, I see the light 
shining through the slanted blinds of the west window. A physicist can tell me that I do not really 
see light itself in these scenarios, but my experience confirms otherwise. I know, after all, when I 
do not see light like this.  
 But light is also something much more preponderant than what is involved in these 
allegedly “direct” cases. Light is something that I often see without looking at it directly, like the 
way in which a room illuminated in ordinary daylight just appears to me as a room of objects and 
things, and not as a room of light. It is the light that makes it possible for me to see anything at 
all. Like the case of the light that I see coming from a lamp or window, this light requires my 
intentionality in order to stick out from what is otherwise only a latent and partially given 
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phenomenon. Husserl has a term for this sort of partial presentation. The phenomenal experience 
of light falls under the category of what Husserl calls “apperception.” Although his 
phenomenological findings need no confirmation from the natural scientific attitude, it is worth 
nothing that his account is corroborated by the explanations of optics given by scientific 
researchers. 
 Apperceptions are rather different from ordinary, “direct” perceptions in that they are not 
directly given as are ordinary material objects. But this is not to say that an apperception is 
interpretive; Husserl intimates that it is not inferential, not a “thinking act.”17 Thus an 
apperception takes on a rather unique status caught between the two modes of perception—it is 
neither perceived nor reasoned.  
 So what is apperception? An apperception is a part of a perception that is indirectly given 
but nevertheless grasped in an immediate manner. Husserl writes of apperceptions that they are: 
. . .intentional lived-experiences that are conscious of something as perceived, [but this something 
as perceived] is not self-given in these lived-experiences (not completely): and they are called 
apperceptions to the extent that they have this trait, even if in this case they also consciously intend 
what in truth is self-given in them. Apperceptions transcend their immediate content. . .18 
 
The first thing to note is that apperceptions entail intentionality. While intentionality is often 
confused with conscious awareness, this is a misconception that likely results from confusion 
with the word “intent.” Intentionality as a concept in transcendental phenomenology actually 
refers as we have seen to the “aboutness” of an experience. Not all experiences have 
intentionality; sensations, for example, are not intentional. They can be made intentional via 
phenomenological reflection, but until then, the sensation is only the “material” correlate of a 
 
17 Husserl, CM §51, 111 <141>. 
18 Husserl, APS, 624 <337>. 
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possible mental act. This is the distinction that plays out in the difference between being in pain 
and thinking about the pain. 
 Second it is significant that the apperception is essentially the perception of something 
that is not immediately perceived. This sounds abstract but with a concrete example we can see 
how straightforward the notion of apperception actually is. I will elaborate upon an example 
given by Moran: I sit indoors as I write this, in a room with both shape and size. As I face in one 
direction, I perceive the limit of the interior space in front of me—the wall. Even though I cannot 
see the wall behind me, I grasp that it is there. This does not require any sort of cognition from 
me; while I am inside of the building my sense of being inside of not only a room but also a 
larger structure is latent in my consciousness despite the fact that it is neither an inference nor 
something that is given directly to sense.  
 In this particular example I have most likely seen the back wall of the building 
previously, but this prior experience is not necessary for apperception. Consider how I can look 
from a close distance at a material object. The object appears to me in its “profile” view, 
according to the specific “adumbration” of its presentation. This adumbration is essentially the 
perspective of the phenomenal object, but it applies more so to the object than to the perceiver. 
The fact that I can only regard this object in adumbrated form while I nevertheless can intuit its 
other possible adumbrations is the product of my apperception. Despite the fact that I have never 
seen the other or “back” side of this object, I grasp that it is there. Again, I do not have to think 
about it in order for the object to have the other side, nor do I directly see that side—it is just 
“there.”  
 Light is a bit more complicated of an example than the back side of a material object, but 
the mode of its phenomenal appearance is just the same: it is apperceived. Curiously, Husserl 
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does not discuss the apperception of light much at all in his writing, which is surprising for such 
a fundamental and ubiquitous apperception, without which visual perception would be 
impossible.19 As vision occupies a primary place in outer sensation, as I have argued, its requisite 
basis in the apperception of light is a surprising oversight on Husserl’s part.  
 It is light that at once both makes it possible for us to see at the same time that it is only 
partially given itself, which accounts for its apperceptive status. Light is not perceived as a 
distinct object in itself but is instead part of a perceptual “schema.” The apperception of light is 
an example of what Husserl has in mind when he indicates that “it is in relation to 
“circumstances” that the thing is what it is.”20 Husserl points out that an object can remain the 
same while the lighting changes, which he calls a change in the “sensuous schema.”21 This 
schema is apperceived since light really only appears to my vision as “cast.” Its givenness is 
therefore indirect; I do not experience it as a singular presentation, in the way that I can see a 
book or an animal.  
 At the same time that light is more difficult to see than material objects, it is that which 
makes it possible to see material objects in the first place, just as the back side of an object 
makes possible its appearance as a multi-dimension shape that takes up space. Take, for example, 
the way in which I am able to see the output of a flashlight in the dark, but not in daylight. In the 
case of daylight light is already cast upon the extent of my environment, such that I cannot see 
any “additional” light that is added onto it, at least insofar as the light is of the same 
polychromatic wavelength as the background sunlight. In the natural attitude, physicists can 
explain the phenomenon of vision in terms of the reflective qualities of an external object’s 
 
19 The most sustained discussion of the phenomenology of light is probably in Ideas II.  
20 Husserl, Ideas II, 44 <41>.  
21 Ibid. 
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molecules. As we have seen the “color” of an object is the brain’s identification of the 
wavelength of light that the object reflects. But crucially this requires a source of light in the first 
place in order for reflection to occur at all. This is why it is impossible to see a material object in 
complete darkness; there is no light, which is necessary in order to see. In pitch darkness, the red 
ball has no color at all. While it is true as we saw in the natural attitude that we do not directly 
see light appear to us, it is manifest via apperception that it is a phenomenological condition of 
the experience of vision; it is evident in experience that without light we would have no vision at 
all.  
 The visual component of the phenomenal field is especially significant in that it is more 
“present” than the other sensuous dimensions of experience.  Consider just how primary the 
status of sight really is; at least when I am awake, more often than not I am seeing something. 
This does not mean that I am noticing anything in particular.  Furthermore, I am likely paying 
more attention to vision (although perhaps not a lot more) than any of the other senses, which are 
either essentially hibernating, as is my olfaction when I do not seem to smell anything in 
particular, or marked by empty content, exemplified by the situation wherein I “hear silence.” 
The silence almost paradoxically “sounds” a certain way to me as sensuous phenomenon. Vision 
is, at least ordinarily, different in kind from other sensory situations like these. 22 Unless I am in 
deep and dreamless sleep, then my vision is either passively or actively occupied.  
 
22 There is even a need to analyze the appearance of blindness, just as it is necessary to analyze 
all other sorts of non-objective visual objects, from hallucinations to vivid dreams to pure 
imagination. There are fascinating insights to be found in the phenomenology of blindness. 
Someone who is profoundly blind from birth sees not “blackness” but “nothing.” Only someone 
who has at one point seen is capable of identifying “blackness.” For those who can see, it is next 
to impossible to phenomenologically different the vision of “blackness” from “nothing.” Many 
people who are not profoundly blind are capable of what is called “light perception.”  
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 Because vision is so primary and fundamental to the constitution of experience, when 
Paul is temporarily blinded by a bright light, his blindness is itself a seeing—it is determined by 
its circumstances. It has to be a seeing to the extent that Paul is capable of identifying it as 
blindness in the first place. This is a familiar experience that many people have had at some point 
or another; I have experienced my own visual field in a “washed out” mode wherein all I see is 
bright white, or, if I squint my eyes, what appears instead to be a dark and red “wall.” Either of 
these visions can result from having looked directly at a bright light source. Even if I close my 
eyes right now, I am at once both not seeing, or seeing nothing, and also seeing something, 
namely a black field or map that comprises my entire visual field. 
 As we can see in these examples, sight is a continuously occurring phenomenon for me. 
Even when I am not noticing things or focusing on anything in particular, I still have the 
experience of seeing. My sight is more continuous than perhaps any other faculty of sense. I am 
almost always “seeing” to some degree, whereas it is far from obvious that the same is true for 
my other external senses.  
 The apparent primacy of sight is likely related to the provenance of the numerous 
epistemological tropes that employ visual metaphors in order to link the intellectual to the visual. 
This analogy is epitomized by the question “do you see what I mean?” as asked to someone 
regarding a matter that involves only words and has no visual basis whatsoever. Indeed 
intellectual understanding is often characterized using visual metaphors. In Plato’s dialogues 
Socrates often asks his interlocutor whether he “sees” whether something is the case or not.23  
Phenomenology inherits this idiomatic schema. Indeed this is occasionally suggested to be a 
limitation of phenomenology; as Don Ihde puts it, this is the “intense visualism” manifest in 
 
23 In a survey of Meno I note ten instances of “see” idiomatically employed like so.  
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phenomenology, a favoritism that is traceable at least to Heraclitus and the Greeks.24 But this 
arguable bias is confirmed by the nature of our experience, which, with certain clinical 
exceptions, tends to privilege the phenomenon of sight. My experience of vision is persistent and 
nearly omnipresent compared to the other modes of outer sensation.  
 The primacy of vision reinforces the sensuous primacy of Paul’s conversion—it is given 
to him in the most fundamental of ways. The visual component of Paul’s conversion evinces the 
fact that his transformation occurs, if not on the basis of some external thing that has properties 
of its own, on the basis of external perception, of the presentation of some “given” that in the 
natural attitude would be considered to be really “outside” of the subject. To this end it is fair to 
characterize the conversion of Paul as at least partially “passive” to the extent that the original 
catalyst for the transformative shift is something that is (at least understood to be if not actually) 
external to the subject. In effect, even if Paul’s conversion is the result of a neurological event 
like an epileptic seizure, it is Paul’s interpretation of the seizure that trumps everything else. In 
other words, even if Paul was experiencing an epileptic episode, he thought he saw Christ. It is 
notable that even the sensuous correlate of the conversion entails a judgment, in this case an 
identification. Paul sees a bright light, and he decides that it is the light of Christ.25 Here the 
judgment pertains to what is an apperception since, as I have shown, light cannot be directly 
perceived but only apperceived. Despite the fact that this apperception is by definition indirect, it 
is potent enough to temporarily strip Paul of his sense of sight. Paul attributes this intense and 
disruptive apperception to the work of God. 
 
24 Ihde, Phenomenologies of Sound, 21, 51. 
25 This should not be understood to imply that it is not “really” the voice of Christ. It may or may 
not be the voice of Christ and Paul’s decision regarding whether it is or not ultimately has no 
bearing on that matter.  
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 Paul also judges that he hears the voice of Christ, thus this is the other sensuous catalyst 
for his conversion. If there is any faculty of sense that rivals the primacy of vision, it is hearing. 
Even when I hear “nothing,” I am still hearing, just as with vision when I see nothing, I am still 
seeing. It is less clear that when I taste nothing I am still tasting, or that when I smell nothing, I 
am smelling. While darkness/blackness and silence (rather paradoxically) have determinate 
appearances before sense, it is far from obvious that “nothing” has a taste or a smell. These 
senses do not operate so noticeably “in the background” as does my vision and hearing. It is 
almost as if the taste or smell of nothing would require a judgment in order to ascend to the level 
of presence, whereas the sight or sound of nothing is something that is more immediately given 
(and therefore more immediately noticed). While it is true that when I taste something I do not 
need to make a judgment in order to experience the taste, in the case of the absence of flavor I 
typically need to determine that I taste nothing. The same is not true for my sight and hearing, 
each of which is essentially pre-judgmental or pre-reflective in nature. I may not notice that there 
is no sound, but I am hearing the lack of sound in a different, more direct manner than what I 
experience when I am tasting or smell nothing. Without a doubt I do not have to make a 
judgment in order to taste or smell something, but the “presence of absence” is more sensuously 
felt by me in the case of my seeing and hearing. I am more likely to notice seeing nothing than I 
am to notice hearing nothing, but each dimension of sense is more continuously present to my 
consciousness compared to other modes of sensation like taste and smell. 
 All of this is to say that the fact that Paul’s conversion is mediated by one of the more 
primary domains of sensuous experience is not insignificant. Paul is addressed in the most direct 
and effective manner possible—after all, seeing is believing. Indeed in Paul’s particular case it is 
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not the “sound of nothing” that accompanies his conversion but instead a determinate sound that 
is identified as a voice. In Acts the author recounts that:  
He fell to the ground and heard a voice saying to him, “Saul, Saul, why are you persecuting me?” 
He said, “Who are you, sir?” The reply came, “I am Jesus, whom you are persecuting. Now get up 
and go into the city and you will be told what you must do.”26  
 
Let us begin with the perceived origin of the voice. This must be distinguished from the so-called 
“actual” origin of the voice, which cannot be guaranteed on phenomenological grounds. That 
said, while it is true that the origin of the appearance cannot be known with absolute certainty, 
Paul does make a judgment regarding the provenance of this voice that he hears. Taking at face 
value the veracity of the scripture, Paul judges the voice to come from without, from some 
external source. Even if this judgment were to be considered “true” in the natural attitude, likely 
via the corroboration of other eyewitnesses (indeed such accounts are in the scriptural sources), it 
is nevertheless not necessarily the case that Paul’s auditory experience is of something present 
“in the flesh.” It should be noted that the scripture indicates that Paul hears a voice, not that he 
hears someone. The difference between the two is enormous; the sound of a voice can appear as 
if it is unembodied and phantasmic, whereas the sound of someone is material and concrete. 
Despite the fact that Paul has been temporarily blinded, and despite the fact that scripture says 
that he hears a voice (and not someone), at first Paul is not sure what he hears, as we can tell by 
the fact that he asks the voice to identify itself. It is only after the voice answers his question that 
Paul judges that he hears someone.  
 It is still possible that Paul makes this judgment in natural error, but it cannot be 
considered a phenomenological error. It is true that people with schizophrenia hear internal 
voices all of the time; it is obvious that a voice that appears to correspond to some real individual 
 
26 Acts 9:4-6 NABRE 
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may not necessarily correspond to material “reality” in such a manner. The real 
phenomenological issue to examine is whether Paul’s hearing is in this case presentation or 
presentification. 
 If the voice is a presentation to Paul, then it is fully present, immediate, and direct. It is a 
givenness “in the flesh.” This is the type of voice that Paul hears when he speaks to one of his 
fellow travelers, or any other “real” person. We cannot yet be sure that Paul does not hear the 
voice in a way like this. 
 If the voice is a presentification, then its givenness is partial. The difference between this 
type of mental experience and presentation comes down to representation and mental status, for 
Husserl conceptualized via the noematic distinction between the different types of acts. It is the 
contrast between the noema of a heard voice compared to the noema of an imagined or 
remembered voice. The latter sort of noema is limited to my own inner sense, whereas the former 
appears as sensuously fulfilled. Differentiating inner speech from external speech is typically 
rather straightforward. Don Ihde calls this the difference between “inner” and “outer” sound.27  
 As Ihde points out, there are exceptions to this difference in lived experience. 
Hallucinations can often appear as sounds instead of sights. Ihde suggests that these 
hallucinations are the synthesis of sound that is directly perceived, and sound that is imagined. In 
such a case an inner sound would appear to me as if it was an outer sound. This is why such a 
sound would seem to me to be so real; it would be given “in the flesh.” I have mentioned the 
clinical attempts to explain Paul’s conversion using neurology. If an epileptic episode does 
indeed account for Paul’s experience, then we can assume that the visual and auditory 
phenomena are presentations via the effective synthesis of inner and outer sense. This is directly 
 
27 Ihde, Phenomenologies of Sound, 132. 
226 
analogous to the research experiments in which electric stimulation is used to produce a 
“feeling.” 
 But let us assume that Paul is “neurotypical” and has not in this case synthesized inner 
and outer auditory sense. Can we then determine what type of givenness is present to him when 
he hears the voice? It is possible to resolve this question on the basis of the intersubjective 
verification provided in the scriptural sources. “The men who were traveling with him stood 
speechless, for they heard the voice but could see no one.”28 It has been the object of much 
scholarly consternation that this account in Acts 9 is ostensibly contradicted by what is written in 
Acts 22: “My companions saw the light but did not hear the voice of the one who spoke to me.”29 
Longnecker has argued that this is simply the result of different meanings behind the verb “hear.” 
This polysemy is evident in English as well as the original Greek. To “hear” can mean to be 
aware of a sound, but it can also mean to understand the meaning of a sound. Longnecker 
maintains that only Paul understands what is being said, while others hear the voice but not the 
message. This is akin to hearing a voice speaking a language that you do not know. I can tell that 
it is a voice that I hear, but I do not grasp or understand what it is saying.  
 If others witness some of the same events that are experienced by Paul, then what is given 
to Paul is presentation. It is impossible, after all, for me to think about a memory with someone 
else in the same way that I can “make a memory” by doing something with another subject. 
Merely talking about a memory is not the same as intersubjectively sharing in the sensuous 
thinking act. My presentifications are limited in their givenness; they are confined to the limits of 
my own consciousness. So it cannot be the case that Paul’s sight and hearing are presentifications 
 
28 Acts 9:7 NABRE 
29 Acts 22:9 NABRE 
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to the extent that others experience the same (or at least similar, if less intense) phenomena as he 
does.  
 Can we be sure that this event is not the result of folie à deux? This is a well-documented 
but thoroughly perplexing phenomenon that notably was removed from the most recent, fifth 
edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders. Essentially the 
phenomenon is of shared psychosis. Could Paul’s fellow travelers have shared in his psychosis? 
This is of course possible but even if it is indeed the case, we can revert back to the insight that 
in some clinical cases there is a synthesis of inner and outer sense. In such cases phenomenology 
and its focus on first person lived experience compel us to classify the “irreal” phenomena as 
presentations. It may resemble a presentification to some third party, but that violates the limits 
of phenomenological perspective.  
 It is apparent that it is only Paul who has a totally synthesized experience on the road to 
Damascus, evinced by the fact that his sight and hearing are complementary phenomena. Even if 
others see the light, it does not blind them; even if others hear the voice, they do not understand 
it. Only Paul seems to experience the event in its fullness, in its completion. It goes without 
saying that the event is for Paul, not for his cohorts. Since the event is for Paul, only he can fully 
interact with it, epitomized in the judgments he makes about what he senses.  
 As we have seen, this is where the real phenomenological significance of Paul’s case is 
revealed—that he is a passive convert who experiences what appears to be a divine revelation 
(via outer sense, his vision and hearing) but in fact cannot be certified to be any more than a 
cluster of associated phenomena confined to his own consciousness and grouped together via a 
judgment on his part. By phenomenological definition a conversion, insofar as it is an 
experience, cannot directly result from an external cause without some judgment on the part of 
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the subject. All of the intense and turbulent phenomena that are associated with his conversion 
reinforce the notion that the conversion is ultimately self-contained in Paul’s own “mind.” The 
voice that he hears may have some external referent, and the blinding light that strips him of his 
vision might be produced by Jesus, but it is also quite possible that the voice and blinding light 
are entirely the fabrication of his own consciousness. While other scriptural accounts indicate 
that Paul’s peers also hear the sound of the voice, in the end it is of little consequence whether 
the phenomenon is shared or individual since our purpose is not to corroborate the existence of 
some external cause for the the appearance(s). That said, it is the true value of the epileptic 
interpretation of Paul that it can offer an explanation of the material events correlated with the 
conscious phenomena, thereby definitively subtracting from the case the obligation to rationalize 
the metaphysical, theological assumptions inherent therein. The material explanation offered by 
psychiatric medicine is, in other words, a welcome supplement to the phenomenological 
analysis, but it is not in and of itself sufficient for explaining anything of import regarding Paul’s 
conversion. It should be noted that in the last analysis it is still very possible that Paul really does 
see and hear Jesus at the same time that major abnormal processes occur in his brain. Thus even 
definitive “proof” that Paul was epileptic would only go so far. Since the speculative 
metaphysical issues may never be resolved it is best to look to phenomenology and focus on 
what is actually given to consciousness, with the question of “real” or not bracketed off to the 
side. 
 While my focus has been on the visual and auditory correlates of Paul’s conversion, I 
should note that it is not just a sound or sight (or lack thereof) that is sensuously given to Paul’s 
consciousness. His visual and auditory experiences are accompanied by intense emotional 
phenomena. I do not need to elaborate at length upon this dimension of Paul’s conversion 
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because traditionally Paul’s emotional reaction to the phenomenon has taken on central 
importance in the scholarship.    
 I will point out, however, that focusing exclusively on Paul’s emotional reaction can be 
dangerous, in part for reasons deriving from bias. When commentators have focused on Paul’s 
emotional response to his conversion, they have tended to downplay his rationality. To be 
emotional is to be out of control, so the story goes. The result of this misguided interpretation is 
that Paul’s conversion is understood to be passive rather than active. But again the real upshot of 
my findings is the insight that Paul’s alleged passivity is really not so passive at all. It is often 
common practice to refer to Paul as if he is a recipient or vessel or even object onto which a 
conversion is essentially forced, and to portray his story in such a way does make some sense to 
certain ends, as in to characterize the potency of God’s power, as we saw in the writing of 
Thomas Aquinas. But in truth, the “passive” reading of Paul in fact belittles the real magnitude of 
the story.  
 Despite the fact that Paul’s conversion is typically modeled as if passive, in fact his 
conversion is not the result of passive synthesis. While Paul experiences on a firsthand basis 
events that he interprets to be transcendent and supernatural, the transcendence of the events is 
entirely the result of an active synthesis performed on the part of his ego. It is the judgment that 
Paul makes regarding the phenomenon that solidifies his experience as one of conversion.  
 
The Conversion of St. Paul: The Body-Convert 
 
I have argued that in prioritizing Paul’s judgmental involvement in his own conversion we do not 
want to completely pass over the phenomenological significance of the fact that Paul’s 
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conversion experience is something that is (in part) sensuously mediated for him, something that 
he lives through, something that “feels” a certain way for him. In the last section we looked at 
how the experiences “feel” a certain way to Paul via his vision and his hearing. But these 
sensuous dimensions to his conversion are of course channeled via Paul’s body. While his 
conversion cannot be reduced to physical events or causes, any sufficient analysis of his 
experience should take note of how sensuous experience and physical “feedback” correlate with 
the rich complexities of Paul’s “inner” experience, his conscious life.  
 The physical side of Paul’s existence figures centrally in his written reinterpretation, or 
revaluation, of his own past. This past is recounted in Paul’s autobiography, as expressed in the 
Letter to the Philippians:  
For we are the circumcision, we who worship through the Spirit of God, who boast in Christ Jesus 
and do not put our confidence in flesh, although I myself have grounds for confidence even in the 
flesh. If anyone else thinks he can be confident in flesh, all the more can I. Circumcised on the 
eighth day, of the race of Israel, of the tribe of Benjamin, a Hebrew of Hebrew parentage, in 
observance of the law a Pharisee, in zeal I persecuted the church, in righteousness based on the law 
I was blameless. But whatever gains I had, these I have come to consider a loss because of Christ. 
More than that, I even consider everything as a loss because of the supreme good of knowing Christ 
Jesus my Lord. For his sake I have accepted the loss of all things and I consider them so much 
rubbish, that I may gain Christ and be found in him, not having any righteousness of my own based 
on the law but that which comes through faith in Christ, the righteousness from God, depending on 
faith to know him and the power of his resurrection and sharing of his sufferings by being 
conformed to his death, if somehow I may attain the resurrection from the dead.30 
 
In this excerpt we can see Paul describe his transition from identifying first and foremost in 
terms of his physical nature, his “flesh,” to a self-perception the noema of which is primarily 
supra-physical, founded on the “Spirit of God.” To a degree this appears, at least at first glance, 
to entail the ascetic denial of embodiment and physicality. It is well-known that there are 
scriptural passages in which Paul makes critical or negative remarks concerning the body.31 But 
 
30 Phil. 3:3-11 NABRE 
31 1 Cor. 12:23 NABRE 
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in this particular case an interpretation such as this would actually stretch and distort the real 
meaning of Paul’s remarks. Here, where Paul denies the “confidence in the flesh,” he is first and 
foremost addressing the contentious status of mandatory Gentile circumcisions in the early 
Christian church. In the early church it was first necessary to become a Jew before coming a 
Christian, meaning that cultural practices like circumcision were required for entrance into the 
Christian faith. This is the context of Paul’s remarks. He is not denying that he is “flesh” but 
instead stipulating that incidental physical differences are insignificant before Christ, whose 
believers combine to form a unity comprised out of difference. As we will see, Paul uses the 
body to explain this relation. 
 The body’s centrality in human experience is perhaps what motivates Paul to return to it 
over and over in his writing. While it cannot be denied that Paul occasionally shuns the natural 
body, in such instances he does not use the same term as he uses to refer to the spiritual body. 
This latter sense of the body definitely takes on significant theological and ecclesiological 
importance in Paul’s writing, typically construed in terms of its mereological significance.   
 Paul refers to the body as sōma frequently in his writing, often using it as part of a larger 
phrase or expression.32 Michelle Voss Roberts notes that the locution “body of Christ” in 
particular has at least three discernible, albeit related, meanings.33 These meanings do not pertain 
to the body as the object of occasional debasement but instead the spiritual body, which Paul 
renders in such a way that it effectively amounts to what I will refer to as a phenomenological 
heuristic. Paul suggests that the spiritual body, in other words, offers subjects a 
phenomenological example in which they are encouraged to participate by focusing intentionally 
 
32 Evola, “St. Paul’s Error.” 
33 Roberts, Body Parts: Theological Anthropology, 101. 
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on what they are already “living out.” In one of the most well-known passages of the entire New 
Testament Paul writes: 
As a body is one though it has many parts, and all the parts of the body, though many, are one body, 
so also Christ. For in one Spirit we were all baptized into one body, whether Jews or Greeks, slaves 
or free persons, and we were all given to drink of one Spirit. Now the body is not a single part, but 
many. If a foot should say, “Because I am not a hand I do not belong to the body,” it does not for 
this reason belong any less to the body. Or if an ear should say, “Because I am not an eye I do not 
belong to the body,” it does not for this reason belong any less to the body. If the whole body were 
an eye, where would the hearing be? If the whole body were hearing, where would the sense of 
smell be? But as it is, God placed the parts, each one of them, in the body as he intended. If they 
were all one part, where would the body be? But as it is, there are many parts, yet one body. The 
eye cannot say to the hand, “I do not need you,” nor again the head to the feet, “I do not need you.” 
Indeed, the parts of the body that seem to be weaker are all the more necessary, and those parts of 
the body that we consider less honorable we surround with greater honor, and our less presentable 
parts are treated with greater propriety, whereas our more presentable parts do not need this. But 
God has so constructed the body as to give greater honor to a part that is without it, so that there 
may be no division in the body, but that the parts may have the same concern for one another. If 
[one] part suffers, all the parts suffer with it; if one part is honored, all the parts share its joy.34 
 
This analogical passage is phenomenologically fascinating. Here Paul appeals to the unified and 
holistic—but also differentiable—phenomenon of embodiment as a means of explaining the 
universal Being commented upon at length by Badiou. Paul describes the way in which the body 
is a collection of distinct parts. It is experienced in different modes, like the way in which the 
ears respond to sound compared to how the eyes facilitate sight, but all of the individual modes 
or ways of appearing are ontologically synthesized into the larger, more general structure. It is an 
example that can be taken up as one’s own, insofar as one has a body, and through the adoption 
of the identification one is afforded a deeper understanding of an abstract metaphysical concept: 
that the infinitely singular comprises the universal. 
 It is wondrous that Paul has ever been considered to be champion of the immaterial soul 
at the cost of the ascetic denial of the body (see, for example, Nietzsche’s The Antichrist) when, 
in passages such as the one above, he specifically characterizes the body as undivided and uses 
 
34 1 Cor. 12: 12-26 NABRE 
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the lack of division to express a theological message. In fact the entire significance of his 
analogy between the body and the Christian Being hinges upon the fact that each is undivided 
and whole. As Vito Evola suggests, Paul’s notion of body as sōma is derived from the Hebrew 
nefeš, which is a “holistic” term that stands for neither soul nor body but both.35 Evola points out 
that when Paul discusses the body in a literal and negative sense, as a physical thing, he uses the 
Koine term sarx, which is close to “flesh” which we see Paul undermine in the excerpt above, 
and the connotation of negativity is novel on Paul’s part. It refers to the part that is “not wanting 
to accept Christ.” This is not at all the body that Paul describes when he depicts the image of the 
Body of Christ, etc. At least when it comes to his notion of identity, the body as sōma is not 
marginalized but in fact brought to the front and center. The body is a central Pauline concept, 
not only for its heuristic use in conceiving of and imagining universal Christian identity, but also 
for the role that it plays in the constitution of personal identity, including, importantly, the past.  
 For Paul, while the flesh passes away it is the convert as Body of Christ who endures. 
The ephemeral significance of mere “flesh” pales in comparison to the significance of the eternal 
soul. This is itself exemplified through Paul’s stance that the particulars of circumcision, or the 
lack thereof, are ultimately of theological insignificance. The body, in effect, is just a temporary 
thing that is paired with consciousness, which is far more definitive, essential, and persistent, 
specifically because it is in virtue not of the flesh-body (sarx) but of consciousness (here qua 
soul or “spirit body”) that the individual is made into, as Badiou puts it, a universal subject.  
 In the case of Paul and other Christian converts, this reordering of the subject into a 
universal form brings about a corresponding “conversion of the body.” Materially this 
conversion entails no “real” or “substantial” change to the organismal dimension of the body; 
 
35 Evola, “St. Paul’s Error.” 
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there is no metaphysical or material transmutation of the subject that occurs with conversion. 
Instead the change in the body is perceptual and phenomenological—the body changes in the 
way that it appears for its subject. Despite the fact that there is no necessary material change to 
the body, we should be wary of reducing the embodied conversion to a simply psychological 
shift. It is not just a matter of gestalt. To the contrary the phenomenological reorientation of 
embodiment is a substantial transformation. If it entails like gestalt the reinterpretation of 
configuration or pattern, it differs in the essential significance of the reinterpretation. While the 
body is “only” reinterpreted via conversion, this reinterpretation plays a role in the constitution 
of the body itself. This is precisely the sort of redefinition that we observe in the case of 
Christian converts who almost paradoxically encounter new embodied selves through their 
transformation; the body becomes a sacred object that requires specific practices (from 
circumcision in the early Church to simple chrismatic anointing to something as routine as the 
performance of the Sign of the Cross.) This sacred body does not and cannot reconstitute itself 
without the volition of the subject. The subject’s volition is manifest in a judgment (or, more 
likely, a set of judgments). Thus the conversion of the body is just as much the result of a 
judgment as is the general “intellectual” or ‘spiritual” conversion.  
 
Conclusions Concerning Active and Passive Conversions 
 
Earlier I included in my synthetic model of conversion a distinction between the “active” and 
“passive” varieties of conversion.36 After phenomenological analysis it is apparent that this 
 
36 It should be noted that here I am not using these terms in Husserl’s sense, to refer to active and 
passive synthesis. 
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distinction is not manifest in experience itself. In other words, there is no phenomenological 
evidence that the convert can be a “passive respondent to outside forces,” as Rambo puts it.37 In 
short the difference between the two supposed types is not phenomenologically meaningful, at 
least in the immediate present. In the natural attitude it is understood that the active and passive 
types of conversion differentiate the “source” of the conversion, either from within or from 
without. Phenomenologically speaking it cannot be denied that each type of experience has its 
own objective correlate corresponding to its acts of consciousness. In other words, there is a 
noematic difference between the two types; my experience is such that I can identify the 
conversion that I seek out compared to the one which supposedly “happens” to me. But in the 
two sorts of conversion there is in fact not a difference in intentionality. In the case of the active 
conversion the experience is understood to be pursued, whereas the passive conversion involves 
no such deliberateness. It cannot be denied that it is possible to phenomenologically distinguish 
the conversion that commences with an intentional act from that which appears to be more 
extemporaneous, but in the present, given, “now” moment of consciousness, there is nothing 
inherent to the phenomenon that marks it as the product of activity or passivity on my part.  
 All of this gestures toward the question of whether a truly “involuntary” conversion is 
possible (as described in Baird and Meintel). Ultimately the answer to this question depends on 
what one means by “involuntary.” In Paul’s case it is undeniable that he chooses to convert—he 
is not forced—despite the fact that he makes this decision after encountering a subjectivity-
disrupting event that institutes a personal crisis. In Paul’s case this comes in the form of a 
“why?” question, which he is incapable of answering, which catalyzes the complete upheaval of 
his identity. So did Paul actively seek out his own conversion? No, certainly not. His life was 
 
37 Rambo, “Anthropology and the Study of Conversion,” 213. 
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entirely oriented toward the persecution of those he would eventually join after his conversion to 
Christianity. But did Paul consent to his conversion? Yes. The conversion was not his own idea 
or suggestion, but when he is, as Baird puts it, invited to re-identify, he accepts the opportunity. 
To the extent that Paul accepts the invitation, his conversion is not entirely a passive occurrence. 
The best way to distinguish this type of conversion is in Badiou’s terms: Paul is a passive subject 
whose life is upset by a subject-shattering event. But in another way, it is also an active 
conversion for Paul. Paul is the recipient of revelation, but the theological significance of his 
story is undermined if Paul does not make a specific choice when faced with revelation. It is 
important that we realize that the specific decision that Paul makes, that he accepts the call to 
which he is subject, constitutes an entirely non-passive dimension of his conversion. In short, 
this decision is a judgment on Paul’s part, which is important when it comes to analyzing the 
supposed passivity of the conversion of Paul as well as others. A judgment is not, after all, a 
passive occurrence. 
 It is apparent that the idea that Paul does not ultimately actively execute his conversion is 
thoroughly problematic on a phenomenological level. Even Badiou points this out: it is partly 
Paul’s response to the event that facilitates his subjective transformation. Paul needs the 
revelation to be given to him in order to convert, but he does not convert at all without assenting 
to it. If a conversion does not require some sort of judgment on the part of the subject and can be 
enacted from without (or outside of the subject), then the sort of changes that result from 
abominable pseudo-scientific methods of the past, like electroshock therapy or lobotomization, 
would count as “conversions.” It would also be difficult to phenomenologically distinguish the 
case of the “forced” conversion, like the kind enforced by the Spanish against the indigenous 
peoples of Florida, in which case the supposed judgment was not freely enacted, and therefore 
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was not really a judgment at all. This does not seem right. My phenomenological model for 
conversion is intended to account for the “passive” conversion that is adventitious, extraneous, 
and most of all thoroughly unexpected, but it cannot accommodate the idea of a conversion that 
is devoid of judgment. Thus the idea of an entirely passive conversion is incoherent—a 
conversion is always active on the level of judgment. Paul did not plan to convert but ultimately 
the conversion does not occur at all without some fundamental and basic assertion on the part of 
his subjectivity. So the phenomenological subject must be actively involved in a conversion, at 
least on some level, not only in the case of conversions that are deliberately pursued, but also 
those are fortuitous for the subject.  
 It has to be noted, however, that this is not equivalent with nor does it entail that 
unconscious conversion is (or is not) a possible experience. One should wonder whether it is 
possible to convert as Paul does, on the basis of a passive impetus, even making a judgment 
regarding the event, but without being conscious of the resultant or constituent “conversion.” In 
the last chapter I posed this very question. Certainly, this is not the type of conversion that Paul 
experiences, as I have shown. Yet it is at least conceivable that an event could initiate a 
conversion without the subject’s knowledge thereof. So the question is whether or not it is 
possible to convert as the result of an experience without having recognized that the conversion 
has occurred. This is tantamount to the case in which someone is substantially affected by a life 
event that is not until much later—or perhaps never at all——realized. There are many childhood 
events that could have this sort of effect on one’s existential identity. It comes down to whether 
or not it is possible for an event to profoundly change someone without their recognition. The 
controversial but well-known psychoanalytic assumption is that this is not only possible but 
common.  
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 This is indeed a possible experience so long as it begins with a judgment, albeit not 
necessarily one the gravity and/or significance of which is realized by the subject. According to 
Husserl the process of sedimentation requires a judgment to inaugurate the process. According to 
Husserl’s model of sedimentation, what is at first “on the surface level” of one’s conscious 
awareness recedes into the depths of one’s mind, the ego’s “underground.”38 He writes that the 
meaning manifest in a given act of judgment: 
… then sinks ever further into the background and at the same time becomes ever more indistinct; 
the degree of its prominence gradually lessens until it finally disappears from the field of immediate 
consciousness, is “forgotten.” It is henceforth incorporated into the passive background, into the 
“unconscious,” which is not a dead nothingness but a limiting mode of consciousness and 
accordingly can affect us anew like another passivity in the form of whims, free-floating ideas, and 
so on.39 
 
Something that does not result from a judgment cannot be sedimented “into” or “onto” the ego. 
This judgment requires an act of the will, and the act of the will requires conscious awareness. 
But the judgment is in this case does not regard whether or not a conversion has occurred, in 
which case the conversion would be conscious. To the contrary this conversion is one comprised 
of many more or less unimportant and insignificant judgments which when considered on their 
own are of relatively little consequence but which, in their (passive) synthesis, combine to make 
something profound. It is also manifest that the object of the judgment differs markedly in these 
two cases; in the case of the conscious conversion the relevant judgment regards my self and my 
existence, whereas for the unconscious conversion the judgment does not regard my self and 
existence, although ultimately it will prove to have some effect on those areas.  
 This is the key to solving the enigmatic case of the seemingly paradoxical “unconscious 
conversion.” Indeed this is how Scobie’s theory of unconscious conversion, an apparent 
 
38 Hua IX 480.  
39 Husserl, EJ §67, 279.  
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oxymoron, can be resolved—while the overall transformation is not (at first) recognized by the 
converting subject, individual judgments are the constituent parts that comprise and therefore 
make possible the conversion. Thus the conversion itself is not an intentional object, at least so 
long as one assumes by “conversion” to refer to the more general change, but the individual 
conscious moments that are sedimented into the layers of the ego are conscious. The 
unconscious conversion is not, in other words, entirely unconscious. No such conversion can 
exist. 
 Using Scobie’s definition, the unconscious convert is the person who cannot remember 
being non-religious in the past, at least not subsequent to the adoption of some sense of personal 
identity, even if rudimentary and developing. Here it is presupposed that the person’s present 
religion is the only religion that he or she has ever had, and the point is that this person’s sense of 
identity has always been tied to religious belief and/or practice. This identity likely dates back to 
adolescence, or perhaps even earlier. If I adopt the phenomenological attitude and via free 
variation examine this point of view from the first-person perspective, a couple of significant 
insights emerge.  
 First, I note that my belief that I have always been a member of my religion, that I lack 
any memory of a “conversion” event via which I became or took on my new religious identity, 
does not entail that I have no recollection of my religious practices, which themselves 
necessarily involve judgments. To the contrary I have many memories of significant religious 
events, but none of them appear to me as my singular “conversion event.” Instead I recall these 
past events as if they are indeed important events, but not necessarily transformative in and of 
themselves. I reflect upon these events as if they are akin to different chapters of my own 
biography, each of which is important and plays a role in making me who I am, but none of 
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which stand out on their own as the precise moment of my “conversion.” These events involve 
judgments of various sorts, from matters of metaphysical truth (e.g. Christ rose from the dead) to 
those pertaining to personal identity (e.g I am a Christian).  
 This is how someone is able to participate habitually in religious practices without 
necessarily feeling that there is some determinate moment before and after which one was 
religious in the relevant way. The relevance of this type of conversion is not limited to the 
religious and spiritual contexts; one must wonder whether the vast majority of psychological 
conversions, the primary category, are enacted on a basis similar to the one I have here 
described.  
 This brings me to the second insight. I observe that the unconscious conversion can only 
be called unconscious by virtue of the fact that it presupposes a very specific and narrow 
conception of the phenomenon of conversion. The standard unconscious model (i.e. Scobie) 
takes for granted the sort of conversion that is mediated by a singular event. It is assumed that 
conversion is sudden and that it is known. There are many types of conversions, as I have shown, 
that are not sudden but are not necessarily unconscious, and the necessary decision to convert 
cannot be conflated with the necessary consciousness of the occurrence of a “conversion.” Actual 
lived experience shows us how it is possible that many conversions could occur without the 
subject thinking of himself as a “convert.”  
 Maybe the vast majority of conversions are unconscious, but not necessarily in the way 
Scobie means, since the habitual practices are the object of consciousness at least some of the 
time (or were in the past.) The same could be true for the so-called passive conversion. 
Ultimately all conversions could be called passive if by passive we refer to the fact that a series 
of contingent events precedes a conversion. Cases like that of St. Paul are easily identified as 
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“passive” since the chance event that precipitates conversion is sudden and more or less 
determinate. The contingency of these events derives from what we take to be “free” choices.40 
 But in the last analysis, to the extent that “free” choices drive the progression of 
contingent events in our lives, the opposite is true; it is not that all conversions should be called 
passive, but to the contrary, that all conversions should be called active, if by “active” we refer to 
the fact that the judgments and practices (which themselves can be reduced to judgments) that 
eventually combine and can together comprise what we call “conversion” necessarily require 















40 If the progression of events is not contingent but to the contrary follows a necessary course, 
then we are not free. This line of thinking is exemplified in the early Christian heresy of 
apokatastasis.  
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Ch. 7. Conclusion: An Eidetic Reduction of Conversion 
 
The Fundamentality of Conversion 
 
In this chapter I will review the eidetic features of the conversion experience, and I will attempt 
to show that conversion is a fundamental structure of consciousness, a universal phenomenon 
that we are predisposed to encounter by virtue of the way our experience is structured. This calls 
into question the claims of some empirical researchers, for example, Snow, who claims that “the 
convert is a social type.” Snow’s idea is that there are certain sociological properties that 
characterize this type, and they ultimately serve to distinguish this type from other types. In a 
sociological context, Snow is probably right. But I would like to suggest that there is nothing 
phenomenologically distinct or unique about the subject who converts, meaning that there is 
nothing that a priori distinguishes this person from any other, even if the occurrence of a 
conversion ultimately constitutes such a differentiation a posteriori (and therefore reinforces 
Snow’s empirical theory within its own appropriate, non-phenomenological context—a context 
which is ultimately less scientific than the phenomenological approach at the level of constitutive 
consciousness).1  
 I would like to stress that according to my own phenomenological theory the 
transformation that occurs for this subject should not be understood to be necessarily radical, 
intense, or even complete, since, as we have seen, the transformation can be of such a nature that 
 
1 Husserl states, “[W]hat is cognizable by one Ego must, of essential necessity, by cognizable by 
any Ego.” Husserl, Ideas I §48, 108 <90>. 
243 
the converting subject is not even aware of it, thanks in large part to the sedimentation of 
knowledge constituent to the conversion itself. 
 My hypothesis that conversion is a fundamental aspect of human experience should not 
be interpreted as an attempt at a direct “denial” or refutation of Snow’s theory, nor any of the 
other well-known accounts of conversion (e.g. acculturation, syncretism, etc.)2 It is not that these 
other theories are necessarily “wrong” given their own disciplinary parameters, but instead, their 
issue is that they do not scientifically assess conversion for what it is: a first-person “lived” 
experience.3 This is not to say that my own phenomenological approach to the issue is not in part 
inspired by a general sense of conversion that has been inspired by the work of these others. 
Indeed this was the entire purpose of the first chapter. It will be seen, for example, that my 
phenomenological account of conversion is utterly incomplete without incorporating the shared 
horizon of the lifeworld. 
 Instead of a denial or refutation of these other theories, my purpose here is to show that 
conversion can ultimately be reduced to a priori phenomenological properties that define the 
experience in a more essential way than other empirical theories.4 For example, Snow does not 
explain the social nature of conversion in phenomenological terms. Thus, in offering this thesis I 
am contesting the common interpretation that conversion can be exhaustively and scientifically 
reduced using the methods of psychology.5 To the contrary I will first analyze the noema of 
conversion, which is some “religious or spiritual object” but not (necessarily) the conversion 
itself. In the second section, I show that while conversion always requires a noesis of judgment, 
 
2 Baer, “History and Religious Conversion,” 25–47. 
3 “Scientifically” in Husserl’s sense.  
4 All of which are limited to results drawn a posteriori. 
5 See Ch. 1. 
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this judgment can regard a religious object as noema, or it can take up as its noema a noesis 
regarding that religious object. Here I also demonstrate that via the sedimentation of knowledge, 
sometimes the conversion phenomenon is not a singular, determinate act but instead the end 
result of a sequence of discrete judgments, the eventual (final) synthesis of which constitutes a 
conversion experience. In the third section I describe what I call the “secondary noeses” of 
conversion, which are noeses that regard similar noemas as the converting act par excellence, the 
judgment, but are themselves supplemental to the conversion itself. But despite this fact I also 
show how sometimes these secondary acts are themselves necessary in order to bring about or 
fulfill the sense of the judging noesis that institutes the conversion. In the fourth section I show 
how the constitution of the conversion phenomenon is intermingled with the constitution of the 
shared horizons of the world at various levels.6 In this section I also explain how conversion 
relates to different aspects of the world, including the “spiritual world,” the “homeworld,” and 
the “lifeworld.” In the fifth section I address the extent to which the Other is a necessary feature 
of the conversion experience. In the sixth section I show how the eidetic structure of the 
conversion phenomenon involves physical, embodied phenomenological correlates. In the 
seventh and final section I demonstrate that the conversion phenomenon always occurs on a 
temporally indeterminate basis. This temporal indeterminacy is a consequence of the dynamic, 
flowing nature of my streaming consciousness and the way in which it is subject to sedimented 
meanings.  
 
6 I will demonstrate that the convert is not a social type at all but is, to the contrary, a possibility 
even for the radically isolated consciousness. It might even be the case that solitary consciousness 
accompanies conversion more often than socialized consciousness. That said, conversion is almost 
always experienced in the social dimension. 
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 As my final conclusion I argue that after examining these various aspects of conversion it 
is apparent that the phenomenon is not just something that we spontaneously experience from 
time to time but in fact is actually something grounded in phenomenological subjectivity itself 
insofar as the existential modifications entailed by conversion are part and parcel of the 
interpretive, self-constitutive nature of consciousness. The conversion phenomenon, I argue, is 
embedded in the very conditions of consciousness on a basic and fundamental level. 
 
An Eidetic Reduction of the Conversion Phenomenon 
 
Having already shown that the fundamental essence of my experience is unified temporal 
consciousness, I can now examine the phenomenological structure according to which unified 
consciousness actually experiences conversion. Essentially what we should expect to see is the 
analytic elimination of the various different “categories” of conversion according to the human 
sciences, replaced with a far more general—but far more fundamental—account of conversion 
on the phenomenological level. 
 Without unified consciousness and the inner consciousness of time, we would not 
experience subjectivity as we presently enjoy it, as complex but unified beings whose existence 
straddles a temporal continuum the objectification of which makes possible not only sustained 
beliefs in various propositions but also conscious phenomena like recollection. Without time 
consciousness there could be no experience of conversion—there could be no experience of any 
kind at all. Since consciousness itself constitutes time for me, all of the experiences that 
consciousness has are situated within its temporal frame. This sedimentation within time is not 
static; it necessarily entails not only the present moment but also the “Before” and the “past 
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Now.”7 Husserl identifies this as the relation a priori (an “eidetic law”) between intentionality 
and “temporal succession.” In addition to this fundamental temporal constitution, genesis and 
synthesis structure the experience of consciousness and intentionality and therefore structure the 
experience of conversion, including the unconscious and passive varieties.  
 Ultimately what this means, assuming that we can account phenomenologically for pre-
reflective consciousness, or at least, that we should consider pre-reflective experience to be 
consciousness. This conclusion is relevant to the present phenomenology of conversion to the 
extent that I have argued that conversions can occur, empirically, without the awareness of the 
subject. In taking this position I have endorsed the supposedly controversial Scobie definition of 
conversion, but only because I have found that the “unconscious” conversion is in fact 
phenomenologically grounded. But ultimately pre-reflective experience is not sufficient on its 
own to bring about a conversion. While pre-reflective experience can help explain how a 
significant existential event like a conversion can occur outside the limits of the subject’s direct, 
reflective awareness (in short, because I am not always reflecting), this cannot actually give us 
enough to explain what brings about conversion. 
 In order to answer this question, we will need to conduct a full phenomenological 
analysis of the experience of conversion, starting with the application of the époche and 
culminating in the eidetic reduction whereby the empirical experience of conversion is reordered 





7 Husserl, Ideas I §82, 96 <165>. 
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I. The Noema of Conversion 
 
When we consider conversion in the imaginative sphere, we find that conversion is bound by 
several essential requirements. These essential requirements are the eidetic features of 
conversion. The first requirement pertains to the noema of the conversion phenomenon; thus, it 
regards the intentional object of the act of consciousness. Insofar as we have seen that the subject 
is not necessarily aware of his own conversion, it cannot be the case that the intentional object of 
the conversion experience is necessarily the conversion itself. Nor is it the case that the noema or 
intentional object of conversion is existential transformation, for the same reason that it cannot 
be the conversion; I have demonstrated that unconscious conversion is an authentic phenomenon, 
which means that the noematic object of the conversion cannot necessarily be the counterpart to 
the noesis that fulfills the sense of the conversion proper. I will pursue this matter in the next 
section. For now let us note that the noema of the conversion phenomenon is a religious, 
spiritual, or philosophical object. Here ‘object’ refers to the intentional object of the converting 
act, and not an object in external, empirical sense. Furthermore, in a strict sense, this religious, 
spiritual, or philosophical object is a judgment, which we will explore on the noetic side (as the 
act of judging) in the following section. 
 We can discern that the noema of conversion must be a judgment with this approximate 
significance or meaning-context (namely, religious, spiritual, or philosophical) because the 
possible object of the conversion has to be an object with existential significance for the subject, 
meaning, an object that has some possibility to bring about the modification of the identity or 
role of the empirical self (or empirical ego).  
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 An example of such an object in the religious sense is the figure of Christ, which, when 
paired with the appropriate noesis, such as one of accepting belief, establishes that the subject is 
someone who is subject to (and accepts) Christ’s saving. Here Christ serves as a noematic 
correlate that, with its corresponding (variable) noesis, bears existential significance to the extent 
that it is what helps bring about the change in the converting subject on the side of the noesis. 
There are countless examples of possible religious intentional objects (noemas) of conversion, 
including: reincarnation, eternal life, sin, forgiveness, mercy, punishment, and so on. Obviously, 
the religious object should not be limited to any one religion or system of religions. That said, as 
we have seen, conversion is a phenomenon that is typically associated with a small handful of 
religions. This does not mean, however, that conversion is phenomenologically impossible 
outside of the limits of these religions. 
 Consider the case of the spiritual or philosophical conversion. Each of these transcends 
the limits of religious practice. Perhaps it is even possible that there is such a thing as a practical 
conversion, like the existential change that one experiences when becoming a father or a mother 
for the first time.8 Surely a significant life event such as this sometimes entails a shift in one’s 
self-understanding such that one’s very identity or role is no longer the same as before. Should 
we just consider this a spiritual conversion, or even a philosophical conversion? It would depend 
on how we define spirituality, and whether the transformation into a father or a mother entails 
having beliefs that we could classify as “philosophical” in nature. I would suggest that to the 
extent that any conversion entails an existential transformation, every conversion can be 
considered to be philosophical on at least some level. 
 
8 I also wonder whether significant career changes might count as conversions. For example 
when one becomes a soldier, or a lawyer, or a professor, is this a conversion?  
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 But if we consider just the spiritual and philosophical conversions, and set aside the 
theoretically “practical” conversion, we find that the two are similar but there are a couple 
important distinctions among them. I take it that this is true even if, as I suggested, every 
religious and spiritual conversion is also technically a philosophical conversion. For example, the 
spiritual conversion and the philosophical conversion differ drastically in their teleology; the 
former is concerned with explaining a specific (metaphysical) aspect of the human being, 
whereas the latter is far broader. I cannot suggest that either of these does not bring about a 
necessary change in the self or consciousness, but the nature of this change is not at all identical 
in the two cases.  Furthermore the spiritual conversion does not have the same standards of 
approach as does the philosophical conversion, to the extent that the former (which will still 
require a judgment noesis, as I will show in the next section) is likely to include practices like 
meditation, prayer, physical exercise, and rituals, the latter takes up a different approach typified 
by the tools of logic and argumentation. But perhaps this is not true of all cases, as it is possible 
that one is drawn to any particular philosophy, whatever it may be, as a result of a feeling instead 
of a rational position. As I will elaborate in the next section, even the feeling will necessarily 
involve some judgment. 
 It is imperative that we note that the noematic correlate of conversion is not necessarily 
some object that I regard as if “external.” In fact for any of these three types of intentional 
objects of conversion, the noema of conversion is potentially the phenomenological subject 
herself. A case such as this is emblematic of a “conscious” conversion.9 In other words it will 
never be the case that the so-called “unconscious” convert (as envisioned by Scobie) experiences 
 
9 Recall that the unconscious conversion is the one that occurs without the subject being aware of 
it, whereas the passive conversion (which can be conscious or unconscious) is the one that is not 
actively sought out. Saint Paul is an example of a conscious but passive conversion.  
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a conversion the noema of which is herself. It is important to note that even when the noema of 
conversion is the subject herself, this subject is ultimately phenomenologically reducible to an 
object of religious or spiritual significance. In fact most religious conversions, at least those 
which are actively pursued, will include some act the noema of which is the very subject herself. 
 As I have already suggested, we will see that the noema as religious object is a possible 
intentional object of any number of different noeses that can contribute to a conversion 
experience. In all of these cases it will ultimately be necessary that an act of judgment regards 
either an “originary” noema (which could in this case resemble the “saturated phenomenon” of 
Marion or the “grace” of Christianity), or it regards a different, non-judgmental noesis 
specifically as noema—in short, reflection. Put differently the distinction is between the case 
wherein there is a noesis that corresponds to some empirical object (where “empirical” could 
refer to an ecstatic vision of something no one else sees), and the alternative case where the 
noesis corresponds to a perceptual act specifically as such. For example, it is possible that the 
subject perceives via vision a sacred apparition. The perceiving of this apparition is a noesis, the 
noema or object of which is the apparition itself qua “object” perceived. For example, a Marian 
apparition appears to a subject; the subject sees the Virgin Mary, so she is the first noematic 
object of the act. To be clear this object need not be a traditional “religious” object; the sparkling 
dish in Böhme’s famous vision of 1600 would work just the same. But either of these cases could 
produce a conversion in one of two ways, and these two ways map onto the distinction I offer 
above. On the one hand the subject may judge the object itself in such a way that bears 
existential significance (without reflecting on the noesis), or the subject may judge the 
perceiving of the object. I should add that here the object can be ordinary, like comprehending a 
work of Scripture, or it can be extraordinary, like beholding an otherworldly apparition. But it 
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should be noted that it is the latter, reflective case that is arguably the more “self-aware” variety 
of conversion, specifically to the extent that the convert judges his own experiencing instead of 
something in the so-called “external” world of the natural attitude.  
 But it is important to note that a noema that concerns some religious or spiritual object is 
not necessarily a noema that is part of a conversion experience, because not every religious and 
spiritual object bears intrinsic existential significance, or even lends itself to such an application. 
For example, if the intentional object of a monotheistic subject’s (negative) noesis is some object 
pertaining to polytheism, (neither) this noema (nor the corresponding noesis) is not sufficient to 
make for an existential transformation, that is, a shift in identity or role. Perhaps the monotheistic 
subject was not aware that polytheistic religions exist, and when she finds out, she denies the 
truth of such religions. Clearly this does not constitute a conversion since there is no existential 
change for the subject. Indeed there are countless religious and spiritual noemata that are part of 
daily practice and ritual and have no bearing on the experience of conversion. That is not to say, 
however, that a religious or spiritual object that is encountered on a routine basis cannot ever 
make for the spontaneous and extraordinary manifestation of conversion.   
In short it follows from these considerations that a conversion experience has to involve 
some noematic correlate that bears existential significance for the converting subject, despite the 
fact that we cannot go so far as to maintain that existential transformation is itself a necessary 
noema of conversion. As I have specified, this noema can still be reduced to a judgment. It is this 
judgment that does the constitutive work behind the existential transformation. Put differently, 
the judgment brings about the transformation. That said, if this is true then the subject himself or 
herself is also a necessary noema at some phase of the conversion experience, which, as I have 
indicated, can be a process instead of an instantaneous event. But again I have to emphasize that 
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this transformed subjectivity is not necessarily something of which the converting subject is 
aware. Now, though, it is necessary to justify this position on a phenomenological basis. 
Consider first of all the contrasting case of the conscious conversion. As I will demonstrate in the 
next section, this conversion requires an act of judging. Here I have indicated that this judgment 
as noema has to regard a “religious or spiritual object.” But the final caveat to this point is that 
the religious or spiritual object can be the subject himself or herself. It is apparent that in the 
case of the conscious conversion, the subject will at some point of the conversion make the 
resolution or judgment to convert. This judgment corresponds to the subject’s very existence. But 
it is also true that the unconscious convert will at some point make a judgment the object of 
which is the self. Thus it is crucial to note that the distinction comes down to the fact that, in the 
case of the unconscious conversion, the converting subject does not realize that the judgment 
made, which pertains to the self, bears existential significance. This is the way in which someone 
can convert in a gradual and subtle manner, but also the way in which someone who grows up 
with a particular religious or spiritual worldview might convert without even realizing it. This 
individual is making the requisite judgments in order to convert, and is doing so as a matter of 
choice, but he or she does not grasp the upshot of the judgments. The fact that in these cases we 
are dealing with a plethora of judgments that occurs over a longer duration of time probably has 
something to do with the fact that the subject does not discern the consequence or upshot of the 
myriad judgments that she makes in route to her conversion. Presently let us turn to the noeses 





II. Judging: The Noesis of Conversion 
 
The next eidetic feature of conversion regards the nature and scope of its noesis, or rather, 
noeses. Every conversion will require a “converting act” as noesis, but the knowledge that this 
act constitutes is sometimes sedimented in the pure ego, sometimes along with what I am 
terming “secondary noeses of conversion,” with the result that the convert is not always aware 
that an existential transformation has taken place. It is also important to note that the noesis of 
conversion can be an empty or filled intention; it is not necessary that every conversion noesis 
will intuit something fulfilled.  
 As for the converting act, it will always require an act (or set of acts) of judging that 
either itself constitutes a conversion experience or constitutes a conversion experience via the 
fulfilling sense of a “secondary” noesis of conversion. Here I will characterize this primary 
noesis of conversion and explore several important phenomenological distinctions that regard it, 
and then I will describe several of the other possible noeses of the conversion act (“secondary 
noeses”) in order to characterize judgment more completely as the “converting act” itself. I will 
show that these secondary noeses are themselves possible objects of the act of judgment, 
decision, and will. I will not address the temporal limits of these noeses, although they certainly 
are significant, because I will take them up in one of the following sections concerning the 
temporal horizon of the conversion phenomenon.  
 Ultimately on the noetic side of conversion everything centers upon the judging act itself, 
which is the most necessary aspect of the conversion phenomenon, not to mention one of the 
most fundamental and ubiquitous noeses of all conscious experience. It could fairly be said that it 
would be impossible for us to imagine a conscious life remotely like ours without the inclusion 
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and influence of judgment. But it is impossible for a conversion, defined as an existential 
transformation, to occur without a judging act because such a transformation, which is 
tantamount to a change in my own unique essence, can only be brought about as a change in my 
understanding of self-meaning, via a deliberate, attentive determination on my own part. It 
follows that any change that occurs for me on such a basis that does not require a judgment is not 
an instance of a change in self-meaning, i.e., conversion. 
 But what exactly is a judgment, a category that prima facie seems rather broad? In the 
Fifth Logical Investigation Husserl describes judgment thus: “When we make a judgment, an act 
of complete predication, something seems to us either to be or not to be, e.g., that S is P.”10 In 
other words a judgment is a statement that it is the case that something is a certain way. In short, 
judging is positing. Remember that in the context of conversion that judgment need not regard 
the occurrence of the conversion itself, but instead must only pertain to the “situation” (as 
Husserl puts it) or circumstances that bring about the conversion. The judgment(s) made must 
then correspond to some set of affairs that bear existential significance for the subject, which is 
an entirely relative matter. What is existentially significant for one subject is not necessarily 
significant for another. That said, we can still carry out the phenomenological reduction of the 
phenomenon. Here I reduce existential significance to the potential for change brought about by 
a judgment that has some impact on a subject’s identity (self) or role (obligation with respect to 
action). 
 Of course the LI is a very early text and Husserl will later revise some of the views that 
he articulates therein. In Formal and Transcendental Logic Husserl conceives of judgment of the 
“scientific” sort, which is a judgment that aims to cognize the truth in contrast to the “identical” 
 
10 Husserl, LI 5: §33, 148. 
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judgment which is not marked by such an objective and only operates on the basis of “distinct 
evidence” that is not necessarily true.11 We will see that Husserl will retain this distinction his 
later phenomenology, although upon closer analysis the distinction occasionally breaks down on 
a phenomenological basis. 
Before we take up a critical interpretation of the distinctions relevant to judgment, let us 
note that in the late-period Experience and Judgment, Husserl calls judgment a specific “mode of 
ego-decision,” which he alternatively characterizes as “active position-taking.”12 Position taking 
involves the acceptance of some claim as true; to take a position on some issue is to hold a belief, 
or, as Dahlstrom puts it in his translation of Ideas I, to take a “stance. But more generally, 
position taking (Stellungnehmen) can also be reflective; it can be the ego’s orientation or stance 
with respect to the various activities of the ego, from feeling to believing to thinking to even 
judging itself.13  
Husserl’s explanation of the nature of judgment is arguably rather unclear in Formal and 
Transcendental Logic and Experience and Judgment, which presupposes some of the main ideas 
as the former, earlier text, albeit using different phrasing. I say this because one might imagine that 
what Husserl means to suggest is that judging is always position taking. In a strictly logical sense 
I suppose that this is true, but it is misleading because Husserl in fact differentiates certain or 
apodictic judgments (or stances) from those which are not made with certainty. We find that he 
uses the phrase “position taking” in a broader and a narrower sense, where the latter refers to cases 
where a judgment is made when in doubt, or when one has to deliberate before judging due to the 
 
11 Husserl, FTL §17, 62-63 <55>. 
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13 It follows that a judgment can be the object of position taking. This would be the judging of a 
judgment. For example: “It was foolish of me to think that I could trust that person.” 
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nature of the given evidence, or difficulties with interpreting it.14 We could fairly say that 
essentially there are different “grades” of position taking, where the gradation corresponds to the 
degree to which the position taking is certain or apodictic.  
It is apparent that I need to resolve whether conversion might involve the stricter sense of 
judging qua position taking, where one is truly judging something because it is not obvious 
whether he is making the correct judgment due to the fact that he is in doubt regarding the evidence 
that is given, or the broader sense of judging (position taking) that pertains to any judgment 
whatsoever, including that which is certain, or even potentially both.  
 One final, important distinction that Husserl offers regarding judgment concerns the 
epistemological quality of different types of judgments. Some judgments are made “in the mode 
of certainty,” which Husserl distinguishes from a second type of judgment, the “modalized” 
judgment, which is precisely the judgment that does not have the “original form of simple 
certitude.”15 With the former type of judgment we are concerned primarily with “categorical 
judgment” that regards some “uncontested” object. An example of this type of judgment is 
epitomized by the judgment that a geometric shape I perceive is an isosceles triangle. Here my 
judgment is grounded by the essential and formal features of a certain category of shape, and I 
make the determination that the object I regard belongs to that category. This does not mean that 
it is impossible that I misjudge the triangle as a scalene triangle (because I do not know the 
essential and formal features of the isosceles triangle, or because I cannot see it clearly, as if it is 
an exceptionally poor scan of an original copy), but to the contrary, that if I do (correctly) judge 
the triangle for what it is, then that judgment is made with certainty. 
 
14 Jacobs, “Husserl on Reason, Reflection, and Attention,” 259. 
15 Husserl, EJ §66-67, 271-275. 
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 But often the judgments that I make are not afforded this degree of certainty. Thus in the 
other type of judgment, the “modalized” judgment, I am making judgments that “must be 
understood as modes of decision.”16 This would apply only to “predicative” judgments, as in any 
statement that S is P.17 These are the types of judgments that Lampert will focus on in his book 
on decisions: those that are not defined by modalized certainty.18 These are “decisions” proper as 
far as Husserl is concerned. These decisions are not just those that lack the ideal amount of 
evidence in order to make a certain judgment, but also the type of decisions that are “open-
ended,” like the decision to try to lose weight, which is such that I am not judging the quality or 
even essence of something, although that does not mean that I do not base my decision on my 
perception of my own body. In other words, it is not necessarily the case that a modalized 
judgment is made without any corresponding evidence. I suggest that it is useful to think of this 
type of judgment not only as a judgment, but as a resolution or a choice.  
Let us contrast this type of judgment with the first, apodictic variety of judgment that we 
discussed. It does not sound quite right to state that I “decide” something is a certain type of 
triangle when certain objective qualities simply inhere in a certain shape (assuming I have the 
required evidence to judge it correctly, and that I am able to meaningfully interpret that evidence 
for what it is). Nor does it sound right to state that I am “taking a position” on the nature of that 
triangle, to the extent that nothing about the situation is really “up for interpretation” assuming 
that my perception of the geometric figure is such that the perceptual evidence given to me is 
reasonably clear and unambiguous. It would be rather grand and inappropriate to declare to those 
who are around me that a triangle that is obviously isosceles is in fact isosceles; I simply do not 
 
16 Husserl, EJ §66, 272. 
17 Lampert, Many Futures, 56. 
18 Ibid. 
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need to take a position on something that can be viewed to be rather obvious. But it does sound 
reasonable to say that I decided or “took the position” that the hazy figure I saw on the horizon 
was a light pole when in fact it later turned out, as I drew closer and had better perceptual 
evidence, that it was a bare tree that only appeared to be a light pole from far away. 
When Husserl introduces the modalized judgment, it is different from the apodictic 
judgment insofar as it is the former is a judgment that deals with an empty or anticipated 
presentation. In short, this type of judgment is not a simple classification of some “thing” 
according to formal properties a priori. This modalized sort of judgment, whether it is active or 
passive, regards an object my perception of which is interrupted or “broken,” where broken does 
not mean malfunctioning, but rather, incomplete. Husserl points out that most of the objects that 
we encounter in judgment are conditioned by anticipations that operate “on the basis of passive 
expectations.”19 Rarely do we encounter objects of sense in the complete mode that we encounter 
geometric figures. The phenomenon of the world is such that I often only perceive objects 
incomplete, with adumbration and apperceived qualities. When our concern is with the 
phenomenon of conversion the judgments that are involved therein belong to this second 
modalized class. There is no religious, spiritual, or philosophical object that I can regard en toto; 
my judgment of these objects will never be one made with mathematical certainty. While the 
judgment qua converting act may be regarded as if it is made with certainty, e.g. “I am certain 
that my judgment of the object x is a certain judgment,” where the object is Christ, the “middle 
way,” or Marxism, the certainty that pertains to these judgments is more of a testament to my 
feeling and confidence in my judgment, rather than a quality or state that inheres in the 
indubitably veridical nature of my judgment, again with mathematical certainty as the clearest 
 
19 Husserl, EJ §66, 271. 
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comparison.20 We have already seen that Husserl also provides doubt and conjecture as examples 
of modalized judgments that by definition do not subsist on a basis of certitude.21 
Essentially the question that now arises concerns whether the judging that is involved in a 
conversion is judging that is made with certainty or not. Clearly this is an issue for determining 
the eidetic noesis of the conversion experience. I suggest that in the phenomenological attitude it 
is readily apparent that it is in fact possible for the conversion experience to result from either of 
these classes of judging acts. I say this because on the one hand it is apparent that the evidence that 
the converting subject judges can be given in such a way that it is perceived to be incontrovertible. 
I think that this is the way in which we should classify the conversion story of Saint Paul. 
According to the Acts of the Apostles Paul asks whose voice he hears as he falls to the ground.22 
Perhaps we should admit that at this phase of his conversion, Paul could be trying to judge 
something that is not given with certainty, otherwise he might not ask the question. But crucially, 
once Paul receives his answer, he does not regard the object of his experience with doubt or even 
much deliberation; Paul is certain about what he thinks he heard.  
But this does not demonstrate that every conversion has to occur in this manner. Let us 
imagine the case of the subject who attributes the cause of some remarkably fortuitous occurrence 
to the providence of God. Perhaps this subject is at first utterly at a loss to figure out how he could 
be so lucky as to have whatever it is happen to him. Eventually since he lacks any other explanation 
that he deems to be reasonable, he judges that it must have been God who was responsible for the 
event, and he converts on the basis of this judgment. In sum must a conversion occur on the basis 
 
20 If there are such “conversion objects” that I can judge with certainty, they are likely 
philosophical objects that are rendered in purely formal terms (e.g. symbolic logic) my certainty 
of which regards the validity of the claim (as object) and not the soundness thereof. 
21 Husserl, EJ §76, 302. 
22 Acts 9:5 NABRE 
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of a certain judgment? No, but it does not follow from this that a conversion never occurs on the 
basis of a certain judgment.  
While Husserl maintains that every judgment that is made actually requires a decision 
necessarily, some writers have attempted to disentangle the two acts from each other.23 I should 
point out that I do think that it is countersensical to imagine a judgment that does not involve the 
deciding of the ego, if what we mean by ‘deciding’ is willing a belief. But it seems to me that 
some of these writers have pointed out something valid when they point out differences on the 
basis of Husserl’s own conceptualization. For example Lampert proposes that one of the 
differences between the two acts is that “a judgment can be instantaneous, but a decision is 
genetic.”24 In other words, a decision is never instantaneous. According to Husserl’s 
phenomenology, to say that a decision is “genetic” is to suggest that it pertains to constitution 
rather than the “static” level of final constituted products of sense.25 Of course I have also 
indicated that every judgment is a decision, though, so it might sound as if I am offering a 
contradictory model here. To the contrary there is no contradiction; without the genetic, 
constitutive work of unfolding decisions, we would not be able to make judgments.  
I would also like to treat the question of whether a judgment is in itself sufficient for a 
conversion to occur, or it requires something outside of itself. Lampert argues that the conversion 
event could be a type of decision, but he notes that some writers (Evangelicals, in particular) 
have argued that merely deciding is insufficient for salvation, as they maintain that the grace of 
God is a necessary condition for an authentic conversion.26  
 
23 Lampert, Many Futures, 56. 
24 Ibid., 61. 
25 Husserl, CM §37, 76 <109-110>. 
26 Lampert, Many Futures, 106. 
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I suggest that an intermediate position between Lampert and the Evangelical writers is 
most reasonable. On the one hand, not every conversion must require “grace” of the sort 
intended by these Evangelical writers, or even other Christian writers.27 For these writers grace 
is, in short, undeserved favor. It is favor that is undeserved due to the supposedly sinful nature of 
humanity. Here on the basis of my phenomenological approach I cannot presuppose this sort of 
grace. In the phenomenological attitude it is not manifest that this type of grace is an eidetic 
feature of the conversion phenomenon; I have already shown that conversion to Christianity 
cannot be the only type of conversion. 
However, if we consider grace more generally as some sort of “claim” that comes from 
what is understood, in the natural attitude, to be “beyond” the converting subject, then it seems 
that grace is required.28 After all conversion cannot occur in a solipsistic vacuum. If one were 
limited only to the resources within himself or herself, then the sort of judgments that take on 
existential significance for the subject would never arise in the first place. Indeed such judgments 
would be impossible. Shortly I will demonstrate that this sort of “grace” is necessary, but only 
 
27 Thomas Aquinas offers a fairly complete account of grace according to the Christian 
Scriptures. Summa Theologica, Ia IIae, q. 110, arts 1-4.  
28 While I do not have the space to explore this issue, with a recently renewed scientific interest 
in the study of hallucinogens and psychedelics it would be interesting to investigate whether 
certain chemical substances can help bring about or aid a conversion. Aldous Huxley is the most 
notable writer to explore such a hypothesis in The Doors of Perception. Ultimately even if it is 
possible that such psychotropic substances can help bring about conversion, the substance itself 
cannot be sufficient for the conversion process to occur, otherwise, we would be looking at the 
sort of “forced” conversion the authenticity and validity of which I contest. The converting 
subject will still require all of the necessary aspects of conversion that I delineate here. In short, 
psychedelic use does not constitute a shortcut to conversion. It might play a role in conversion 
for some individuals, but the matter is really not so different from visiting a fantastic cathedral or 
beholding a wonder of the natural world, either of which could help bring about a conversion. In 
clinical contexts, these substances are being used as a treatment for depression and the like, but it 
is important to note that if a “conversion” occurs in one of these clinical contexts (i.e., a patient 
recovers from depression), all of the phenomenological features of conversion still have to 
obtain. The substance without a relevant, corresponding noesis cannot produce a conversion. 
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manifest in the appearance of the world and the Other. The “grace” of the Christian God, or any 
other god, cannot be necessary for conversion to occur, but the grace of the world and the other 
are strictly requisite. Thus the Evangelical critics to whom Lampert refers cannot be right.  
On the other hand, I do not take it that Lampert’s view, namely, that a conversion can be 
reduced to a type of decision, is quite right either—at least not without some qualification. If an 
open-ended decision cannot be instantaneous due to the way in which it requires the 
consequences of its execution to be necessarily indeterminate and virtual with respect to future 
possible outcomes as they result not only from the singular decision but all of the decisions that 
follow it, then conversion cannot in every case be reducible to an open-ended decision—if 
anything I suggest that the existential transformation involved in conversion is actually more 
concerned with the present and even the past rather than the future, even if it is ultimately true 
that a conversion will have some bearing on the course of the subject’s future.  
If I am right that conversion is primarily concerned with that which has already occurred 
rather than what will occur in the future, then we should regard the convert’s sense of time as 
linear since that which has occurred is the only course of events that has, for me, in this actual 
world, led up to the present moment. After all the past is all set and done; what has occurred has 
occurred, and that is what has brought me to the present.  
While certain conversions may involve beliefs about what should be done in the future, 
such as acting a certain way in accordance with certain precepts, or even holding beliefs about 
events that are predicted to occur in the future, such as the second coming of the Messiah, not 
every conversion, which is “only” an existential transformation, will entail a shift in the way in 
which one regards the future, even if sometimes this does occur. Perhaps it sounds radical to 
assert that conversion entails no such necessary shift. But consider the fact that we have said that 
263 
a convert can move from one subset of Christianity to another, for example, from 
Episcopalianism to Catholicism. I do not take it that such a conversion occurs on the basis of a 
decision that regards the future as a complex, multi-branched set of possible outcomes, nor am I 
convinced that such a conversion even involves any shift at all in the way in which one perceives 
the future. It is probably warranted to question the extent to which such a shift should even count 
as a conversion since it does not seem like much of an existential transformation when compared 
to other more extreme sorts of conversions, but in the last analysis this matter is entirely up to the 
convert. If his new religion is significant with respect to the manner of his own self-
understanding—and I maintain that in the phenomenological attitude it is manifest that most 
religious conversions, even that which operates internal to a specific faith system like 
Christianity, Islam, and so on, this is precisely what occurs—then a conversion has occurred. “I 
was an Episcopalian, but now I am a Catholic.” I see no issue with viewing a case such as this as 
one which bears existential significance for the converting subject. 
I think that it is apparent that sometimes conversions are instantaneous, at least in terms 
of the manner of their givenness to the converting subject, even if it must be admitted that this is 
not true in all cases. Consider how it does not seem that a conversion theory such as this can 
really explain the paradigmatic case of Saint Paul. Does Paul judge that he hears the voice of 
God in such a way that the givenness or appearance of the corresponding evidence (in virtue of 
which the judgment is made) is defined by its open-endedness, or is it a judgment that is made on 
a simpler basis? Is Paul’s conversion more like the decision to get up early the next day, or more 
like the decision that takes for granted that the future is complicated, defined by innumerable 
possible outcomes? Lampert likes to refer to the latter as more of a “project”—I wonder whether 
we should regard Paul’s case as a project, or something more basic.  
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All of that said, nevertheless I think that we must further qualify the apparently 
“instantaneous” variety of the conversion experience since the judgment(s) involved therein, as 
enacted by a historicized subject, are still subject to all of the temporal aspects of consciousness, 
from retention and recollection, to sedimentation, to the various secondary noeses that I will 
address in the next section.  
 Lampert criticizes the idea that conversion could be so swift (“quick and clean”) as 
“irresponsible” although he then points out that it may be problematic to challenge the worth of 
such a thing. This cannot be right if decisions cannot be instantaneous. Conversions, I suggest, 
can occur on an instantaneous basis. Look at the story of Saint Paul, for example. The objection 
to this would be that Saint Paul’s conversion is not actually an instantaneous judgment but a 
decision that occurs over an extended duration. The problem with this rebuttal is that it is not 
corroborated by the scriptural sources that furnish us with the narrative. These sources could be 
accurate or inaccurate but altering the details of the anecdote seems to be a misstep.  
 But there is another problem with the idea that conversion is a decision. If it is true that a 
decision is necessarily open-ended with respect to the future, then I do not see how this can be 
made congruent with conversion as it is actually experienced. Who experiences a conversion 
with the expectation that he will soon enough convert again? This is an extreme counter, and I 
recognize that Lampert probably would see no issue with this, that his real point is that the 
decision to convert is one that is futurally indeterminate, from which it logically follows that 
maybe the convert will relapse his faith or even convert yet again. But my point is this: is it not 
the case that what defines a conversion is the present moment of the “now”? As I have already 
stipulated numerous times, this does not mean that the subject realizes that the conversion occurs 
at some specific moment. Conversion can be a gradual process, and it can be unconscious. When 
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I indicate that conversion occurs in the present moment of the “now,” I refer to the judging act. 
The judging act belongs to the present, not the future, the yet-to-come. What I contest in 
opposition to the phenomenological decision theory of conversion is that it holds that the 
reduction of the givenness of the decision qua phenomenon uncovers the fact that the eidos of 
the decision is that it appears precisely as branched, futurally indeterminate, virtual, and open-
ended. When we examine the judgment involved in the conversion experience, we find that the 
appearance of the judging act does not always abide by this characterization. 
Furthermore I ask: are conversions not assumed with a sense of finality, even if they are 
ultimately subject to being superseded by some future event? Conversions involve taking more 
or less “firm” positions (firm as in lasting), which is necessary for the event to have any 
existential significance instead of just being some passing fad. Perhaps Lampert would argue that 
the subject who decides is not necessarily aware of the open-ended futural noema of his act. I 
would respond that it ultimately does not matter whether or not the subject is aware of these 
matters regarding his act, since the distinction between the judgment and the decision comes 
down to, as Lampert himself puts it, the way in which a decision’s value is determined by the act 
of deciding and not its content.29 With my account of judgment as noesis of conversion, the 
content of the act does afford the act with its value, since I have indicated that it is only a specific 
type of judgment, namely, that which bears existential significance for the subject, that is capable 
of bringing about a conversion. To be sure the judging itself is still important but, as Lampert 
notes, decisionism can ultimately be rather arbitrary, and that simply will not do with this 
particular case since the content of the judgment needs to look a certain way in order for the 
conversion to occur. 
 
29 Lampert, Many Futures, 105. 
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 For now that settles the question of whether it is a judgment or a decision that is 
eidetically necessary for conversion. Next, I would like to address the judging noesis of 
conversion from another angle; we cannot gloss over Husserl’s description of judgmental 
position-taking as “active,” which is intended to convey the sense in which his view, according 
to which our judgments regard our perceptions and “situations,” contrasts with that of Brentano, 
for whom judgments are solely propositional.30 This will become important for my own 
argument. For now we should note that this account of active position-taking does not contradict 
what we have already established regarding the nature of the “passive conversion,” which I have 
defined as a conversion that the subject does not pursue, but nevertheless entails constitutive 
judgments, which are themselves necessarily “pursued” insofar as they are made. 
 Crucially Husserl’s model of judgment is one that holds that judgments entail, in every 
instance, acts of will. In Husserl’s most sustained discussion of judgment, Formal and 
Transcendental Logic, this is especially clear. There he writes, that “judging […] is 
acting.”31And instead of being confined to a removed, ideal logical sphere, these judgments qua 
positions regard individual, “real” objects and have a “relation to a real universe, a “world” or a 
world-province” (Husserl’s italics).32 This will be important later on, when we delineate the 
worldly horizon of the conversion phenomenon. 
 But if every judgment entails an act of willing, another important problem arises. Is it 
judgment or will that is eidetically necessary for conversion? If judgment can be reduced to an 
 
30 Cobb-Stevens, “Husserl’s Theory of Judgment,” 151. The author traces similarities between 
Husserl’s model of judgment and that of Aristotle but points out that there is no influence that his 
theory is influenced by Aristotle. 
31 Husserl, FTL §63, 166 <149>. 
32 Ibid., §83, 204 <181>. It should be noted that this does not mean that the object has to be a so-
called “external” object necessarily, evinced by Husserl’s category of “determinative judgments.” 
See FTL §54, 225. 
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act of willing, is it not the case that it is an act of will that is essential for conversion to occur, 
and not just a judgment, which is but one sort of volition. In fact this is a misguided line of 
reasoning. In the Logical Investigations Husserl characterizes willing as “non-objectifying” and 
points out that it thus requires some intellectual act as its ground.33 This does not mean that an 
act of willing does not correspond to a noema as object; the difference is that a non-objectifying 
act does not itself add to the referential relation to the object, but instead only influences the very 
presentation of the object. Husserl must make this move in order to establish the fact that a 
simple act of willing cannot itself “make” the object. Every act will still necessarily involve an 
objectifying act, however.  
To the extent that there are all different sorts of acts of will, only some of which involve 
judgments, we cannot in good faith reduce a judgment to willing. Every conversion will 
necessarily include a judgment (or set of judgments), and so every conversion will necessarily 
include an act (or acts) of willing, but not every act of willing is an act of judgment. As Husserl 
points out in the LI, every act of the will requires some basis in a founding presentation.34 This 
founding presentation need not be a judgment; it can be a perception or feeling. It is via feeling 
in particular that the resulting act of will involves a sense of the value or worth of whatever it is 
toward which the ego wills. Thus it is apparent that willing itself cannot be reduced to judgment.  
 Presumably, it may seem rather counter-intuitive to reduce all conversions to judgment, 
especially in light of the fact that I have already suggested that not every conversion is the object 
of conscious awareness on the part of the convert. And indeed, it is undeniable that many 
conversions will include other noeses, some of which are directly perceived, others of which are 
 
33 Husserl, LI 5: §37, 158-159. 
34 Ibid., 159. 
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apperceived. But one might be wondering why other intellective acts like thoughts and beliefs 
are not sufficient for bringing about a conversion. The problem with these acts, which can appear 
as secondary noeses but cannot themselves constitute a conversion, is that they do not 
necessarily require a shift in the active position-taking of the ego. In other words, I can have a 
thought about some religious object, but it may be a thought that has occurred to me in the past. 
Perhaps it is even a thought that I have more or less consistently retained for quite some time. 
This thought does not necessarily bring about a change in who I am, and if it does, it is because I 
have judged the thought. In fact the noesis of judging is the only noesis that is itself sufficient for 
a conversion. Thus it is the only necessary and essential feature of conversion at the noetic level, 
therefore it is the only noesis that constitutes an eidetic aspect of the conversion phenomenon.  
 The noesis of judgment in conversion takes some sort of rational and/or logical position 
on a religious or spiritual object (as noema). It is important to note that this judgment could be 
affirmative (S is P) or negative (S is not P). For example one could judge that Christ is his savior, 
or he could judge that Christ is not. In either case it is apparent that the judgment has to mark a 
departure from some previously held belief (or lack of belief). Thus if a conversion is to result 
from the judgment “Christ is savior” then it has to occur on the basis of the fact that the subject 
previously held either no belief regarding Christ as savior, or the belief that Christ was not 
savior. In either case the conversion is manifest in the epistemic change on the part of the 
subject. 
 But phenomenologically speaking, there are several important distinctions to make 
regarding types of judgments, with most of these distinctions coming down to differences in the 
very constitution of the judgments.35 One such distinction is determinative versus relational 
 
35 Husserl, EJ §67, 274; Husserl, FTJ, Appendix 2: §1, 312 <275>. 
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judging.36 The essential difference between the two regards the nature of the object judged; 
determinative judgment is “internal explication” (also known as internal determination) whereas 
relational judgment involves “external contemplation” (sometimes referred to as relative 
determination). Husserl stresses that it is only in the latter case that “objects are actually put into 
relation with one another in a thematic way.” But Husserl also admits that on a formal (not 
genetic) basis the difference between these two types of judgments collapses, and many 
“internal” judgments should be taken as relational, insofar as the difference between the is-
judgment and the has-judgment breaks down when a judgment includes more than two 
substantives (i.e. subjects).37 The second substantive is, according to Husserl, a “relative object.” 
In short, taken a certain way, many inner determinations are technically relational. Conversion as 
I have here defined it is always a “putting-in-relation” (as Husserl calls it), but if a judgment (qua 
converting act) is regarded as genetic, then the distinction is preserved.  
 The question, then, comes down to the number of substantives involved in a judgment 
qua conversion act, wherein, if there are two or more substantives, the result is that the 
conversion judgment is not just an inner determination, but a judgment of relation. I have already 
indicated that the noema of a conversion experience is some religious or spiritual object. But I 
have also admitted that this religious or spiritual object can be the convert’s very self. In such a 
case are we dealing with an is-judgment or an has-judgment? Husserl concedes that 
determinations and relations can occur in either type, depending on the circumstance. But the 
specific circumstance that we are dealing with is one in which there is one substantive on the 
“subject side” and, insofar as we are talking about an existential judgment (regarding identity or 
 
36 Husserl, EJ §54, 225. 
37 Ibid., 226. 
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role), a second substantive on the “predicate side.” For example, when one resolves “I am (now) 
a Christian,” we are dealing with a case of double substantives. Thus the judgment is not just 
“internal”—it is thoroughly relational. This is because the second substantive, ‘a Christian’ is a 
relative object. 
 The second important distinction for our present purpose concerns the difference between 
the universal judgment and the non-universal judgment.38 In the case of the former my judgment 
is such that my judgment makes reference to a universal and, crucially, this universal reference is 
the object of thematization. In a judgment like this, my apprehension of the generality of the 
object is itself a “productive activity.” As Husserl puts it, this means that “new objectivities are 
actively constituted which can then enter into judgments as cores—cores which are no longer, 
like those which we have considered up to now, individual cores, but general cores, belonging to 
some level of generality or other.” The question, then, is whether conversion is necessarily 
limited to either of these varieties of judgment, namely, the thematically universal, or the 
negative case wherein I do not render as thematic the universal reference.39 It seems that the 
conversion phenomenon can occur on the basis of either of these types of judgments. In some 
cases the conversion object is judged specifically as representative of some universal (e.g. God), 
epitomized in Saint Paul’s realization that the voice and the light belong to God. But it also 
seems that in other cases conversion can be far more “unique.” For example, many individuals 
have grasped some important existential insight on the basis of something as random and 
particular as catching sight of a flash of light (e.g. the conversion of Philip K. Dick). At first 
 
38 Ibid., §80, 318. 
39 Husserl implies that this universal reference will always be necessary. “To be sure, in all 
apprehension of a particular there is already at work a reference of the particular object to the 
general type…” Ibid., 317. 
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glance it would appear that the religious conversion is more likely to involve a judgment that 
entails thematic universal reference, whereas this is less likely of a requirement for the spiritual 
conversion. It seems that the philosophical conversion could occur in either category. 
 As our final consideration regarding the noesis of judgment, it is now clear why judgment 
is essentially so problematic. The fact of the matter is that the world and everything “in” it are such 
that we are often not able to make judgments with certainty. Indeed it is significant that judgment 
has even been called a “problem.”40 The problem comes down to the extent to which the necessary 
presupposition of a judgment is a “pregiven object.” This is what Husserl explores in his writing 
on transcendental logic. The question is: from what origin does predicative judgment emanate?41 
This origin is, by definition, pre-predicative. If this origin, which is the pregiven world of objects, 
is pre-predicative, then it is the object of “passive doxa.”42 What this means is that every 
conversion has some necessary basis in passivity on the “object” side, with the result that any given 
conversion whatsoever is never the sole product of judgment eo ipso, but a judgment that can only 
originate from the “backdrop” that is the phenomenon of the world.43 This is a phenomenon that 
is passively constituted for me. I will elaborate on this aspect of conversion later in this chapter. 
 
III. The “Secondary” Noeses of Conversion 
 
Next, I must describe several of the other possible noeses of the conversion act in order to 
characterize more completely the “converting act” itself. This offers a more complete 
 
40 Sallis, “Problem of Judgment.” 
41 Ibid., 129. 
42 Husserl, EJ §7, 30. 
43 Husserl, FTL §86, 204 <181>. 
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characterization to the extent that, as I argued in the prior section, some judging noeses of 
conversion will achieve their fulfilling sense with a secondary noesis either as forebear to the 
noesis of judgment, i.e. as one of its causes, or as noematic correlate of the noesis itself. While 
judgment is the only noesis that is in itself necessary and sufficient, the phenomenon of 
conversion is such that sometimes the judging act actually requires a complementary noesis in 
order for the judging act to be furnished with its aboutness. 
 All of these noeses are capable of regarding the existentially significant religious object, 
whether it be an empirically “external” object or the “subject” that is the self, occurring either 
concomitantly with or sequentially to the judging noesis, but they are themselves also, as we will 
see, possible noematic objects of the act of judgment.44  
 No matter how these “secondary” noeses should appear, they are never capable of 
constituting the conversion on their own. Significantly, however, insofar as it is the judging act 
that is constitutive for the conversion, it can never be the case that a conversion happens for a 
subject as a result of an act of judgment followed by whatever secondary noesis. There would be 
no such problem for the scenario wherein the secondary noeses precede the judging noesis, in 
which case the secondary noesis (or noeses) may actually causally bring about the judging 
noesis, or even serve as object of the act of judgment. 
 The former case can be called an “originary” or “founding” noesis of conversion. While 
every conversion will necessarily require a judgment noesis at some point, the originary noesis 
of a conversion (as cause) can be a volition, affect, perception, belief, or thought. Traditionally it 
has been held that many converts will convert solely on the basis of some sort of judgment (e.g. 
 
44 In other words these “secondary” noeses can either occur alongside the judging noesis, or in 
addition to it. 
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RCIA). These subjects will take their conversion on purely judicative terms. But for others, 
conversion is something that starts with a noesis the noematic correlate of which is a religious 
object that is not rational in nature, but instead one which results from something more akin to a 
feeling or emotion. Some converts feel as if they are “called” to convert, and while I would still 
suggest that these converts ultimately must make a judgment in order for the conversion to occur, 
their conversions do not at all begin with judgments. Still others begin their conversions as a 
simple act of will or volition that is not necessarily rationally approached, such as the choice to 
convert in order to appease a spouse.45 In other cases a conversion can be precipitated as a result 
of a perception, like the vision of an apparition or mystical object. Even in the traditional case, 
epitomized above in the case of RCIA, the convert is judging some religious object that is 
constituted at least in part on the basis of thoughts and beliefs.  
 As for the latter case I describe above, namely, that wherein a secondary noesis itself 
serves as intentional correlate of the judgment (i.e. the “thing” the judgment is about, like the 
judgment I make about a belief I have in Christ), in the previous section I provided the example 
of the conversion that results from reflection, which is what occurs when the judging noesis 
regards another noesis instead of something on the noematic “side.” As Husserl puts it this is the 
distinction between an “immanental” noema and the “actual object” noema.46 Technically every 
noema is, in the phenomenological attitude, immanental. But as I have shown, I do not convert in 
the phenomenological attitude. When I convert, empirically and in the natural attitude, I can 
 
45 It may be objected that this should be considered a forced and therefore inauthentic 
conversion. Based on the analysis I have presented here, if the conversion is forced, that is, the 
volition of another but not the subject herself, then it is not a really a “conversion” at all. I 
suggest that a conversion like this is authentic so long as the convert freely makes the decision to 
convert in order to please some other person.  
46 Husserl, Ideas I §90, 217 <185>. 
274 
regard as the object of my mental act some “actual” object, e.g. Christ, or I can regard as object 
my own mental act, e.g. my belief about Christ. 
 It is critical that we note that almost always a conversion occurs as a result of a 
combination of two or more of these noeses. Husserl indicates that: 
[T]he full noema consists of a complex of noematic moments, that in <that complex> the specific 
sense-moment only fashions one kind of necessary core-stratum in which further moments are 
essentially founded which, therefore, would likewise be designated as sense-moments, but in an 
extended meaning.47 
 
For example what might start as a feeling about some religious object could eventually yield to 
some volition regarding that same object, which in turn yields a resulting judgment. It is even 
possible that the most potent conversions, such as that of Saint Paul, will encompass all of these 
noeses, although certainly not simultaneously. Ultimately, however, it is the judgment noesis that 
is eidetically necessary for conversion, and it is the only noesis of conversion that is on its own 
sufficient. As we have already said it must be granted that the judging noesis need not take up as 
noema a judgment that pertains to a religious, spiritual, or philosophical object, but instead can 
take up as object a volition, affect, perception, reflection, belief, or thought that corresponds to 
this “conversion object.” 
 The noesis of volition in conversion is a desire or willing regarding some religious or 
spiritual object. The difference between a noesis of judgment and a noesis of volition is that the 
latter is not (experienced as) rational, whereas the former is. While it can at first glance be 
difficult to differentiate these two noeses, in fact the most straightforward way to distinguish 
these two noetic categories is in terms of “judging that” versus “wanting that.” For example 
someone who converts to some version of Christianity and therefore judges something akin to 
“Christ is my savior” should be distinguished from some other person who wills “I want to be 
 
47 Ibid., 218 <185>. 
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united with Christ.” But as we have seen, very noesis of volition, as non-objectifying, actually 
entails an objectifying noesis enacted by judgment (or feeling). Consider how, in the example, 
the desire for unification with Christ presupposes some judgment about Christ. For example, the 
implicit judgment might be something to the effect of “Christ is someone with whom I should 
desire to be united.” It should be noted that the affect noesis might be paired with a judgment 
noesis that negatively assesses the “more primitive” affect; in such a case obviously no 
conversion would occur, since the judging act would trump the affective act.  
 The noesis of affect in conversion is epitomized in the occurrence of a feeling, or even 
emotion. For example, it is possible for one to “feel” that Christ is her savior. But insofar as 
conversion requires an existential change, the “mere” feeling on its own is not sufficient for 
conversion; the feeling has to be accompanied by an analogous judgment noesis that bestows 
existential significance upon the feeling. Consider, for example, how an atheist can “feel” a 
certain way about Christ while she sits in a worship space, but without some judgment regarding 
that feeling, the feeling is not on its own enough to make for a change in existential identity or 
role. 
 Lastly, I will treat together the noeses of perception, reflection, belief, and thought. First, 
the perceiving sometimes associated with conversion correlates with the seeing or hearing of 
some existentially significant “object,” whether it be supernatural or worldly. For example if I 
see someone on the side of the road, asking for money and for help, this can be part of a 
conversion. Thus I typically face this noema as if it is an “actual object.” Second, the reflecting 
associated at times with conversion, which I have already briefly treated, typically correlates 
with something immanent to consciousness. I can reflect on a judgment that I made, or 
something I desired, and so on. It is less clear that I can reflect, however, on what I presume in 
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the natural attitude to be an actual object. For starters, Husserl characterizes reflection in such a 
way that it is intentionality that turns toward itself. But second, what might in the vernacular be 
called the “reflection” of some object, for example, reflection on the nature of God’s 
omniscience, is closer to contemplation, and therefore, thought or even belief. Thought and belief 
are the final two noeses of conversion that I will discuss here. The thinking or believing inherent 
in these noeses corresponds to a concept or idea as thought or believed. It is critical to note that 
with any of these secondary noeses of conversion, the sense and therefore horizon of the 
secondary noesis need not be something religious, spiritual, or philosophical. It is the judging 
noeses that belongs to these domains of existential significance. For example, if we think back to 
the example I gave of an encounter with someone who is in need of help, it is apparent that there 
is nothing necessarily religious, spiritual, or philosophical about my seeing of this person. It is 
the judgment that I make about my seeing of this person that takes on religious, spiritual, or 
philosophical significance, which is to say, existential significance. 
 There are a few final concerns regarding all of the noeses of conversion, judging in 
addition to the secondary noeses I have here covered. While conversion itself (eo ipso) need not 
be the intentional object (noema) of the conversion experience, it will never be the case that a 
conversion occurs for the subject without a corresponding “attentive form of intentionality” on 
the noetic side.48 As I have argued, this attentive form of intentionality will always be included in 
a judging act (or, more often, set or series of acts), but as we have seen, it could include other 
forms of attentive noeses, from affect to reflection to perception. Indeed, as I argued, it might 
even require those other noeses for itself, either causally or noematically. 
 
48 Jacobs, “Husserl on Reason, Reflection, and Attention.” 
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 Furthermore it follows from everything I have already indicated that the noesis of 
conversion is not (necessarily) some specific, singular act that institutes the “completion” or 
fulfillment of the conversion, as if the convert is passing through some determinate threshold 
before which he was not converted, after which he was converted. Here the problem is not the 
fact that the judging noesis may be accompanied in some fashion by secondary noeses—to the 
contrary I have actually suggested that in all of these cases it is the judging act that produces the 
conversion-meaning, even though sometimes the act cannot occur without some initiation or 
even a noema of one of the secondary noeses here identified. The real issue is that there is some 
concern that the conversion itself (as existential change), precisely insofar as it may not be 
realized by the subject, is not necessarily a change that occurs on the basis of some single, 
determinate act of consciousness. Indeed if conversion is the result of a judgment, then it seems 
counter-intuitive to suggest that a conversion could occur unaware to the converting subject. But 
we can confirm this surprising conclusion by differentiating the fulfillment of the conversion 
from the act that brings its fulfillment about. While the judging act is necessary to bring about 
the fulfillment of conversion, it is not the case that this fulfillment is immediate. Indeed this 
fulfillment is often the result of the retention of meaning. In such cases the conversion results 
from the sedimentation of the convert’s judgments upon the convert’s self. Essentially this is the 
“bridge” between the judging/judgment and the ego. In Experience and Judgment Husserl 
explains this bridging sedimentation thusly: “[it is] the continuous transformation of what has 
been originally acquired and has become a habitual possession and thus something non-
original.”49 The idea is that the course of my experience is eventually imprinted upon my very 
ego. Husserl calls this alteration in my habituality “non-original” because of the fact that these 
 
49 Husserl, EJ §67, 275. 
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imprints upon me are not immediately “present” like other objects of sense. For example 
consider the difference between living a fantastic, life-changing experience, and the ultimate 
consequence of that experience upon your existential identity. The latter can certainly take on a 
profound impact upon who I “am,” but that impact is not present to me in the manner of the 
original, “founding” experience.  
Of course, in the present case, we are considering the way in which an experience that is 
not identified as fantastic or life-changing can become sedimented and ultimately change one’s 
life, which means that something the impact of which was not realized can ultimately take on a 
significant existential impact. I can see how this might be viewed as dubious; how can something 
that I do not recognize ultimately play a role in the constitution of such an important change in 
my identity? Husserl can resolve this concern for us. Sedimentation belongs to passive synthesis, 
such that once some experience starts to “disappear from the field of immediate consciousness” 
it vanishes “into the ‘unconscious,’ which is not a dead nothingness but a limiting mode of 
consciousness and accordingly can affect us anew like another passivity in the form of whims, 
free-floating ideas, and so on” (my italics).50 It is the power of these sedimented bits of 
knowledge to “affect us anew” that furnishes us with the explanation that we need to make sense 
of how something can make such a profound impact on the subject over the course of time, 
without the subject immediately (or ever) realizing that impact. Whether I abandon or retain 
some relevant conversion experience, the sedimentation of that experience can ultimately take on 
an influence on my overall outlook that surpasses what was given to me in the original, 
immediate experience. 
 
50 Ibid., 279. 
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 In the last analysis what is revealed via the noema and noeses of conversion is the fact 
that conversion is grounded in phenomenological subjectivity itself. To the extent that the noema 
of conversion is some judgment regarding an existentially significant “object,” the noesis of 
which is capable of producing in the subject an existential change, where such changes are often 
the result of the sedimentation of meanings (namely the meanings of religious objects of all 
sorts) over the course of time, it is apparent that conversion is not always radical and intense. We 
are tempted in the natural attitude to regard only conversions such as these, namely, those which 
are radical and/or intense, as conversions. Similarly, we shy away from calling these more 
gradual changes a change in “identity.” But if we consider the fact that the conversion 
experience, like all experience, would not be possible if not for a temporal basis and without 
active position-taking, we can see that conversion is a very natural “side effect” of consciousness 
as we experience it, specifically, as a streaming flow defined in part by our choices. This flow is 
manifest in my unified sense of experience over the duration of time (thanks to retention and 
protention) which has meaning on the basis of the synthesis carried out by myself, as the ‘I’ in 
the ego pole, or the transcendental (i.e., intentional) ego. The interpretive nature of consciousness 
is such that consciousness is “writing” its own history over the course of its experience. I will 
elaborate on the temporal horizon of conversion later in this chapter.  
 
IV. The Worldly Horizon of Conversion 
 
The fourth eidetic feature of conversion concerns the nature of the phenomenological horizon. 
The constitution of the conversion phenomenon is integrated with the constitution of the shared 
horizon of world at various levels Without the world there could be no conversion because 
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consciousness is such that it constitutes for me a world that serves as essential counterpart to my 
embodied experience.  
 It is important to qualify what this means in phenomenological terms, because it is also 
true that the conversion experience could technically survive the destruction of the world, and it 
is true that a radically isolated subject can convert. Simply put, when I state that the conversion 
experience requires the world, this is meant phenomenologically. We will see precisely what this 
means soon enough. But we already know that this entails that my present remarks regarding the 
world should not be taken to mean that the world necessarily exists in a physical or material 
sense.51 
 As we know, consciousness for Husserl centers on the mechanics of intentionality. The 
world thus relates directly to this intentionality insofar as it grounds innumerable objectifying 
acts. In its broadest sense the world is in short the totality of all possible intending, which in 
Ideas I Husserl refers to as the “horizon of horizons.”52 As horizon of all horizons the world 
plays a role in the establishment of the “experienceableness” of the physical thing (which is not 
necessarily capable of being seen but instead a thing that is potentially experienceable.)53 In 
other words the physical thing is not necessarily a material thing but such a thing as that which is 
speculated to “exist” according to the science of physics. These things can be experienced in any 
number of different ways beyond the limits of touch. For example sound is a physical thing, 
despite the fact that it is not material and cannot be touched (although at certain frequencies it 
can certainly be felt). It is of course true that conversion is not a physical thing, but in many 
 
51 Husserl, Ideas I §49, 109 <91>. 
52 Ibid. §1, 6 <7>. Later, starting with the Crisis, Husserl will use the term lifeworld (Lebenswelt) 
for this specific world-concept, but with much more consideration given to the temporality of the 
lifeworld than what is offered in Ideas I, or any text before the Crisis for that matter. 
53 Ibid., §47, 106 <89)>. 
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cases its occurrence will involve a noesis the object of which is some physical thing out in the 
world, which ultimately corresponds to a judgment made that bears transformative existential 
significance for the convert. 
 But the world is also something the very appearance of which is statically constituted. 
This is why Husserl also calls the world the “correlate […] of experiencing consciousness.”54 In 
Ideas I one of his main points regarding this issue is that without the correlative world my 
“factual experience” and “experimental consciousness” would not have anything to be “about.” 
The concern that Husserl has for the world in this text is mostly logical and ideal in nature; one 
of his most important points is that the statements that I make would have no reference without 
the world.55 My statements, in order for them to mean anything, require the world as correlate. In 
short in the first volume of Ideas Husserl is mostly working to ground in consciousness the 
relation of scientific claims to the world.  
 In Ideas II he takes a rather different approach to the world. There he distinguishes 
material nature from animal nature from the spiritual world. It is certainly significant that 
Husserl only chooses to use the term “world” in this particular text to describe the spiritual 
world, even though his discussion of animal nature mostly focuses humans, albeit as “natural 
objects,” which for him refers to the human or animal soul that is “connected” with the body.56 
The spiritual world and therefore the spirit itself transcends this sense of soul for Husserl. This 
sense of spirit is neither natural-scientific nor “psychophysical.”57 Husserl understands that here 
 
54 Ibid., 105 <87>. 
55 Granted, Husserl insists that consciousness could survive the destruction of the world, a point 
to which I will soon turn.  
56 Husserl, Ideas II §19, 96 <91>. 
57 Husserl, Ideas I §48, 181 <173>. 
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he enters the domain of metaphysics and he does not shy away from using the term.58 In Ideas II 
he shows that all of our experience of the material world is ultimately grounded by the work of 
the spirit. While he preliminarily regards this spirit in a solipsistic way, he also notes (even 
before doing so) that the spirit is not an isolated figure but is to the contrary inextricably linked 
to the world.59 In fact it is not just one spirit that is linked to the world in such a manner, but 
every spirit. In Ideas II Husserl elaborates on the nature of this correlation between subject (qua 
spirit) and world, noting that “I am what I am (and each other person is what he is) as subject of 
a surrounding world.”60 But he takes this idea even further when he indicates that the spiritual 
world is a world that is intersubjectively constituted by Others, which I will address in the next 
section.61 
 Conversion is fundamentally linked to the spiritual world insofar as, as I have shown, 
conversion is an experience that involves some transformation of existential significance. 
Existential significance is not anything that we will find in physical nature, which amounts to 
“bare life” itself; instead, it is something that belongs to the human spirit, for whom “existence” 
is a concern in the first place. Nature knows of no such thing. While non-spiritual “things” like 
material objects or even the body as physical correlate or “animal nature” can certainly take on 
existential significance, the significance itself is meaning for the spirit and none other. In other 
words nature can bear existential significance for humanity, but never can it bear such 
significance without our involvement.  
 
58 Ibid., §48, 181 <172>. 
59 “…if we take the subject at first again as the one and only subject, as solipsistic, then we find a 
plethora of relations between the posited Objects and the “spiritual” subject, as we are now 
calling the subject of intentionality.” Ibid., §55,227 <216>. Also, “[t]he concepts of the Ego and 
surrounding world are related to one another inseparably.” Husserl, Ideas II §50, 195 <185>. 
60 Ibid., §50, 195 <185>. 
61 Ibid.  
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 As Husserl puts it in Ideas II, the spirit, phenomenologically construed, is the “subject of 
intentionality.”62 It is because the spiritual subject is the intentional subject that conversion 
occurs only for the spirit, because conversion can only occur on the basis of the activity of the 
intentional subject.63 We have seen that this intentionality specifically centers around certain 
judgments that regard the significance of the convert.  
 This is even more significant because this highlights the fact that even if there are secular 
sorts of conversion that involve no “religious” or “spiritual” content, ultimately every conversion 
is a conversion of the spirit. That said, it is important that we do not subject this spirit to 
metaphysical assumptions that are not grounded in a science of consciousness. While it would be 
appropriate to use terms like ‘mind’ or even ‘soul’ to refer to this spirit, we have to limit 
ourselves to the analysis of this Geist only insofar as it appears—as subject of intentionality.  
 Since conversion is something for the spirit, we must analyze briefly this spiritual 
“world” in which conversion occurs. First, Husserl identifies the essential law of the spiritual 
world as motivation.64 Motivations play a crucial role in the constitution of our lives in the 
world. There are actually several different types of motivations according to Husserl: the use of 
reason, association and habit, association and experience, each of which he carefully 
distinguishes from “natural causality.” 
 When reason is our motive it drives the course of our judgments and dictates the 
parameters of justification and verification. Husserl distinguishes two different types of reason in 
Ideas II: active reason and relative reason.65 The former is what I use when my ego is “motivated 
 
62 Ibid., §56, 231 <221>. 
63 It should be noted that there are plenty of types of intentionality that do not necessarily bring 
about existential change in the subject. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Ibid., §56, 233 <221-222>. 
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by insight.” When I employ active rationality there are no breaks or disruptions in my line of 
thought; my thought is coextensive with this type of rationality, where I am identifying 
“connections of requirement.” Similar to Descartes, Husserl does not take it that I can err when I 
use this rationality; if something is logically necessary, then there is nothing to debate. As my 
active rationality is active only in the moment that it is taken up, it is restricted in use. Indeed 
since active rationality requires constant usage, it is only intermittently involved in my life.  
 Relative rationality does not deal with logically necessary connections but merely the 
relations between things. It, by contrast, is not necessarily consistently employed, and it is in 
virtue of this fact as well as its subject matter (relative relations) that accounts for it being much 
more prone to mistakes and errors. When I use relative rationality, I am faced with a “confused 
unity” that I do not regard with instantaneous logical insight. Since relative rationality is not 
subject to the same activity requirements as its counterpart, it resembles much more of a mindset 
or a mood than it does a noesis grounded in pure logic.  
 It seems to me that the conversion experience derives primarily from judgments that are 
made via relative rationality. While I cannot indubitably demonstrate that it is impossible for a 
conversion to follow from judgment(s) that have been made only in the mode of active 
rationality, it seems likely that this sort of conversion, if it is possible, occurs only on a very rare 
basis. Consider for example what a conversion in active rationality would look like: a series of 
deductions and calculations the result of which is some certain conclusion. While this mode of 
rationality is useful when we deal with problems in the logic or mathematics classroom, we do 
not live most of our lives using this type of reason. Far more important for us in a practical sense 
is the use of relative reason, which Husserl alternatively characterizes as the pursuit of some 
value the source of which is genuine, and we can see how this would complement quite nicely 
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our phenomenological model of conversion. This account of relative rationality also serves as 
another limiting factor in virtue of which we can exclude the forced conversion as inauthentic; 
the value that is pursued does not have a genuine source within the subject himself. 
 Before we move on to the homeworld it is critical that we take note of the fact that 
Husserl incorporates affect in his discussion of reason as motivation, not only in terms of how 
judgment is motivated by affect, but also how affect is motivated by judgment. In some cases, 
such as when I become distracted by an instinct or a drive, I am subject to irrationality. In a case 
like this my judgment is motivated by affect, negatively so. The experience of conversion is 
driven by judgments that may be rational, or irrational.  
 The lifeworld and homeworld are part of Husserl’s attempt to incorporate the context of 
culture, history, and society in his phenomenology, and as such they emerge in his later works 
like the Crisis. Out of the two the homeworld, as its title implies, is the more specific concept.66 
Each of these concepts is essentially an analytic elaboration of the more general idea of the world 
that Husserl presents in Ideas I, as “horizon of horizons.” But he eventually comes to 
characterize this meta-horizon according to intersubjective criteria in his later thought. 
 The homeworld is the world of familiarity for me.67 For me it constitutes what seems to 
be normal or typical, but not in any ethical sense.68 It is the sum of the horizons that are specific 
to me and are derived from the localization of my consciousness in some specific time and place. 
The homeworld is a unity of meaning and sense comprised by worldly things’ pregivenness.69 
 
66 Husserl occasionally uses the term near-world (Nahwelt) for the homeworld. There is no 
significant difference between the two concepts, and we find that he uses them interchangeably. 
See Hua VI 303. 
67 Hua XV 210. 
68 Donohoe, “Place of Home,” 32. 
69 Steinbock, Home and Beyond, 154; Donohoe, “Place of Home,” 33.  
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But we should push Husserl to conceive of the homeworld in even more precise terms, including 
my race, my class, and my gender, all of which play a profound role in the operation of my 
conscious life. Without a doubt the homeworld qua familiar but passive referential context for 
consciousness bears an obvious influence on the constitution of my consciousness, which does 
not originate ex nihilo but is always already founded in a homeworld, which is relative on a 
cultural, historical, and social basis. Essentially this homeworld is a more specific “horizon of 
horizons” that is relative to my own life on the basis of certain definitive variables that play a 
role in the life of my consciousness. Thus this homeworld accounts for many of the meanings 
and assumptions that I make as I go about my life. Furthermore my homeworld is specific to me, 
as my “home” is not the same as the home for Others, but something that is my own “home” of 
consciousness (in other words not a literal a literal dwelling place). We can consider the lifeworld 
to be a reduction of the homeworld taken in terms of its general essence; the homeworld is just 
the lifeworld of some particular subject. The lifeworld is essentially the broader conception of 
the homeworld in general, for anyone, anywhere.  
 The homeworld, and by extension lifeworld, are relevant for the phenomenological 
analysis of the conversion experience because it structures the conversion possibilities for the 
subject. This comes down to the distinction between the homeworld and its antithesis, the 
alienworld. It may be the case that I am more likely to convert to a religion, spiritual worldview, 
or philosophy that is already familiar to me within the outer limits of my homeworld. For 
example if I am a citizen of Europe or the United States, Christianity is probably more culturally 
familiar to me than Sikhism, whether I am a Christian or not, although this is certainly not true 
for a Sikh living in Europe or the US. In virtue of this increased familiarity with some ideas, and 
less familiarity with others, I am more likely to pursue conversions that are “available” to me 
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within my larger homeworld, and less likely to pursue those that rest outside of it. To be sure it is 
certainly possible that someone can convert to a religion or spiritual worldview or even 
philosophy that surpasses the old limits of his homeworld, but this would require in advance the 
reorientation of the homeworld in order for the new existential framework to be an “option” for 
the converting subject. Indeed, when this happens the homeworld is rearranged for the subject 
with new meanings embedded in it as ground. Because conversion possibilities within my own 
homeworld are already embedded in my consciousness, I deduce that I am more prone to pursue 
these possibilities that are in closer proximity to myself. 
 But it is also the case that any conversion whatsoever plays a role in the reconstitution of 
the homeworld. Even if a religion like Christianity, which is already familiar to me given the 
homeworld I inhabit, is not my own religion, were I to convert to it, then my sum of horizons 
would shift. Thus we can see how the requisite existential transformation upon which I have 
already elaborated at length plays a role in the structuration of the very horizon (of horizons) 
within which my experience takes place.  
 In closing we should note that it is not quite the case that consciousness is itself derived 
from the world, as if the world is logically or causally prior to consciousness (in a 
phenomenological sense). In fact the two require each other in a mutually constitutive relation. 
Husserl writes that, “The concepts of ego and surrounding world are related to one another 
inseparably.”70 In Husserl’s later phenomenology it is undeniable that the world is constituted by 
the ego, where constitution entails the appearance of the world as a phenomenon, and not the 
material existence of the world in a mind-independent sense. It is the world that serves as the 
 
70 Husserl, Ideas II §50, 195 <185>. 
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“universal ground of belief pregiven for every experience of individual objects.71 Objects in the 
world are always already there for me, and all of my mental acts presuppose the existence of 
these objects. They “stimulate and set going” all of my mental processes, from which they are 
given structure and “legitimacy.”72 But furthermore we have to consider this world as, first, a 
spiritual phenomenon that does not necessitate very much with respect to the veracity of the 
claims my religion, spiritual worldview, or philosophy makes with respect to “material” nature or 
reality, and second, as a culturally, historically, and socially embedded phenomenon.  
 I have stated that without the world there can be no conversion. It is important to address 
the extent to which this is not a contradiction of a famous passage in Ideas I wherein Husserl 
describes the “annihilation of the world.”73 There Husserl writes: 
The existence of a world is the correlate of certain multiplicities of experience distinguished by 
certain essential formulations. But it cannot be seen that actual experiences can flow only in such 
concatenated forms; nothing like that can be seen purely on the basis of the essence of perception 
taken universally, and of the essences of other collaborating kinds of experiential intuition.74 
 
How are we to reconcile these remarks with what I have said here? First it should be noted that the 
larger context for these remarks Husserl makes in Ideas I regard the “material countersense” of an 
idea that there could be a world outside of our own.75 Husserl concludes that it is problematic to 
speculate that a real world exists outside of our own because there is no actual ego to which this 
world appears, with the real point being that what is experienceable for any single ego must “of 
essential necessity be cognizable by any Ego.”76 But a world outside of our own is not experience, 
so this cannot be right. Second, to return to the original issue with the supposed annihilation of the 
 
71 Husserl, EJ §7, 28. 
72 Ibid., 29. 
73 Husserl, Ideas I §49, 109 <91>. 
74 Ibid. 
75 Ibid. §48, 108 <90>. 
76 Ibid. 
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world, Husserl’s precise claim is that if the “world of physical things” were annihilated, then this 
would not “touch” the existence of consciousness. One might wonder how he can say such a thing 
when I have presented the world as I have, as a thoroughly necessary correlate of intentional 
consciousness. Ultimately, we can resolve the tension by reminding ourselves that we cannot 
presuppose the real, external, material existence of the intentional objects that are present to my 
consciousness. Husserl insists that pure consciousness is entirely self-contained, such that the 
annihilation of the allegedly material world presents no problem for the existence of consciousness 
eo ipso. But beyond this there is the fact that even if it is true that consciousness itself could survive 
an incident such as the annihilation of consciousness, that does not mean that this consciousness 
would have access to the experience of conversion, which seems to require the world as correlate 
in order to furnish for itself the necessary subject matter to pertain to the constitutive judgments 
that comprise it. 
 
V. Conversion and the Other 
 
The fifth eidetic feature of conversion relates back to the fourth, the world. I suggest that, as we 
saw with the world, it would be impossible for the conversion experience to occur without the 
givenness of the Other. While Husserl will typically use the term Other to refer to the other ego, 
here I refer to the Other in two senses, the Other as (the) transcendental ego (of the Other), and 
the Other as social institution, as non-self. It is critical that we note that each of these senses of 
Otherness are defined by the fact that they pertain to things that I understand to my transcendent 
to my self. If my experience were limited to my self, without these transcendent correlates on the 
“outside,” then I would not have much of a life; my consciousness would be limited to the 
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reflection of its own internal states, and these states would be rather “bald” and plain without any 
involvement with that which is external to my self. Indeed both of these senses of Other are 
required in order for a conversion experience to occur, primarily because without the Other there 
would be no world phenomenon, without which judgments of existential significance could not 
be made.  
 The first necessity is the intersubjective constitution of the world as enacted by other 
transcendental egos. We already say Husserl make this point when he characterized the spiritual 
world in Ideas II. The fact that conversion requires Other transcendental egos is a testament to 
the fact that the world phenomenon is the product of intersubjective constitution. Strictly 
speaking, however, the constitution of the world is the product not just of my own transcendental 
ego, but any number of transcendental egos qua “community of monads.”77 Husserl alternatively 
refers to this community structure as “transcendental intersubjectivity,” noting that the world is 
the accomplishment of this transcendental intersubjectivity.78 It is the achievement of this 
community to make possible “a world of men and things,” without which conversion could not 
occur. Husserl describes this interrelation of monads an “intentional communion” which he 
characterizes as “essentially unique connectedness.”79 The crucial qualification, however, is that 
these other monads are constituted by my own consciousness. Critically, these others are 
constituted “in me” precisely “as monads, existing for themselves.”80 Thus while it is true that 
the world phenomenon is the product of intersubjective constitution, it is also true that the Other 
is constituted by me, with a givenness such that I take it that this Other is also an ego, like me. 
 
77 Husserl, CM §55, 120. 
78 Ibid. §49, 108. 
79 Ibid. §56, 129. 
80 Ibid. §56, 128. 
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 The second necessity is that the Other is required in the sense of social institutions, 
without which conversion would not be possible. I am identifying social institutions as Other to 
the extent that Husserl includes culture in his conception of “other experience.”81 This social 
institution may be a religion, a spiritual worldview, or a philosophy, but more generally, this 
social institution could be a language, or set of cultural practices. I realize that this condition 
stipulates that there can be no such thing as a private, personal conversion that surpasses the 
limits of individual reference and meaning. But upon closer analysis we can tell that this must be 
true, insofar as sans the Other qua social institution, we would lack the requisite linguistic and 
cultural domains in order for a conversion to take place. Insofar as I have reduced the conversion 
phenomenon to essentially require judgment noeses, a conversion without the social institution 
of language could never take place.  
 Ultimately my self-experience would not at all be the same without other experience.82 I 
can see how many aspects of my self are ultimately entangled with the outer world. It follows 
that ultimately what I consider to be my “self” is influenced by, and informed by, that which is 
not actually within the limits of my selfhood. For example, would it make sense to talk of 
personality, as a way that we interact with other egos, without these other egos? Would it be 
possible for something like religion or a formal philosophy to exist at all without the constitution 
of the Other? Perhaps the most concerning problem would concern the origin of language itself. 
Without the Other, would language be possible at all? And without language, would conversion 
make any sense? For all of these reasons I take it to be clear that my experience of my self, and 
 
81 Ibid. §44, 98-99. 
82 Ibid., §43. 
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therefore my experience of the conversion phenomenon, requires on a fundamental level the 
Other. 
 
VI. The Essential Embodiment of the Converting Subject 
 
The sixth eidetic feature of the conversion experience concerns the essential embodiment 
involved therein. I have already shown that every conversion experience will require judgment, 
but here I will demonstrate that these judgments could not be made not only without world and 
the Other, but also embodiment. In fact, without embodiment, I would not be able to experience 
the world as environment. Furthermore, it is through bodily mediation that certain sensations that 
factor in the conversion experience are constituted. 
 In Ideas II Husserl characterizes the body as “organ of the will” and “seat of free 
movement.”83 What Husserl means is that the body is something that is, despite its material or 
physical nature, intrinsically linked to my will. In this respect it differs from other “objects.” In 
contrast to other objects, I have an “immediate and spontaneous” relationship with the object that 
is my body. This is why Husserl also refers to the body as “willing body.”84 With these words he 
refers to the fact that I enjoy a primary relation between my self and my body; when I want to 
move some part of my body, I simply will it in a direct and immediate fashion.85 It is this sense 
of the body, specifically as Leib rather than Körper, that is tantamount to the very center of all 
my life experience. The reason for this is that the body is “the medium of all perception; it is the 
 
83 Husserl, Ideas II §38, 159 <151-152>. 
84 Ibid., §54, 223 <212>. 
85 Here I am referring to the physiological norm; as Merleau-Ponty shows us with Schneider, 
there are certainly clinical exceptions to this embodied volitional immediacy.  
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organ of perception and is necessarily involved in all perception.”86 It follows that without the 
body, there is no perception of an external world. We can link this conception of the moving 
body, and of the sensing body as locus of all perception, to the conversion experience.  
 As we saw in the fifth chapter, there are several important respects in which embodied 
perception plays a role in conversion. First there is the critical role that my body plays in the 
constitution of consciousness. My consciousness is embodied consciousness, which means that 
my experience of outer as well as inner perception is influenced by my status as an embodied 
subject. I cannot imagine the experience of consciousness without the embodied basis that I 
presently enjoy. One implication of this is that I cannot imagine the experience of conversion 
without a body. It follows from this that the annihilation of my body would prevent me from 
experiencing a conversion—or at least, a conversion that remotely resembles the type that I can 
encounter in this embodied life of mine.  
 How does this relate to the judgments made by the converting subject? Recall that we 
have stated that the judgment(s) made by the converting subject are ones which have some 
bearing on the existential status of the convert. But since judgments are enacted by 
consciousness, and since consciousness is necessarily embodied, embodiment is an essential 
feature of the possibility of human judgment. This may seem counter-intuitive to the extent that I 
am fully capable of making judgments that do not regard physical or material issues. For 
example, these are the sort of judgments that I make when I employ “active rationality.” I have 
shown, however, that it is not clear how a conversion could occur solely on the basis of the use 
of active rationality. To the contrary conversion typically involves the use of relative rationality. 
Second, and more importantly, just because the object of a judgment is non-material “thing,” it 
 
86 Ibid., §18, 61 <56>. 
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does not follow from this that the judgment itself, as noesis, would be possible if my 
consciousness were not partly constituted on the basis of my physical organism. Using Husserl’s 
terminology, we can see how the body serves as a “hyletic” foundation for the determinative 
form that consciousness brings to the table. Certain biophysical conditions correlate with my 
experience of consciousness; while we cannot (in the phenomenological attitude) make 
ungrounded claims regarding the ontic status of my biophysical organism, we should also note 
that the way in which I live as such an organism is radically different in kind from any claim that 
I make about the existence of mind-independent material or physical objects in an external 
world. My body is not this type of object—it is mind-dependent. 
 Existential significance is always constituted in part along with the embodiment of the 
subject. In short who I “am” is not just a conceptual belief but to the contrary a belief that 
involves non-conceptual correlates such as my physical being. The relationship between mind 
and body is mutually constitutive; my sense of who I am entails a certain orientation with respect 
to the body. Husserl says, “[A] human being’s total consciousness is in a certain sense, by means 
of its hyletic substrate, bound to the Body.”87 I do not regard myself simply as an abstract, 
immaterial ego; as Marcel puts it, I am my body. My experience of consciousness is such that my 
very subjectivity is a unity that is comprised of body as well as mind. Thus, for the converting 
subject it is the case that every conversion experience entails not only a conversion of the mind 
or soul but also a conversion of the body. Perhaps the clearest example of this can be found in the 
case of Saint Paul, for whom bodily issues occupy a major concern subsequent to his conversion 
experience. We already saw Paul contend with practical body issues like circumcision. But Paul’s 
position on the matter of circumcision is actually only part of the much larger concern that Paul 
 
87 Ibid. §39, 160 <153>. 
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has with the body; specifically, after his conversion he thinks of himself as one with the Body of 
Christ. In other words, his physical self-understanding is restructured in such a way that he no 
longer approaches his own embodiment with the same schematization as before. Perhaps it 
would be instructive to include a more mundane example of this sort of “conversion of the body” 
that I maintain is involved in every conversion experience, including those which subsist outside 
of the limits of organized religion. Consider for example the way in which someone who 
“converts” to Marxism. This person does not just change their political and economic beliefs; he 
or she comes to view their body, and be a body, in a different manner. This convert certainly 
looks at his personal identity in a new way, specifically on the basis of class struggle. But part of 
this class struggle comes down to the exploitation of labor, which requires the body; without the 
body there is no labor, including even labor that involves no strenuous physical exertion. After 
all as I write out these remarks I am laboring. I need my hands, my eyes, my brain, and so on. If 
every conversion involves existential transformation, and every conversion is a conversion of the 
body, then existential transformation involves a change in the very constitution of embodied 
consciousness. 
 But we have to note that when this conversion of the body occurs, it is the product of 
interpretation on the part of the ego. In other words, this conversion of embodiment requires no 
necessary physical or material change to the subject (although it is certainly the case that such 
changes are possible). Instead, the reorientation of the body is the product, again, of judgment.  
 Second, we must address the sense in which the body is involved in the constitution of 
various sensations that accompany the conversion experience. We have already seen that often 
but not always conversion will involve certain embodied sensations, whether it is something that 
is seen, heard, or felt. Because a conversion experience, culminating in a judgment, is often 
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brought about by some instituting secondary noesis, whether it is a flash of bright light, a voice 
that is heard, or some sort of feeling, we can conclude that often it is the case that conversion 
begins with an embodied sensation. But in fact our final conclusion should be even more 
extreme; since, as we have seen, conversion requires the world, and since my experience in the 
world requires my embodiment, ultimately it is true that every conversion “begins” with the 
body, even in cases where some pre-judgmental noesis precedes the conversion proper. 
 Lastly, to the extent that the body is “seat of free movement,” without my body I could 
not experience the world in the same way. It is my body that permits me to move about the world 
and experience all that it has to offer. Thus it is apparent that without a body not only would it be 
impossible for me to have perceptions of the external world, but without a body I could not move 
about that same world. Therefore I would never be able to convert without being embodied. 
 But just as I could not convert without a body, I could never convert without temporality, 
which I will treat in the next section as the nature of its horizon is one of the eidetic features of 
all experience, including the conversion experience. 
 
VII. The Temporal Horizon of Conversion 
 
Elaborating on the nature of existential transformation itself, we find that it occurs on the basis of 
the unity of the pure ego and it requires the identity of this ego over time, manifest in time 
consciousness. In short this means that experience requires time, and conversion, as an 
experience, requires time in a general sense as well as a narrower sense. To the extent that 
conversion involves an existential transformation, this transformation requires a succession of 
temporal moments in order for said transformation to occur; to transform takes time. But we find 
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that the amount of time is wholly variable; as for the specific temporality within which the 
conversion occurs, it is the seventh eidetic feature of conversion that it involves no definite or 
determinate temporal limits at the level of the horizon. 
 A conversion can be the final result of a lifetime, or it can be a rapid and brief occurrence. 
The most important implication of this is that the distinction between the process-conversion and 
event-conversion fundamentally collapses within the stream of conscious time. 
Phenomenologically speaking, the process conversion is just a specific type of extended event 
that occurs over a longer duration of time.88 It is the ego that constitutes this phenomenological 
time, the flow of which makes conversion a possible experience. This is furthermore 
compounded by the fact that conversion is a phenomenon that transcends a single conscious 
instant; as transformation, it requires a wider temporal context in order for the transformative 
change to be traceable.  
  This phenomenological time does not appear to me as differentiated—this is precisely 
why it is characterized as a stream or flow, every aspect of which is comprised of 
undifferentiated constituent parts, unlike a single drop (or even molecule) of water. Thus, in the 
phenomenological attitude, there is no “material” difference between the event conversion and 
the process conversion. In the phenomenological attitude the difference between the two is 
entirely relative considered in light of my reflection upon the onset of time. In other words, any 
supposed difference in the two appearances is merely the product of my own judgment regarding 
the matter.   
 
88 Even delimiting the phenomenological duration of an “event” proves to be difficult. There are 
certain situations for which I can set some specific threshold as the temporal boundary between 
an event and a process, but my selection of such a figure would be wholly arbitrary. 
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 There is another important temporal feature of conversion in essence. It concerns the 
temporal noema of the future, what Jay Lampert refers to as a “futural noema.”89 We have 
already reviewed another aspect of Lampert’s decision theory of conversion, even as it regards 
the way in which the converting subject contends with his or her future, but here I would like to 
take up another angle of Lampert’s theory. Following his account of the way in which any given 
decision “projects” into multiple timelines in the future, I maintain that this defines some 
conversions but not all; I suggest that sometimes conversion actually closes off and narrows the 
scope of possibilities in the future. In other words, conversion is not always an open-ended event. 
I will attempt to prove this shortly.   
 First let us sketch another portion of Lampert’s argument. He focuses on decisions as 
evocative phenomena; in short, the way in which they are given is such that they disclose 
something about the future. To disclose something about the future is to disclose something 
about the nature of temporality, at least, temporality as we experience it. According to Lampert 
the central disclosure regarding temporality is that the consequences of a decision are 
indeterminate. This relates to time insofar as this contrasts with the ordinary assumption in the 
natural attitude that time is something that is linear, which is actually only the case for a “simple” 
decision vis-à-vis an “open-ended” decision. If Lampert is right, insofar as most of the decisions 
that are consequential for the meaning of our lives are open-ended rather than simple, then time 
is a web or series of branches, not a straight line. Time looks like such a web insofar as any given 
decision has an indeterminate effect or outcome. But furthermore any given decision is subject to 
the effects that subsequent decisions will bear. The end result is a web of possible future 
 
89 Lampert, Many Futures, 10. 
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outcomes, all of which are interrelated and “virtual,” which is to say, projected and not (yet) 
actual.  
So for our current inquiry the first question is whether the conversion experience is 
futurally virtual or indeterminate, which is to say, open-ended or not. I grant that I have indicated 
already that a conversion cannot be reduced to a decision (in lieu of a judgment) but we should 
remind ourselves that I also indicated that every judgment does require a decision in the sense of 
willing.   
To be fair, the only case in which I can see a conversion of this nature (namely, one that 
opens up future possibilities instead of precluding them) would be a philosophical conversion 
wherein one made the judgment that this theory regarding conversion is first, true, likely true, or 
at the very least thoroughly reasonable, and second, is something the position-taking of which 
bears existential significance for the subject, either consciously or according to sedimentation. 
Phrased this way, this sounds like a conversion to a variety of existentialism that centers upon 
rhizomatically unfolding future possibilities.  
In contrast to this account of conversion, the temporality of which constructs a “future 
composed of multiple, virtual time lines,” my sense of conversion is that its temporal effect is 
such that, while it does not eliminate outright all multiple future timelines, nevertheless it does 
reduce their number. We can see this play out in the present as well as the future. Before the 
subject experiences a conversion, it (viz., conversion) was just one possibility out of an 
innumerable sum of possibilities. Conversion is something that could potentially occur for me. 
But once the conversion occurs and therefore shifts from that which is merely possible or 
potential, to that which is actual, at least some of the other, “old” possibilities are no longer 
possible, at least not at that specific time and place and for that specific subject, insofar as the 
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moment of the act has passed as what was present but is now past. This is also true for the 
possibilities of the future, however. When someone converts to some specific religion, spiritual 
worldview, or even philosophy, this conversion is guiding the course of their future in such a way 
that some possible situations are rendered impossible. By ‘impossible’ I refer to the state of no 
longer being part of the causal trajectory that follows from the converting act as “source” or, 
better yet, a determinant of the future. For example, if I convert to Christianity this will have an 
effect on how my future plays out. The effect need not be drastic or even something about which 
I have knowledge. The point is that the conversion itself will drive the course of future events for 
me. 
 I suggest that the temporality of conversion is indeed fascinating, but not according to 
how it pertains to the future, but rather, the way in which we see it play out in the present as well 
as the past. The temporal indeterminacy of conversion, I argue, is sourced in these two divisions 
of time rather than the future. Conversion is temporally indeterminate for several reasons. First, 
there is no set number of changes which can be considered phenomenologically sufficient for 
conversion, no “tipping point” at which a conversion “occurs” for the subject with empirical 
certainty. Since we experience consciousness as a dynamic stream of moments rather than as a 
sequence of discrete “dominoes” or conscious snapshots, there is no phenomenologically valid 
procedure for isolating in time the supposedly precise moment at which the ego converts. 
Without a doubt, in some cases the subject will be aware of this moment. But across all cases we 
can be sure that this is not always the case. It could be objected that a judgment, which I have 
suggested is eidetically necessary for conversion to occur, occurs at some specific and precise 
time. Logically speaking this is true. According to logic alone, the conversion definitively 
“occurs” when the relevant judgment is made. But ultimately, I think that his line of thought is 
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mistaken, and I think that it is rather misleading to present conversion as something that occurs 
as if through a threshold such as I here describe, because in at least some cases, this is not how 
conversion plays out. Insofar as this is a phenomenology of conversion, I have to exclude the 
particularities of any given conversion experience and focus on what is truly essential. I have 
already addressed the extent to which sedimentation plays a crucial role in the constitution of the 
subject and therefore any of the judgments that he makes. But there is a second move to make 
here. I think that it is likely that at least some conversions occur on the basis of a set of 
judgments rather than just one. Perhaps it is tempting to declare that in such cases, it is the final 
judgment that brings about the conversion. This cannot be right, though, because that final 
judgment required all of the antecedent judgments (or secondary noeses, for that matter) in order 
to occur. Thus it makes much more sense to talk of such a conversion as a gradual process with 
multiple constitutive aspects, instead of some single instant. That said, I do think that conversion 
can be instant like that. The issue, phenomenologically speaking, is that if conversion is 
sometimes instant but sometimes not instant, this means that its temporal unfolding is eidetically 
indeterminate. It is a fluid process that occurs in flux; there may be great divergence in how time 
affects any two given conversions.  
 
The Phenomenological Fundamentality of Conversion 
 
In conclusion I would like to stress that the conversion experience is grounded in 
phenomenological subjectivity itself. I know that I have dismissed neuroscientific studies of 
religious belief that specifically focus on the human predisposition for religious belief. I 
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indicated that I was not able to derive phenomenological conclusions from these studies. That is 
still true. 
 But now I think that I am able to draw a very similar conclusion regarding conversion 
(where the conclusion is, informally, that we appear to be “hard-wired” for the experience of 
conversion). I suggest that this hard-wiring is phenomenological in a constitutive sense. 
Conversion is something that we are prone to experience simply on the status of our being as 
transcendental subjects. Maybe it is for that reason something that is not just possible but even 
likely or probable for us.  
I realize that it may seem odd or even illicit to attempt to use phenomenological methods 
to grasp an inductive conclusion regarding the probability of conversion occurring. Ultimately, 
though, I maintain that this is true for phenomenological reasons. The eidetic features of 
conversion are such that they encompass many of the most fundamental features of 
consciousness itself as a totality. The structure of the conversion phenomenon, I suggest, is 
embedded in the very conditions of consciousness on a basic and fundamental level. In other 
words there is a fundamentally symmetrical relation between consciousness and the conversion 
phenomenon.  
From its basis in judgment, the world, the Other, and a time that is both futurally 
determinate and otherwise indeterminate, we can see how conversion encompasses many of the 
most common and essential aspects of consciousness in general. But furthermore we find that 
there is a fundamental link between the phenomenon of conversion and the interpretive nature of 
self-constitutive consciousness. To say that self-constitutive consciousness if of an interpretive 
nature is to suggest that the synthesis that consciousness carries out is comprised of innumerable 
interpretive acts that ultimately ground the very progression of consciousness itself. 
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Consciousness sustains itself on the basis of its own endeavor to grasp meaning and 
retain that meaning over the duration of time. Therefore we can construe conversion as a sort of 
experience that corresponds to our sense of existential significance (in terms of identity or role), 
as a sort of self-fashioning. The judging acts that a conversion involves are such that the subject 
is essentially “making” himself or herself in the course of carrying out these relevant acts. Thus 
we should note that the meanings with which consciousness is concerned do not just regard the 
truths that are supposedly “out there” in the “external” world, but even more importantly, the 
meaning of personal identity, of self-experience, the answer to the perennial question “who am 
I?”   
Indeed to convert is to undergo a shift or change in the way in which one interprets 
oneself, with the rather paradoxical caveat that, thanks to sedimented meaning and knowledge, 
this self-interpretation is not always the object of the converting subject’s conscious awareness. 
But as we have seen, insofar as the subject must make judgments in order for a conversion to 
occur, at least some portion of the conversion process is volitional, which is to say, conscious and 
deliberate. No one can coerce the consciousness of the Other to reconstitute itself against its will. 
The conversion in the name of the Other is not a conversion at all; while conversion requires the 
world and the Other in order to be possible, ultimately every conversion must be the result of 
consciousness’s own will. 
In closing I cannot help but wonder if there are other aspects of human experience that 
are similarly embedded in the phenomenological conditions of our conscious lives. If not, then is 
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